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


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









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RIVER



Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec

A Critical Study

Together with a Reprint of Arnold's Journal


By

Justin H. Smith

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With Facsimile Maps and Plan

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1903





Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec

A Critical Study

Together with a Reprint of Arnold's Journal

By

Justin H. Smith

Professor of Modern History, Dartmouth College; Author of "The Troubadours at Home," "The Prologue of the American Revolution," "A Tale of Two Worlds and Five Centuries," etc.

With Eighteen Maps and Plans

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Published, July, 1903



TO MY FRIEND
THE HONOURABLE CHARLES T. GALLAGHER
OF BOSTON
WHO HAS FOUND TIME IN THE
ACTIVE PRACTICE OF THE LAW TO CULTIVATE
LETTERS AND ART
AND TO SERVE THE PUBLIC IN MANY
POSITIONS OF TRUST AND HONOUR



PREFACE

IT seems very singular that no thorough-going history of the American invasion of Canada in 1775 and 1776 has yet been written. This may be due partly to a preconceived idea that nothing of real importance was involved in it, partly to the fact that in appearance the campaigns proved a total failure, and partly to the prominence of the ill-starred Arnold from beginning to end.

On turning my attention to this neglected field, I soon discovered that Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec would have to be studied as if nothing had ever been written upon it. When the data for this inquiry were mostly in hand, the announcement of a book on the subject appeared, and seemed to promise an escape from the labour of clearing so much of the way. The promise was not perfectly fulfilled, however, as may be discovered from the notes of the present volume; and

now, after a number of delays, the results of my investigations are offered. The purpose here is to ascertain facts, not paint a picture; and the foliage of the subject has been ignored.

I wish it were feasible to acknowledge in detail my indebtedness to the hundreds of persons who have courteously given me items of information. After beginning a list of their names, I have felt that it would be unfair to stop short of completeness; and a complete list would be hard to make as well as too long for any one to read. Let me record a general but sincere acknowledgment of obligation and of gratitude.

Mention must be made, however, of the

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To this list should rightfully be added the names of a very large number of persons, from whom the author has received valuable items of information relating particularly to family history, local history, and local topography; see the Preface.



Arnold's March to Quebec

INTRODUCTION

LATE in the summer of 1775, General Schuyler moved against Canada by the way of Lake Champlain; and, to meet this attack, General Carleton, the British Governor, concentrated his forces near Montreal. At this time Washington felt able to spare a portion of the troops besieging Boston, and he concluded to despatch a small force under Benedict Arnold through the Kennebec Valley against Quebec, hoping either to gain possession of the Canadian capital, or to aid Schuyler by drawing Carleton to its defence.

The route of Arnold's detachment lay through an unknown region, a wilderness; and it would be a fascinating as well as difficult problem simply to disentangle the facts of the march, and so clear the way to a sound history of the expedition. Where did the gates of the wilderness open and close upon these daring

patriots? What lakes were furrowed by their keels? At what bastion did they storm the granite wall of the Appalachians? How did they surmount the difficulties of the way, and what were the steps of their progress?

But questions of still greater moment are involved in our inquiry. The march itself was a campaign,—a campaign against the forest and the flood, against fatigue, sickness, and famine. The contest proved close and pitiless, and the issue remained long in doubt. In so keen a struggle, the smallest of circumstances was enough to throw the victory this way or that. We cannot understand it at all unless we understand it thoroughly; and therefore every detail not only enlists attention and repays interest

I

THE ROUTE BEFORE ARNOLD

A STUDY of the route that Arnold followed might go back a long way, for the geology of the region predestined an expedition like his; but it will be more convenient and quite as useful to begin with attempts at the delineation of it. It is very curious to observe how the truth about this highway between south and north glimmered and faded for many years, before coming clearly out in the full light of knowledge; and it is worth while to see how the region was represented on a few maps out of the many which have been examined.

We may begin with a map of North America preserved in the French Navy Department.[1] * Both the Kennebec and the Chaudière are here beaded with a lake, and a straight waterway lies between them. The drawing is undated, but internal evidence proves that it was done no later than the year 1682. In 1698,

* The "superior figures" refer to notes, which will be found at the conclusion of the text.

however, Hubert Jaillot dedicated to the Dauphin a map that parted the two rivers, though in other respects it was no doubt incorrect enough. After another interval of about the same length, John Senex, of the Royal Society of London, produced a chart in which the separation of the St. Lawrence basin from that of the Atlantic Ocean was emphasised (1710). Guillaume Delisle[2] followed this fashion presently in two maps published at Paris (1722 and 1750), and in one issued at Amsterdam.[3] The Sieur d'Anville in his map of 1746 adhered to the same opinion.

Two maps of 1755 show still further enlightenment. John Mitchell of London drew some

extremely proper for a fort which would restrain y^e^ French and curb y^e^ Abenaki Indians."


The next year marks a reaction. In 1756 Nolin, in his *Carte du Canada*, induced a continuous line of water to connect the Kennebec with the St. Lawrence at Quebec, for, as this indicates, the old opinion had not yet quite expired; but Seale, the engraver of an English map dated New Year's Day, 1771, followed wiser counsels, and refrained from joining the Kennebec and the Chaudière.

In 1776 appeared "A New Map of the Province of Quebec . . . from the French Surveys connected with those made after the war [of 1754–1763] by Captain Carver and other officers in his Majesty's Service." It was printed for Robert Sayer and John Bennett, and bore the engraved date: "16th February, 1776."

Of course Arnold had then crossed the wilderness, and had proved certain things about its topography; but none of the geographical fruits of this expedition can be supposed to have made their way into a London map of that date. Confirmation of this view is found in the fact that on August 14th of the same year Sayer and Bennett appeared with a new map; and in this, not only were there substantial changes,

but an attempt was made to indicate "Arnold's rout." The map of February 16th is thus of special interest as illustrating the opinions about this region accepted by well informed cartographers at the time Arnold set out, and for that reason a portion of it is reproduced here.

Dated the very next month (March 25, 1776), we find a map that bears these words: "Middle British Colonies in North America, first published by Mr. Lewis Evans of Philadelphia in 1755, and since corrected and improved, as also extended, . . . by T. Pownall, M. P." Here we observe Dead River drawn fairly near the truth, with a lake at the extreme end, and not far from it a


FROM CARVER'S MAP,
16TH FEBRUARY, 1778.
les Trois Rivieres
LAKE
ST.
PETER
R. St. Francis
ABENAQUIS
ARUSEGUNTEKOOKS
KENEBECKIS
Lake Memorobka
or
Memphrimagog
Fort St. John
Fort Halifax
Ouramaska
Norridgewock
Wiaudi R.
Mississquoi R.
Missisquoi Bay
Richelieu
Montreal
Chambly
St. Johns Falls
Fike R.
Lake R.
1st Fall
2d Fall
Yamaska R.
Chaudiere R.
Kennebeck R.
ASIKS




some of them could draw a little, as even the most illiterate of guides can do to-day. Better yet, they could tell a white man how to draw; and there is a map in the possession of the Historical Society at Skowhegan, Maine, drawn in this way by Major Goodwin of our army in 1825, that shows about what the process might be expected to produce,—a rough but valuable sketch. White men also traversed these forests occasionally. French missionaries, and in particular Jesuits, came down from Quebec to labour among the savages. As a regularly settled missionary in the Kennebec wilderness, Gabriel Dreuillettes stands first in order. About the middle of the seventeenth century he found himself domiciled among the Abenakis.[5] His intercourse with Quebec must have been somewhat constant, and we know that he twice went south to Boston.[6] Near the close of the century, the Fathers Bigot were often among the Indians of Maine, and one of them appears to have been a regular missionary in the Kennebec region. Most famous of them all, Sébastien Râle[7] dwelt among his dusky converts on the banks of the Kennebec, in the very track that Arnold followed, for many years, and must have been well acquainted with every Indian path to Quebec.

From the French, at least, these missionaries had no reason to conceal their knowledge, and many hints must have reached the cartographers in this way.

Other sources existed. Thomas Jefferys in his Explanation for the New Map of Nova Scotia (1755) said:

"The Remainder of the Kennebek to its Head, where it interlocks with the La Chaudière, and also the course of this last River to its Exit in the River St. Lawrence, is taken from an Eye-draught made by a French Deserter in 1754."

Pownall, as we have already hinted, possessed special information, and it seems worth while to quote what he said in his Topo-



MAP
Dictated by an Indian
TO
MAJOR GOODWIN.
1825



was supposed to be by an Indian Path and Carrying-place, which, going off from Kenebaëg about Eight or 10 miles above Noridgewaëg, in a North West Course of Six or Seven Miles came to a Pond which issued into the River Chaudière. Some such Information had been given to Government ; it was of the utmost Importance that Government should not be misled. In the year 1756, I had an Opportunity of inquiring into this Matter by scrutinizing a Journal given to me and signed by Capt. Hobbs and Lieut. Kenedy ; and by examining the Journalists themselves as to the Authority of the Particulars, I found enough to be convinced that this supposed Pass was mere conjecture, taken upon trust of Bartholemon, an Indian, who was found to be false and a Spy, and was in 1755 shot by our own People as he was attempting to desert. Government therefore was early cautioned against this misinformation. When I was Governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay [1757–1760], I had this Rout particularly investigated by Ensign Howard, a Country surveyor, under the Direction of Capt. Nichols, who commanded at Fort Frederick. Instead of a short pass of some Eight or 10 Miles of easy Portage, this Indian Path turned out to be a Rout, on a Line as a Bird flies, of near 50 Miles over Land, *impracticable to an Army that hath a Train of Artillery and heavy Baggage.* It appeared, however, that (although a difficult and very laborious Rout) it was practicable to any Body of Men who should go light armed, as a Scouting Party, either to reconnoitre or to break up settlements. The sort of March which Arnold and his People experienced, has confirmed this Account given 17 or 18 years ago. . . .

"This River Kenebaëg, to begin from its principal Branch, may be described as rising on the Height of the

Land in North Latitude 45° 20′, and in East Longitude from Philadelphia 5° 10′ or thereabouts; its source is from a little Pond, and the first Courses of its Birth a Succession of Ponds or drowned Lands, Swamps, and Falls. Its first general Course is 30 miles South East, it then makes a great Bow, whose string (lying East and by South and West and by North) is 12 miles.[8] It then runs North-easterly Nine Miles and an Half, and then tumbling over falls North East 10 Miles joins the North Branch.

"The North Branch is said (I speak not here from the same Degree of Authority) to arise in and issue from a little Pond about 16 Miles North of this Crotch, from whence (it is likewise said) there is a Carrying-place of 13 or 14 Miles to an Eastern Branch of the Chaudière River. This was represented to me as the shortest Rout to Canada, but I do not find in my Journals that I have set this down as confirmed or sufficiently authenticated. After these Two Branches join

this was the Indian Dwelling of the Tribe of that Name. A little below are the Falls.

"The River then runs in a winding Course Five Miles East, and at the Point where it turns again South the River Wesseronsaëg[8] comes in from the North East. Keeping on the same Course 12 or 14 Miles more it comes to Tachonaëg Falls,[10] below which Sebastoocoög[11] comes into it, from a Pond bearing North East and distant about 25 Miles: In the Fork between these two Streams Mr. Shirley built Fort Halifax. From hence the River runs in a course South-westerly 17 Miles to Cushnoög[12]; here is a little Blockhouse called Fort Western. The Fall at Cushnoög is the Head of Tide Water; Sloops of 90 Tons Burthen come up hither from Sea. . . .

"To describe next the River Kenebaëg as a Rout to Quebeck: in the first Place the Reader has been told that Sloops of 90 Tons Burthen can go up to Cheshnoög Falls,[13] about 30 Miles from Small Point. From thence to Fort Hallifax at Tackonic Falls,[10] 17 Miles, is a Waggon Road. Thence a certain Degree of Navigation for Bateaux takes Place, which is interrupted by Falls and Rapids below Norridgewaëg, at which Places all Baggage must be again carried over Land, where a Waggon Road might be made between the Hills and the River. Half a Mile above Noridgewaëg there is a sharp Fall, but for that a good Waggon Road might be made quite up to the Great Carrying-place.

"Hence the Indian Path goes off West from the River over Land about Four Miles and a half to a Pond about Three Quarters of a Mile long; a good Waggon Road might be made here: This First Pond has been found to issue its Waters into the Kenebaëg. Hence the Path runs over like Grounds West-Northerly about a Mile,

and comes to a Second Pond ; this has been found to issue its Waters into Sagadahoc River.[13] Hence, over the like Land and in the same Course about a Mile More it comes to a Third Pond, which, issuing its Waters to the North and falling into a river which runs North-easterly, gave rise to the Misinformation that here went the Rout to Canada by Chaudière ; but the River which this Pond Empties itself into is found to be the Kenebaëg,[14] which in this place runs North-easterly; from this Pond the Path runs West-northerly near Four Miles, and strikes the southern-most Bend of this Main Branch[15] of Kenebaëg; up this stream there may be an imperfect Navigation for Indians, and Traders or Hunters, somewhat better in the Time of Freshets, but both the Navigation is bad and the travelling, between high Ranges of Mountains and in swampy boggy Vales, very troublesome to Individuals, very arduous and almost impracticable to Bodies of Men. When you get higher towards the Source of the River you come to a

Kennebec. As soon as the conquest of Canada was secure (1760), General Murray, the British commander, resolved to investigate the Chaudière Valley and its communications with the Kennebec, and the very next year John Montresor, an able officer, destined to become the King's Chief Engineer for America, was despatched with a party of Indians to inspect the region. He accomplished his task, drew a map, and wrote a journal.[17] Later the map and an imperfect draft of the journal fell into the hands of Benedict Arnold; and later still they both fall into ours. In the course of our inquiries we shall very probably need to consult them.

Not long after Montresor made this reconaissance from Quebec back again to Quebec, an expedition went north from the opposite side of the mountains. In 1764 the Massachusetts Bay Company sent a well organised surveying party under John Preble up the Penobscot, with instructions to see whether a road could not be made that way to Quebec. January 1, 1765, the party returned to Fort Pownall, on the Penobscot, and reported in substance that such a road was not practicable. Incidentally, the report mentioned the Indian route by way of the Chaudière and the Dead

Rivers, and on Captain Preble's map it was indicated, or, more exactly, suggested.[18]

This brings us pretty near to the time of Arnold's expedition, and the next step reaches it. Montresor's narrative mentioned another source of information about the Dead River route,— New England surveyors. One of these bore the name of Goodwin and the title Major; and the following letter shows not only that he possessed sketches and minutes of the region, but that Arnold had the use of both.

"POWNALBOROUGH [MAINE].
"October 17, 1775.

"TO HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE WASHINGTON, ESQ.

"SIR:

have a copy of said plan, etc., and then you would be a judge of what would be best to be done. It hath been a great cost and labour to me to obtain those plans, etc., and make them. Sir, if you think it worth your notice, and will give orders therefor, I will copy one for you, and wait on you with it, and give you the best intelligence I can, as I think I know as much of this country as any one, as I have been travelling, surveying, and settling this part, ever since the year 1750. . . .

"SAMUEL GOODWIN."[20]

"N. B. Mr. Reuben Colburn informed me you wanted a plan. I thus began it about 3 weeks before Col. Arnold arrived."

All these things, taken together, show that a good deal was known, in a rough way, of the Dead River passage into Canada before Arnold made it famous. But a military use of the route,— was that ever considered? Botta says: "Not only no army was ever known to pass through these rough and dismal solitudes, but never had human being until then [*i. e.*, until Arnold went], imagined it was possible."[21] Yet it is wonderful how few things men do that were not thought of by other men: was Arnold's enterprise an exception?

In 1697 Iberville proposed to attack Boston by way of the Chaudière, "bursting from the woods with one thousand Canadians and six hundred regulars," as he wrote in a *Mémoire*,

Five years later, Saint Castin took up this plan, and offered to make the expedition with fourteen hundred good men.[22] In the long quotation from Pownall's Topographical Description, the author stated that in 1754 and 1755 it was proposed to invade Canada by way of the Kennebec; and we know that in December of the latter year, Shirley of Massachusetts definitely suggested, in a council of Governors held at New York, to menace Quebec by that route. Roy affirms[23] that during the campaign of 1756 the English actually decided to send two thousand men up the Kennebec and down the Chaudière against the Canadian capital, but that after Montcalm took Oswego the plan was dropped. Pownall

natural route. On the north a post of fusileers was stationed in the valley of the Chaudière to guard against the danger[25]; and on the south the selectmen of Falmouth (Portland), disturbed by a rumour that arrived on the last day of April, sent three men of New Gloucester, with Remington Hobby and John Getchell, of Vassalboro, to "ascertain if any Frenchmen were in motion, or any of the savages were preparing to ravage the frontier settlements."[26] Indeed, an expedition against Quebec by way of the Chaudière was actually proposed in 1775 by Jonathan Brewer, some while before Arnold or Washington seems to have thought of it.[27] Evidently there was nothing very esoteric in the thought of using this route.

Just how all the ideas about this way into Canada came to be crystallised into the expedition under Arnold's command, is a question that lies outside our present field. What seems important is to show that before our American soldiers took ship for the Kennebec, people knew a good deal about this route, and thought of it as available for military uses; and probably facts enough have been cited to establish these points. It only remains to show that in spite of this, all their information

was crude and inexact up to the very day of Arnold's departure. Carver's map is evidence enough, probably, so far as the general intelligent public are concerned; and a letter of the American Commander-in-chief to the American Congress reveals that men the most interested and the best informed had no realization of the actual difficulties.

"CAMP AT CAMBRIDGE,
"September 21, 1775.

"TO CONTINENTAL CONGRESS:

". . . I am now to inform the Honourable Congress that, encouraged by the repeated declarations of the Canadians and Indians, and urged by their requests, I have detached Col. Arnold, with one thousand men, to penetrate into Canada by way of Kennebeck River, and, if possible, to make himself master of Quebeck. . . .

meet Jaconick Falls,[10] and from Jaconick Falls to Norridgewock, as the river runs, thirty-one miles; from thence to the first carrying place about thirty miles; carrying place four miles, then a pond to cross, and another carrying place, about two miles to another pond; then a carrying place about three or four miles to another pond; then a carrying place to the western branch of Kennebeck River, called the Dead River; then up that river, as it runs, thirty miles, some small falls and short carrying places around them intervening; then you come to the height of the land, and about six miles carrying place, into a branch which leads into Ammeguntick Pond,[4] the head of the Chaudière River, which falls into the St. Lawrence River about four miles above Quebeck."

II

THE WITNESSES

HAND-CAMERAS were unfortunately not in existence in 1775, and we have no photographs of scenes along the route; but pens and paper were familiar articles, and a number of the soldiers felt moved to use them. In short, a good many reports of the march have come to us from members of the expedition, besides various items and

published in book form as early as 1812, while few of the others got into print until many years later, or have ever come before the general public. And, finally, the high character and standing of the author seemed to place the seal of truth, and certainly did place the seal of honesty, upon its face. For us, however, Henry's tale, though still the most enjoyable of all, perhaps, has a number of defects. He was only a boy of sixteen when he joined the expedition, and his lack of rank barred him from the circle of the officers.

His book was not written until he stood at the very close of his life, thirty-six years after the occurrences he narrated. Indeed, it was not written by him at all, but dictated to his daughter, though he had been working on the subject more or less for several years. "Casual notes and memoranda" he was aided by, we are told, and so we can well believe; but evidently memory supplied by far the greater part of his account. In fact, the Pennsylvania Historical Society has a letter written by Henry to General Francis Nichols, November 29, 1808, in which he says of his proposed book: "It's detailed principally from my own memory, assisted by the notes of Genl. Meigs and Wm. McCoy," and

certain questions that Henry asked Nichols prove that his recollection was in places extremely defective. The author died without revising his manuscript, and his grandson tells us that it was not very carefully printed. For all these reasons Henry's journal seems to merit only a low place as an authority on questions of detail, and a close examination of it proves the justice of this opinion, although good reasons appear for believing that certain things fixed themselves very definitely in his memory.

The first rank must certainly be given to the one extant journal that has never been printed in full until now. That is Arnold's.[2]

Arnold was a man of unusual intelligence,

justified the means, and it is quite possible that we may find some evidence of intentional misrepresentation on his part. But there was little call for this on the march through the wilderness, and especially little concerning the matters that chiefly interest us; so that Arnold's journal is certainly of prime importance.

A pendent to this narrative is the record of the early weeks of the march[3] signed by Arnold's secretary, Captain Eleazer Oswald.[4] Force has printed this, and we shall have to accept his version, for the original has disappeared from our sight. The journal is similar in character and value to Arnold's own; indeed, Oswald wrote in Arnold's name, and used the pronoun of the first person as Arnold would have done.

Next in value stands, probably, the diary of Captain Dearborn.[5] The writer was not only a leader in the expedition, but he was a man of unusual ability. Later in life he figured as Secretary of War, Major-General, Commander-in-chief of the army, Collector of Customs at Boston, and Minister to Portugal. The manuscript[6] of his journal as it now exists dates from March 25, 1777, and is not in his own writing, though it bears his

name. But we have several journals of other events from his hand, and we naturally infer that he kept an account of the march to Quebec, and later had it copied by a good penman. The manuscript shows corrections, which Mellen Chamberlain, who took a special interest in autographs, declared were Dearborn's. The journal is therefore a first-rate authority, though not quite so good as if it were an original day-by-day record.

Less full, complete, and precise, but still of excellent character, is the testimony of Major Meigs, an intrepid soldier and able officer. Dearborn and Meigs appear to have compared notes, and each may have derived information from the other.[7]

copy given to Stiles by Josiah Meigs; but it must be admitted that we do not positively know these things, nor how carefully the printing was done.

The need of reserve is emphasised by finding the journal, as printed in the *Remembrancer*, quite different in style. Evidently Almon did not receive the manuscript from the author, for his name is given as Robert Meigs. It was doubtless from a copy that the printer worked, and a copy not always accurate. But the style of this journal is that of a soldier of 1775, while the style of the journal printed by the Massachusetts Historical Society is that of an instructor in Yale College. In short, one may believe that in the latter we have Major Meigs's original faithfully and intelligently edited.[9] The date of publication in the *Remembrancer* proves that this journal was composed at about the time the events occurred.

Next in order should come, probably, the surgeon of the army, Dr. Senter.[10] He, too, proved a somewhat notable person, for when he died, at the early age of forty-six, he possessed a national—even an international—reputation among those of his profession. Senter was for the times a fairly well educated man, and this fact distinguishes his journal from

a number of the others; but he was young, he betrayed occasionally the inattention of the talkative person, he was not an officer nor even a military man, he was prevented by his duties from closely observing many facts, and there are striking instances of error and even carelessness. The fulness of his account gives it an appearance of accuracy above its real merit. The authenticity of the journal is beyond question. One curious fact is sufficient proof. Senter was very proud of a certain letter that he received from Benedict Arnold, and states in his journal that it was on the opposite page. This letter has been abstracted from the manuscript, but the place where it was attached is evident. This assures us that we

before Arnold went over to the British (1780), for after that Senter would not have shown pride in his letter. As in other such cases, the author probably made notes as he went, and afterward wrote them out, with some or more likely many additions from memory. An element of uncertainty is therefore to be reckoned with. The printed version [11] is substantially correct, but contains a good many trivial and some important departures from the manuscript.

Besides this, another document attributed to Senter exists, which may be called Senter's Account. It is now the property of the Rhode Island Historical Society, and has not yet been printed. It was given to the Society by a descendant of Dr. Senter, and the natural inference from this fact would be in favour of its authenticity. But it had not been long in the possession of the family; it had had turned up among the papers of Governor Francis, and was forwarded to Senter's granddaughter without careful examination, under the impression that it was the original of the Pennsylvania publication just mentioned. That, however, it is not, by any means.

Still the document seems clearly the work of Senter. There is an extremely close similarity

in substance between this and his journal, combined with great independence as to phrasing. We find statements, errors, and expressions in both which we do not meet with elsewhere. Either Senter wrote both, or some unknown author used the journal as the basis for his Account. To accept the latter alternative would require us to believe, not only that this unknown author gave himself extreme trouble to disguise what he took, and even went so far as to invent curious details, but that he then proceeded to defeat himself by imitating certain unmistakable peculiarities of his original. This would be a psychological absurdity, not to say impossibility, and one cannot imagine an adequate motive for such a

served in the expedition as a captain. His diary, annotated by E. M. Stone, has been published, but the editor permitted himself a great number of slight departures from the manuscript, with some of considerable significance. The second is the narrative of John Topham,[14] also a captain, whose residence was Newport. He and Thayer were close friends apparently, and certainly they often joined as comrades in difficult and perilous undertakings. Topham's manuscript, belonging now to his grandson, is mainly in good preservation still, but October 6th is the beginning and May 23d the end of what can be read. It is supposed to be in the Captain's handwriting. I have not been able to find anything certainly traced by his pen to compare with it, yet, in view of the clear family tradition, there seems no good reason to doubt its paternity.

Next, however, appears a manuscript, never listed before among our sources of information, I believe, that must be taken account of. It bears the signature of William Humphrey,[15] a Providence man, who marched as lieutenant in Thayer's company. The document seems clearly to come from him. That is also the family tradition; and this tradition is the more valuable because he lived until 1832, and his

wife until 1843. Now a comparison between Thayer and Topham reveals at once remarkable similarities; and when Humphrey is considered, it is even more evident that we are not in the presence of three independent accounts.

It will be convenient to compare Humphrey and Thayer together first. The simple fact that both make the error of placing Beverly between Cambridge and Malden — an error found nowhere else — is enough to prove a connection; but this is only one out of innumerable resemblances. We next inquire which was the basal document. It is evident at once that Humphrey employs a rougher style than Thayer.[16] Now if Thayer reworked

able to make any other way but by wading through the water in which situation, we were obliged to remain without vituals or drink untill the next morning about 9 o'clock exhausted with both cold and fatigue reach'd the detachment as they were beginning their march.

" the storm abated the river rose 6 feet perpendicular and ran exceeding rapid. the sun rose with a little rain but soon grew fair, & we embark'd on board our Bateaus & after going about 6 miles against the current which ran at least 5 miles an hour, came to a carrying-place, entirely overflowed, that our Bateaus went trough the woods without the trouble of carrying them advanced about 50 Rodds and encamp'd."

According to this record, Thayer went two day's journeys on the same day,— one on the shore and one on the river. We might attempt to explain this apparent absurdity by assuming that the first paragraph had reference to events of the 21st. But Thayer and the others give no hint of moving on the 21st. In fact they mention how they employed themselves in camp, and Senter, who reached the camp on that day recorded : " At sunset we arrived at the encampment of Col. Greene & his division, who were waiting for provisions." Turning now to Humphrey, we find that his record is almost word for word like the second paragraph above, but rougher in style. We see, therefore, how Thayer came to have

it. Plainly, he composed his journal by smoothing Humphrey's, adding his personal experiences, and giving in some cases his fuller knowledge. A curious illustration of the latter change is Thayer's reporting the number of men despatched for a certain purpose, while Humphrey wrote: "The number I do not know." The value of Thayer's journal is somewhat lessened by this discovery of his indebtedness; and yet not necessarily very much, for he was a witness of nearly all the events of his journal; and, even if he used Humphrey's statements, he gave them, to a great extent, as his personal testimony.

Topham's journal resembles Humphrey's even more closely, perhaps, than Thayer's has

Encamped 20 rods from the pond." Our first question is, why did not Topham say "I" in the first sentence? In other places he did not hesitate to speak of himself in the first person. Our next is, why does he not mention October 26th? And our third might well be, where were the carrying-places,—on the river or on the pond? All these inquiries appear to be answered by a quotation from Humphrey:

"[Oct.] 25. . . . Here Col Green Capt Topham & Thayre stay'd by desire of Col. Enoe in order to hold a countiel of war in which it was Determined that Enoe should not go back. 26. This Day we proceeded over 3 Carrying places 2 small ones And one about ½ a mile & through a pond that Is about ¼ of a mile & a carrying place as much more And came to another pond & encamp'd."

It seems perfectly clear that Topham copied Humphrey, carelessly omitting a date and muddling one sentence, yet, on the other hand, adding a couple of facts. Consequently our opinion of Topham's journal is about like our opinion of Thayer's.[17] His testimony is substantially, yet not absolutely, that of an independent witness. In both cases, it must be remembered, in particular, that we do not know when the journal was written, and as the

endorsement of Humphrey is valuable in proportion to the freshness of the writer's recollection, this value is an uncertain quantity.

Humphrey's narrative, also, may need to be discounted somewhat. The first two months of it do not appear to be in his handwriting, and after January 5, 1776, when he was in confinement at Quebec and ink was taken away from him, the diary goes on in ink as before. But there are hints that Humphrey kept a record as he went, and it may fairly be assumed, since his book must have suffered a good deal of damage on the march, that he decided later to have it copied.

The only other journals throwing light on our subject, except some written by privates,

begin until after the assault on Quebec (December 31st). Reasoning on this hint, I thought the missing manuscript might possibly be found among Marshall's papers. But I had no success in this direction, for it soon appeared that his papers were scattered.[19]

The anonymous journal was published in Glasgow in 1776, and bears this title: *Journal of a March of a Party of Provincials from Carlisle to Boston and from Thence to Quebec.* The editor said in his Preface: "The following authentic Journal, wrote by an officer of the Party, was sent from a Gentleman in Quebec to his Friend in Glasgow, who put it into the hands of the Printers." Evidently the author belonged to the rifle company of Captain Hendricks. Now we are told by Henry that Sergeant McCoy of Hendricks's company, "an excellent clerk," gave Major Murray of the Quebec garrison "a genuine copy of his journal of the route through the wilderness into Canada." Of course a sergeant should not be called an officer, but on the other hand he might be spoken of as such, at least by a civilian. Moreover, this anonymous record has the air of coming from a sergeant. So it seems to me very possible that the "Provincial's" journal is neither more nor less than the

missing narrative of jolly Sergeant McCoy. This consideration gives it more weight; but there is no certainty about its authorship, and we must reckon further on the errors of a copyist and of two printing offices,—one in Scotland and another in America,—for I have had to rely on Egle's version.[30] The testimony of the journal is mainly sound and valuable, but it is seldom full. Distances made the central point of the author's thought, and even in this respect he is neither minute nor precisely correct. Yet the meagreness of the record adds to the impression of its genuineness and contemporaneity.

Next come a series of reports from the

a man, too, from whom we might expect a journal. He was above the average age of Arnold's men.[22] His father, Captain Abner Stocking, was a prominent man in the town; his grandfather, George Stocking, had been a captain in the militia; one of his brothers became a Methodist minister. It looks at first a bit suspicious that the diary of a Connecticut man should have been published by relatives at Catskill, New York, especially as we have no record that any of his relatives went there; but we know that people did go from the quarries near his home to open quarries at Catskill. So far we can make our way. But we find on reading the journal that the auther of it was not, as a rule, where we have excellent reasons to believe that Hanchet's company was.[23] At the same time Stocking's record has every appearance of individuality and good faith.

A reasonable explanation may perhaps lie within reach. While Stocking was imprisoned at Quebec, he might naturally resolve to enliven the tedium of confinement, and obtain a souvenir of a notable experience, by writing an account of the incidents that had taken place. Perhaps he had begun a journal and given it up. Anyhow, his memory was full of

facts, but he needed a chronological string to hang them on. He might, then, without the slightest intention to deceive, borrow the string from one of his comrades, modifying and extending freely his comrade's narrative according to his personal recollection. Later we shall approach this problem from another point of view. Whatever we conclude about it, we must look upon Stocking's journal with some reserve; yet the author was so evidently a careful, sensible man, observant and also reflective, that we cannot help regarding his narrative as in substance reliable. As for his manuscript, it seems to have disappeared entirely, and we have no means of judging how accurately it was printed.[21]

neat." The journalist was a painstaking man, one would say, and there is no reason to question his honesty; but he was merely a private, and possessed only ordinary intelligence. Neither do we know how long after the events his diary was written. However, these are points of no great practical importance, for Melvin adds little to the other journals. Only a few times does his narrative become of special significance, and in those cases the danger of a departure from the original seems to be slight.

Caleb Haskell was a Newburyport man, and according to tradition a cabinet-maker and a sailor at different times.[26] He was a plain, sensible person, and made a plain, sensible narrative of what he saw and heard. Particulars are often wanting, and occasionally there is an error; but in its rather limited way the journal is decidedly valuable. It was first published in a Newburyport newspaper, and afterwards, in 1881, Mr. Withington issued it as a pamphlet. I have been fortunate enough to light upon the copy used by the printer, and, better still, to have a critical comparison made with the manuscript,[27] and so have obtained the reading of the original. The printed copy is substantially correct, though it

contains a few significant errors; but the grammar, spelling, and capitalisation of Haskell's text were considerably modified. What is doubtless more important, somebody has made erasures in the original that blot entirely what was written.

In the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* for April, 1886, there is printed a journal of the Kennebec expedition presented by Justin Winsor, and attributed to Ebenezer Wild.[28] But the Massachusetts archives do not give the name of any Ebenezer Wild who can have gone to Canada with Arnold. That, to be sure, is not conclusive, for some of the Massachusetts members of the Kennebec detachment do not appear on the

detachment had departed. This Wild kept journals. One was devoted to the Ticonderoga expedition of 1776, and at the close of it, he speaks of setting out for the Saratoga campaign in the words: "I marched for my second campaign." But this would have been his third campaign had he gone to Quebec.[30] Finally, the manuscript of the journal attributed to Wild makes no claim that it was composed by a person of that name. The natural inference from these facts is that the document is a copy of a record kept by some one else.[31]

In the *New England Historical and Genealogical Register* for 1852 there appeared a journal almost identical with this attributed to Wild. It was represented as the composition of Joseph Ware, of Needham, Mass.; and it has been so attributed since.[32] Just why there was so much confidence about this does not appear, for according to Mr. Winsor's notes it bore no indication of source except the words "Joseph Ware his book." If this is enough to prove authorship, what must be the number of schoolboys wickedly robbed of their copyright dues on *Webster's Spelling Book*[33]!

The simple fact is that Joseph Ware of Needham cannot have written the journal, for he did not belong to Arnold's army. The

Massachusetts archives contain a roll dated Cambridge, October 5, 1775, which reports him as a corporal in Whiting's company of Heath's regiment on that day. There was, however, a Joseph Ware in Ward's company of Arnold's army, for the name is down in both our lists of the prisoners of December 31st.[34] But this is all the information that we have. Although several Joseph Wares appear on the Massachusetts rolls, no one of that name is reported as "gone to Quebec,"—the usual formula, — and we must conclude that this was somebody who enlisted specially for the Canada campaign, and cannot be identified. In that case the journal, if written by him, is practically anonymous.

noticed. A comparison also shows with considerable certainty that they were written by the same hand. The writing is very similar, and I think I am not mistaken in the opinion that he who penned the one also penned the other; and there is a reasonable presumption that Mr. Tolman was the penman, and that the one furnished me by his son is the original; and for several reasons.

"First, it appears to have been written at different periods, and has an older appearance than Mr. Ware's copy, which looks as though it was written all at one time and almost with the same pen.

"Second, Mr. Ware does not use the personal pronoun 'I' from beginning to end, whereas Mr. Tolman says under date of January 19, 1776: 'This day I was taken down with the small pox, and carried to the Hospital, and in 15 days was able to return to the prison.'

"And lastly, two sons and two daughters of Mr. Tolman, now living, all unite in saying that they have, time and again, heard their father speak of *his journal* as one that *he* 'kept' on the march and while in prison, and that they have *no doubt* that it is in his handwriting. . . . Mr. Tolman and Mr. Ware had frequent intercourse after the war," and the former may have furnished the latter with a copy of his journal."

There certainly was an Ebenezer Tolman (or Toleman) in Ward's company of Arnold's army, the company in which we find a Joseph Ware. The evidence in Tolman's favour, set over against the facts about Wild and Ware, seems decisive, so that we may boldly discard the two latter names, and attribute their

journals to the former. Of course, this is not quite satisfactory, for we have not the original manuscript, and have only Mr. Locke's testimony that Tolman's copy differed very slightly from Ware's; but it is the best we can do, for the Tolman original appears to have disappeared from our ken.[38]

Unfortunately, we are not quite done with this journal. The same difficulty meets us as in the case of Stocking. Tolman belonged to the third division, but his record belongs to the first. Is this another case like Stocking's, whatever be the explanation of that? Presently we shall try to make up our minds.

The next document on our list is Morison's. Morison[39] was only a private in Hendricks's

The original manuscript I have neither seen nor heard of. It was printed at Hagerstown in 1803, and a copy of this edition exists in the library of the Pennsylvania Historical Society. As the title-page of the book states that it was "published from the manuscript," we may probably conclude that the original went the way of other printer's "copy"; and this appears the more likely because Morison was dead, and the publisher, as he issued the book at his own risk, was not likely to increase his bill of costs by having the rather voluminous manuscript copied. How accurately the printing was done, we have, therefore, no means of judging.

With all its plainly marked personal peculiarities, Morison's journal shows a certain family likeness to "Provincial's." This makes a group of four suspicious documents, and it is now time to investigate the problem of origin more fully.

Tolman's case may be taken up first. His journal, at bottom, is clearly not his own, for, as we have seen, it describes things from the point of view of the first division, while he belonged to the third. Further, we have a diary from another member of the same company, Haskell, which agrees with what we

should expect, not with what Tolman gives us. Further still, there is internal evidence to the same effect. For instance, here is a bit of Tolman's journal:

"[Oct.] 5th, 6th & 7th.—Pushed up to the head of the Kennebec, where we carried out into a pond. These last three days we came about 20 miles. 8th.—This day we pushed on very briskly, it being Sunday. The foremost companies lying still on account of heavy rains; we marched all day, it being very wet & cold, & suffered a good deal from the inclemency of the weather, and came up with some of them at night. 9th, 10th & 11th.—Carried to the first pond," etc.

How does it happen that on the morning of October 8th Tolman found himself a "brisk" day's march behind the riflemen, when, ac-

heavy rain." Evidently Tolman relied on "Provincial" or Morison for October 5th, 6th, and 7th, but wished to give the doings of his own company for the 8th; and so, instead of following his guide for the latter, merely alludes to the "foremost companies." Haskell confirms this by saying that on the 8th they went eight miles in the rain. That Tolman leaned on "Provincial" rather than Morison is hinted by a great number of close verbal similarities,— even many whole sentences; and by the fact that both he and "Provincial" give figures omitted by Morison. Yet Tolman was not a slavish imitator. At one time he did not pursue the same route as "Provincial," and his journal is faithful to the fact. There are many differences of wording or arrangement between the two, and in some cases he makes additions. With proper care, use may be made of his record.

Stocking's case is by no means so clear. Resemblances between him and "Provincial" there certainly are. The whole general course of the two is the same. Whenever "Provincial" lumps the record of two days or three days, Stocking, with two exceptions, does the same. Where there is a gap in one, the other is silent; and more minute points are not wanting.[40]

Apparently Morison cannot have been his authority, for Morison's record of October 17th and 18th is: "We ascended this river 36 miles, these last two days, carrying over two small carrying-places of about 10 rods each"; while Stocking has it: "17. After passing over a small carrying place of 16 rods we rowed 16 miles up the river. . . . 18. This day we rowed 20 miles & passed a short carrying place. . . ." But a similar difficulty arises October 5th, 6th, and 7th with reference to regarding either "Provincial's" or Tolman's journal as Stocking's original. These are only specimen cases. At all times he shows independence, and he adds matter of his own liberally. It may be that he wrote with more

look, not of a daily record, but of a free reworking of something else, filled out with many additions. For an example, the record of October 18th may be referred to again: "We ascended the river 36 miles these last two days, carrying over two small carrying-places of about 10 rods each. In this encampment we were confined the four following days by heavy rains." From the first sentence one would infer that the record was made at the close of the 18th; but the next sentence negatives this idea. Besides this, we find in places, particularly November 5th and 6th, an almost verbal resemblance to "Provincial" and Tolman.

Under date of November 4th, he says: "Last night we got plenty of good beef and potatoes, but not much bread," and Tolman records: "Last night had plenty of beef & potatoes; but little or no bread was to be had"; while "Provincial" writes under date of November 3d: "Here we . . . got plenty of good beef & potatoes, little or no bread." As Tolman's journal was probably not based on Morison, it would seem to follow that Morison's was based here on Tolman. But Morison may have used more than one source. The main point is to remember that his

record is not altogether his own, though he was an eye-witness of the march, and in a sense confirms the record that he adopts.

Simon Fobes, a private in Hubbard's company, is next in order.[41] What he gives us is not a journal, but recollections, put in writing sixty years after the events took place. His narrative contains many errors, but it adds a number of items which we seem justified in accepting.

This completes the list of original documents covering the whole of the march to Quebec, but we have also the diary of Ephraim Squier[42] of Scott's company, one of those who turned back in the wilderness and made for Cambridge. As the only account of this

here is a contemporary, unaltered record, as Squier himself stated.

To these sources may be added an account of the expedition by the Rev. Jacob Bailey,[43] a tory clergyman of Pownalborough, on the Kennebec, and a careful and voluminous writer whose work has never been published. The number of facts that he adds is not large, but his point of view makes all that he says interesting. Of course he was not an eye-witness of the march, but he knew about things done in his immediate vicinity, and seems to have obtained information from guides, and perhaps from other persons who traversed the wilderness.

Finally, we have letters bearing on the subject, particularly from Arnold, Captain Dearborn, and Captain Ward.[44]

In short, the witnesses are many and their testimony is full, though it covers by no means every point. A satisfactory harmony of all these varying accounts, often confused and often inaccurate, is hard to secure; but the problem has to be faced.[45]

III

CAMBRIDGE TO GARDINERSTON

THE Orderly Book[1] of Colonel William Henshaw, who was Adjutant-General at Cambridge until Washington took command, and then served as assistant to Gates, contains this entry :

"Head-quarters, Sept. 5th, 1775. Parole *Waltham* ; countersign *York*. . . . A detachment, consisting of

will offer themselves for this service. Colonel Arnold & the Adjutant General will attend upon the Common in Cambridge to-morrow, in the forenoon, to receive and parade their detachments. The Quartermaster-General will be also there, to supply tents, &c. . . ."


Adding to the figures of the order about 250 riflemen, a surgeon with his mate and two assistants, two adjutants, two quartermasters,[4] a chaplain, and a few volunteers,[5] we reach a total of almost exactly 1050.[6] Washington called the detachment "one thousand men"; and, speaking roundly, that was the number of the rank and file.

On the 8th of September, the Commander-in-chief issued this order:

"The detachments going under the command of Col. Arnold, to be forthwith taken off the roll of duty, and to march this evening to Cambridge Common, where tents and everything necessary is provided for their reception. The rifle company at Roxbury[7] and those from Prospect Hill, to march early tomorrow morning to join the above detachment. Such officers and men as are taken from Gen. Green's brigade for the above detachment are to attend the muster of their respective regiments tomorrow morning at 7 o'clock upon Prospect Hill; when the muster is finished they are forthwith to rejoin the detachment at Cambridge."

In view of what followed, the delay in setting out seems extremely unfortunate. Washington's intention was not at fault, and he

felt greatly disappointed at the loss of time. But it proved more difficult than was expected to make the necessary preparations, and Squier informs us that when the men were paraded on Monday, September 11th, "in order to march for Quebec," some of them refused to move without a month's pay,—"so we stayed still in Cambridge." The advance did, however, begin on that day,[8] and on Wednesday the major part set out. Newburyport,[9] a good harbour on the Merrimac River, about three miles from the sea, was to be the rendezvous. First of all the riflemen moved; and after spending one night at Neale's Tavern, and the next at Mr. Bunkam's church, they camped on Wednesday, the 13th, about a mile from


NEWBURY
ROWLEY
IPSWICH
ROCKPORT
CAPE ANN
TOPSFIELD
WENHAM
MIDDLETON
BEVERLY
SALEM
READING
WAKEFIELD
LYNN
MALDEN
MEDFORD
BOSTON
SKETCH MAP
OF
NORTHEASTERN MASS.
SCALE



Wenham, and rested for the night in Rowley and Ipswich; and early on Saturday they arrived at Newburyport.


The second battalion was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Greene and Major Timothy Bigelow. The captains were five in number, and their names were Samuel Ward, Simeon Thayer, John Topham, Jonas Hubbard, and Samuel McCobb. Setting out on the 13th, earlier in the day than the first battalion, this party were able to reach Malden before night, Beverly[13] on Thursday, and Newburyport on Friday.[14] Arnold himself, after lingering at Cambridge until Friday,[15] pushed on so vigorously that he dined at Salem,[16] and lodged that same night in Newburyport.

On Saturday[17] the little army were all near the point of their next departure, but not all together. The riflemen were encamped in Newbury, near the edge of Newburyport, by what was known as the Trayneing Green and is now called the upper Common,[18] while the rest of the soldiers pitched their tents elsewhere or found lodgings in the Town-house, a church, and two rope-walks in the Port.[19] Twenty men from Newbury and the Port were members of the force, besides the Rev.

Samuel Spring, the chaplain, and both officers and men were hospitably treated. Many last preparations proved necessary, and it was a busy time.

Nathaniel Tracy, Arnold's host,[20] was a man of considerable wealth at that day, and particularly interested in ships. It was to him that Washington had addressed himself for vessels to transport the detachment to the Kennebec,[21] and he advanced £700 of lawful money to fit out the expedition. Thanks in part to his exertions the fleet was there, and was adequate; but certainly not all the vessels were grand: "dirty coasters & fish boats" they seemed to Fobes.

Saturday the winds were contrary; but, in


QUEBEC
LEVIS
ST. LAWRENCE
CHAUDIERE
RIVER
CANADA
LAKE MEGANTIC
DEAD
RIVER
KENNEBEC
MAINE
PENOBSCOT
RIVER
SKOWHEGAN
WATERVILLE
AUGUSTA
RIVER
CONNECTICUT
RIVER
VERMONT
N. H.
MERRIMAC
RIVER
SEGUIN I.
N
S
NEWBURYPORT
CAMBRIDGE
BOSTON
MASS.
SKETCH MAP
OF
ARNOLD'S ROUTE.
0 10 20 30 40
SCALE OF MILES.



The transports—eleven schooners and sloops —lay at the wharves near the centre of the town, and on Monday afternoon[24] the men embarked,—none too willingly, it must be confessed, for in at least one case a guard was necessary to keep them aboard. Nothing more was needed but favourable conditions for setting sail, since one of the scouting fleet had come in and reported the coast quite clear.[25].

Tuesday, rather early in the forenoon, anchors were weighed, and at midday ten of the transports were safely off. The schooner *Swallow*, however, ran aground, and could not be floated at that tide.[26] Captain Scott was ordered to remain aboard with eleven others, and follow as soon as he could; but the rest of the passengers were transferred, and early in the afternoon the fleet set sail for the Kennebec and Canada with a favourable wind.

The following signals,[27] issued to the fleet, show that careful preparations for contingencies were made:

"1. Signal for speaking with the whole fleet: ensign at main-topmast head.

"2. Signal for chasing a sail: ensign at fore-topmast head.

"3. Signal for heaving to: lantern at mast head & two guns, if head on shore; and three guns, if off shore.


"4. Signal for making sail in the night: lantern at mast head, & four guns. In the day, for making sail: jack at fore-topmast head.

"5. Signal for dispersing & every vessel making the nearest harbor: ensign at main peak.

"6. Signal for boarding any vessel: jack at main-topmast head, & the whole fleet to draw up in a line, as near as possible.

"N. B. No guns to be fired without orders."

About four o'clock two fishing schooners were spoken, but nothing was heard of hostile ships; and, after keeping on the course[28] until about midnight, the fleet hove to off Wood Island.[29] It was a quick passage,—


SKETCH MAP
OF THE
LOWER KENNEBEC
SCALE
0
10
N
S
AUGUSTA
HALLOWELL
Kennebec River
GARDINER
Cobbossee Contee River
PITTSTON
GREEN'S LEDGES POINT
SO. GARDINER
RICHMOND
WEST DRESDEN
LOVEJOY'S NARROWS
Kennebec River
CHOPS
Androscoggin River
BATH
BRUNSWICK
FIDDLER'S REACH
PARKER'S FLATS
PHIPPSBURG
GEORGETOWN
SHEEPSCOT RIVER
POPHAM BEACH
FORT POPHAM
SEGUIN ISL.



made out. A little later the vessels, one by one, began to enter it.[31]

Whether fortifications existed here in 1775 we do not know; but that seems very probable, for Arnold's fleet was greeted by men under arms, and they could not have expected to keep British cruisers out of the river unless they had cannon and some kind of defences. Old guns may have been put to use again there, for the French and Indian War had come to an end only twelve years before (1763). Whatever the explanation, a number of soldiers were on the alert, and a pilot was immediately provided.

From this point the fleet separated more or less, for the navigation of the river is not simple, and such a number of sailing craft could not be handled in a body. Rocks, islands, bold headlands, and confusing bays are numberless in this part of the Kennebec. However, guided by the pilot, Arnold worked his way up the stream, and anchored for six hours at Parker's Flats, about four miles from the river's mouth.[32] Next he proceeded about six miles farther up the river, and arrived at Georgetown. One of the missing transports appears to have rejoined him here.[33]

Georgetown was a generous term at that

day, and included also Arrowsic Island, Bath and West Bath, Phippsburg, and Woolwich. Of all this area, Arrowsic Island was the most populous part. James Sullivan, afterwards a noted jurist and a Governor of Massachusetts, is believed to have been one of its inhabitants [34] in 1775. Another of the residents was Samuel McCobb, town clerk and a delegate to the Provincial Congress. News of Lexington travelled to Georgetown in eight days; and then McCobb, laying down his pen, took up his sword,—or, more probably, musket,—organised a company, marched in six days, we are told, to Cambridge, and fought behind the rail-fence at Bunker Hill. When the Kennebec expedition was decided on, he appears to have hurried back to Georgetown, raised some twenty recruits to fill up his quota, and joined the expedition on its arrival there.[35]

Some of the transports did better and some did worse than Arnold's top-sail schooner. Senter passed the night on Parker's Flats, but Meigs contrived in some way to get up as far as Pownalborough, about thirty miles from the sea, while Stocking's yet abler skipper, using both sails and oars, and aided finally by the evening tide, succeeded in anchoring his sloop only six miles below Fort Western.

The next sun was not yet due by a full hour when Arnold's anchor came up and he set out again. About opposite the present city of Bath, the two other missing vessels of his fleet rejoined him, after working their way across from Sheepscot River. Then, sailing through Merrymeeting Bay,[36] an enlargement of the Kennebec, and passing Swan Island,[37] Arnold pushed on as far as Gardinerston (September 21st). "Left the transports in the river, wind and tide unfavourable," recorded Oswald.[38] Dearborn's vessel ran aground,[39] and all the ships found themselves in difficulties.

Swan Island, now the township of Perkins, is about three and one-half miles long, and splits the river into halves. The western channel, often called at this day Swan Alley, is the one the Boston steamers take, for they wish to stop at Richmond village near the upper end; but Arnold's vessels appear to have chosen the other and deeper one. When a little more than half-way to the parting of the two channels above, they came to Little Swan Island,[40] once, according to tradition, the seat of a powerful sachem. There they found a hard bit of navigation in Lovejoy's Narrows,[41] and finally, rounding the island, they entered once more the full Kennebec.

This was a notable point in their journey. On the left, a little above the present village of Richmond, could be seen the remains of Fort Richmond. It had been occupied first in the winter of 1720–21, or in the following spring,[42] and had been dismantled a generation later.[43] On the right or eastern side lay Pownalborough,[44] the Dresden of our day. "A court-house and gaol and some very good settlements," was the record of Captain Dearborn; and one may still see the big, square, box-like, two-story house that answered as court-house and jail.[45] Here lived Major Goodwin, surveyor for the Plymouth Company, original proprietors of the region, and here the Rev. Jacob Bailey ministered to a sizable congregation, a large part of it loyalists like himself. Here also could be seen a fort, and Meigs noted it, though Dearborn did not. It stood on the river bank about a mile above Swan Island. A court two hundred feet square was encompassed with palisades except on the land side; barracks and two blockhouses were put up within, and the fort was christened in 1751, its birth-year, Fort Shirley[46]; but the need of such defences had passed away, and of course the fortifications were not kept up. Pownal-

borough, however, did not detain Dearborn, and four o'clock found him at Gardinerston with Arnold.[47]

Many of his comrades were with him, but not all. Two of the fleet were now aground[48] some fifteen miles below; and, as the *Swallow* had come up, Arnold sent her down with some men to their relief.[49] And so, after hazards of many kinds, the expedition seems to have reached or passed the landing at Gardinerston by Friday night, the 22d of September.

IV

GARDINERSTON TO FORT WESTERN

SYLVESTER GARDINER of Kingston, R. I., after studying medicine for eight years in France and England, settled in Boston, practised his profession successfully, made money also in the business of importing drugs, and became the greatest land-owner in the Kennebec valley. The extent of his possessions there was vast: at one time probably not

Year's Day, 1773, he bought himself a present of two and a half square miles. The Major owned a house there, and a good one, too. It has always remained in the family, and his granddaughter told me that the present building is substantially as he erected it. One can easily accept the tradition that Colonel Arnold lodged there.

There were good reasons why the commander of the expedition halted at this point: Colburn was the real fulcrum of his enterprise. August 21st Arnold had addressed to him the following letter[3]:

"WATERTOWN [MASS.], 21st Augt 1775.

"MR. REUBEN COLBURN

"SIR

"His Excellency General Washington Desires you will Inform your self how soon, there can be procured, or built, at Kennebec, Two hundred light Battoos[4] Capable of Carrying Six or Seven Men each, with their Provisions & Baggage, (say 100 wt. to each man) the Boats to be furnished with four Oars two Paddles & two Setting Poles[5] each, the expence of Building them & wheather a Sufficient quantity of Nails can be procured with you. you will Also inquire, what quantity of Fresh Beef can be procured at Kenebec, & the price.— at Newbury you will Inquire the Size & Strength of the two Armed Vessels, If Compleated, & wheather, bound on a Cruise or not.[6] Also the Condition the Armed Vessels are in at Kenebec[7]—you

will Also get particular Information from those People who have been at Quebec, of the Difuculty attending an Expedition that way, in particular the Number, & length, of the Carrying Places, wheather Low [?], Dry land, Hills, or Swamp. Also the Depth of Water in the River at this Season, wheather an easy Stream or Rapid — Also every other Intelligence which you Judge may be necessary to know, all which you will Commit to writing & Dispatch an express to his Excellency as soon as possible, who will Pay the Charge & expence you may be at in the Matter.

"I am
"Sir
"Your Hble Sv^t^
"BENED^t^ ARNOLD."

Colburn was evidently an active, enterprising man, and took hold of the matter vigorously. Three times he appears to have gone to Cambridge. Once he was expressly summoned by Washington; about the other trips we do not know. He was at headquarters on August 21st, and there on September 3d he received his definite orders[8]:

"Orders for Mr. Rheuben Colbourn of Gardnerstone, upon the River Kennebeck in The Province of Massachusetts Bay —

"You are to go with all Expedition to Gardnerstone upon the River Kenebeck and without Delay proceed to The Constructing of Two Hundred Batteaus,[9] to row with Four Oars each; Two Paddles & Two Setting Poles to be also provided for each Batteau: —

"You are to Engage a Company of Twenty Men consisting of Artificers, Carpenters, and Guides, to go under your Command to Assist in such Services as you & they may be called upon to Execute [10] : —

"You are to Purchase Five Hundred Bushells of Indian Corn, to Provide the Workmen employed in Building the Batteaus : —

"You are also [11] to bespeak all The Pork, and Flour, you can from the Inhabitants upon the River Kennebeck, & a Commissary will be immediately sent [12] from the Commissary General, to agree, and pay for the same; you will also acquaint The Inhabitants, that the Commissary will have Orders to Purchase Sixty Barrells of Salted Beef, of Two hundred & Twenty pounds each Barrell : —

"You are to receive Forty Shillings Lawfull Money for each Batteau, with the Oars, Paddles, and Setting Poles included [13]; out of which you are also to pay The Artificers & for all the Provisions Nails etc.[14] they shall expend.

"Given at Head Quarters at Cambridge this 3[d] day of September 1775

"G[o] WASHINGTON

"By the Generals Command

"HORATIO GATES Adj[t] Gen[l]"

The first reason, then, why Arnold stopped at Gardinerston was to see about the bateaux. Major Colburn had a shipyard; and, in the year 1763, Thomas Agry, a shipwright, came and settled just above him at a slight turn in the river, known then as Agry's Point,[15] but now as Green's Ledges Point. The shore

was covered, it is said, with white oaks that would make excellent ribs for the bateaux, and pine for the rest of them could be sawed two miles above at Gardiner's mill, and floated down. Finally, Henry Smith had been keeping a tavern just above Agry's Point for about three years, and could take care of the workmen. So it was here that the bateaux were constructed.

Quick time had been made with them undoubtedly, and the two hundred boats were now lying on the beach. Yet Arnold felt by no means wholly pleased. Whatever the ribs were made of, sides and bottoms had been constructed of green pine, heavy but thin and weak, and many bateaux were undersized. Arnold

been their motives,— they could have had none else. Did they not know that their doings were crimes,— that they were cheating their country and exposing its defenders to additional sufferings and to death?"

Without a doubt the feebleness of the bateaux was a vital defect in the preparations for Arnold's enterprise; but it does not follow that the boat-builders were really to be blamed. The time allowed them was very short. One can hardly believe that seasoned lumber for such a fleet could possibly have been on hand. The bateaux were to be thrown away, it was expected, after a service of two or three weeks, and it would not pay to build them very expensively. The need of strong boats could not have been understood at Cambridge, and perhaps it was not at Colburn's, for the few people who navigated the upper Kennebec and Dead River probably did so in lightly freighted canoes or pirogues, and understood the management of them. Certainly there was no sign of a guilty conscience on Colburn's part, for he marched with the army close within Arnold's reach. In reality, this appears to have been one of many misfortunes that resulted naturally and almost inevitably from haste and scanty knowledge of the conditions. The bateaux would have answered,

had they only been required to navigate waters like the Kennebec at Colburn's, and perhaps they would have answered where they went, had expert boatmen been in charge.

Arnold had another reason for stopping at Gardinerston. As soon, apparently, as the expedition was decided upon, or perhaps even sooner, Major Colburn had been directed by Washington to send scouts along the proposed route "in order to see what were the obstacles Col. Arnold would be likely to meet on his way to Quebeck." [17] Dennis Getchell and Samuel Berry of Vassalborough,[18] just above Fort Western, were engaged to execute this commission, and now Arnold received their report in a letter addressed by them to Colburn.[19] The report was as follows [20]:

"VASSALBOROUGH, 13th Sept'r, 1775.

"SIR. In Compliance with your Orders I proceeded with Mr. Berry [21] on our intented Journey to Quebeck as Follows—Fryday 1st Sept'r. P.M. we sat out.[22] . . . Wednesday 6th. we Reached the third Pond in the Great Carrying Place distance 9 miles — Thursday 7th. we arrived at an Indian Camp 30 miles distance from the last mentioned pond, up Dead River [23] good water, of [24] this Indian [25] we got intelligence that He was employed by Governor Charlton to Watch the Motions of an Army or Spies that was daily expected from New England — that there were Spies on the Head of Chaudiere River, that Some way down the River there was

Stationed a Regular Officer & Six privates, He possitively Declared that if we proceeded any further he would give information of his Suspicion of our Designs — as otherwise he should Betray the Trust Reposed in him—[26] But Notwithstanding his Threats we thought it of moment to get all possible intelligence & Accordingly on Fryday the 8th. we went up the River aforresaid [27] about 30 miles — We found the water in General pretty Shoal & meeting with nothing new Returned to the Indian Camp — Our Indian Pilot fearing the Consecuence of going any further with us after our first arrival at the Camp, did not go with us, on our last days Journey [28] — in this interval We had a Conference with an Indian Squaw who gave us this intelligence, that the Spy had a Commission from Charlton, that at Shettican [29] the uppermost Settlement on Chaudiere there was a great Number of Mohawks that would have destroyed us if we had proceeded, that all the Young Indians from that Quarter had gone to Johnson [30] — that the Spy was in daily expectation of the arrival of Three Canoes of Indians — We found the Carrying places pretty passible —the water in General pretty Shoal—on Account of the Dry Season—The Trees we found Marked [31] so as the way is pretty direct as far as we went—& may easily be found.[32] . . .

"Denis Getchel
"Samuel Berry."

There was ample basis for at least a portion of this threatening report. Natanis proved a friend, whether he was really in Carleton's pay at this time or not; but there were Indians at Sertigan, about half-way down the

Chaudière,[33] and, as we have found, a British post had been established in that vicinity, though it had been withdrawn about the time Arnold's detachment set out from Cambridge, because the soldiers appeared to be more needed elsewhere.[34] But Arnold, with characteristic boldness, snapped his fingers at all hints of danger. The Indian, he wrote Washington,[35] was "a noted villain, and very little credit, I am told, is to be given to his information."

Still another matter of importance appears to have awaited Arnold at Gardinerston. Major Goodwin and his maps have already been mentioned. His letter to Washington, quoted in Chapter I., proves that he met Arnold; and, as there is no evidence that Arnold stopped at Pownalborough, and it would certainly have been more natural for Goodwin to wait upon him, we may conclude that their meeting took place at Gardinerston. Some weeks before, Colburn had given notice that maps would be wanted, and Goodwin now delivered them.[36]

These matters, however, were not the only ones that required Arnold's attention. The lessening depth of water in the Kennebec made it impossible for the transports to go

all the way to Fort Western, about nine miles[37] above Colburn's; and in fact some went but a little distance, if any, beyond the shipyard. At Gardinerston, therefore, or some point a few miles above, it was necessary to transfer men and cargoes to the bateaux. A portion, at least, of the provisions that Farnsworth, the commissary, came down to gather had no doubt been brought to Colburn's, and arrangements had to be made for taking these supplies to Fort Western, the real point of departure for the wilderness. A hundred men were now drafted to row the bateaux to that rendezvous.[38] Arnold engaged "two caulkers, some guides & assistants," as Oswald states; and then—by transports as far as they could go,[39] by the boats, and in part by land, some of the detachment stopping over-night at the Gardiner of to-day, or at Hallowell — the troops moved on for Fort Western. Arnold reached that point at six o'clock on Saturday evening, the 23d; and, if we except some belated men and those detailed for work, the whole army had arrived there before Sunday, the 24th.[40]

V

AT FORT WESTERN

FORT WESTERN stood on the eastern bank of the Kennebec, in the Augusta of to-day, the Hallowell of 1775, the Cushnoc[1] of Indian geography, about forty-three miles from the sea.[2] At this point a trading post had been established at a very early time, and in 1754 that was succeeded by what Governor Shirley[3] of Massachusetts called "a strong, defensible magazine."

The principal building, parallel with the river and only a few rods from it, was one hundred feet long and thirty-two feet wide, with posts eleven feet high. There it stands to-day, a little below the carriage bridge, and one may see the kind of work put into those border fortifications. It was a log house, except that the logs were squared beams a foot thick, laid close together, and dovetailed at the ends instead of crossing and projecting. So excellent was the fitting of the timbers that

a knife-blade can hardly be inserted in the joints to-day. At present the sides are covered with shingles, and the roof displays dormer windows, but these, it seems likely, are modern.[4] Doors and windows were of solid plank, and the rain was probably kept out with short split boards[5] in lieu of shingles. This was the barrack or living house. Around it lay an area or parade-ground one hundred and sixty feet long and sixty-two feet wide, protected with a palisade. At the north-east and the south-west corners of the area stood a blockhouse[6] with a projecting upper story, pierced for cannon and musketry, and a sentry box of hardwood plank on the top; while the other two corners were strengthened with much smaller blockhouses, a single story in height.

These were the essential features of Fort Western, except that a still stronger palisade, thirty feet distant from the inner one, ran back from the river and around to the river again, and very likely there was a trench outside of that.[7] Certainly this was not a Gibraltar; yet these wooden walls could resist not only any rifle-ball of the time, but the shot of any cannon likely to be transported hither; and so the post was well designed for its purpose,—to serve primarily as a magazine and

base for the more advanced position at Fort Halifax, higher up the river.

When the hopes of French and Indians had been killed by Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham in 1759, the need of fortresses on the Kennebec passed away. Fort Western was dismantled not long after, and its garrison withdrawn; but the commander, Captain James Howard, remained at Cushnoc as a settler,—the first resident there; and the barrack was a lodging very suitable for a good number of Arnold's men. The parade-ground proved no doubt a convenient and suitable spot for the tents of others, and also for the board cabins that some of the troops put up to shield them

extended to the officers of the expedition, and tradition has it that a banquet or barbecue was given in honour of the army.[11]

But courtesies and festivities appear to have been only incidental. There was a vast deal of work for the troops to do.

Fort Western marked the head of navigation then as it does now, for just above begins a half-mile of rapids. Here all the stores had to be packed in the bateaux, and from this point the strength of men was to furnish the motive power. Under the supervision of their officers, we may well believe that most of the soldiers devoted themselves to preparing for the onward march, for we find the first three divisions ready to set out when the signal was given, while we know that others were employed in getting up from below the articles of every sort brought in the transports or accumulated at Colburn's.[12]

Arnold himself was not less busy. It was here, perhaps, that he met and talked with Getchell and Berry, the guides whose report had reached him below at Gardinerston.[13] But their information was only what their letter had already given him, and at that Arnold still mocked. On Sunday—or possibly on Saturday evening, as soon as he reached the Fort—

he ordered Lieutenant Steele, of Smith's riflemen, to select six [14] men and a couple of canoes and go to Chaudière Pond,[15] reconnoitring the way, obtaining all possible information from the Indians hunting there, and, in particular, ascertaining the course of the stream that empties into the Pond.[16] The same day he sent forward Lieutenant Church,[17] with seven men, a surveyor, and a guide, to note "the exact courses and distances to Dead River." [18]

Monday the attack on the wilderness began in earnest. For convenience in this new kind of warfare Arnold now arranged his army in four divisions.[19] The leading group was very naturally of rifle corps, for they were regarded as light infantry, and the men, coming from the confines of civilisation, were more truly pioneers than the musketmen; and Arnold proposed to have Greene lead the advance with a company of riflemen and two companies of musketmen. But here a difficulty arose: Morgan, Smith, and Hendricks objected to the plan. There was no quarrel, no ill-will; but they held that no officer should have authority over the riflemen except Arnold and Morgan, and the latter declared that such had been Washington's design. The difficulty might have proved serious, but Arnold, though

he wrote Washington for instructions,[20] conceded the point; and the three rifle companies set out on Monday under the command of the Virginia captain, Daniel Morgan, the born leader of such an enterprise.[21]

Their orders were to go as quickly as they could to the carrying-place [22] between the Kennebec and Dead River—the Great Carrying-place [23] it was usually called—and "cut a road over to Dead River," as Oswald states.[24] With provisions for forty-five days in their bateaux, but yet freighted less heavily than succeeding divisions appear to have been, the brave fellows embarked.[25] October 7th most of them reached the end of their journey on the Kennebec, and eight days later their bateaux were afloat in Dead River on the farther side of the Great Carrying-place.[26] Later we shall inquire into their journey.

At noon, September 26th, Arnold sent off the second division. This included the companies of Thayer, Topham, and Hubbard, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Greene and Major Bigelow.[27] October 7th and 8th brought these men to the Great Carrying-place, and about the 13th they reached Dead River.

Wednesday, September 27th, at three o'clock in the afternoon, Major Meigs embarked with

the companies of Dearborn, Ward, Hanchet, and Goodrich, Arnold's third division. They, too, had provisions for a month and a half. On October 10th most of this body reached the Great Carrying-place, and the 15th found a part of it camping on Dead River.

Behind all these companies was Lieutenant-Colonel Enos with Captains Williams, McCobb, and Scott, the fourth and last division, and also Colburn's company of "artificers."[28] It was their turn to set out on the 28th, and perhaps a part of them did so. But there were many loose ends for the rear to gather up. Some of the men had not yet quit the shipyard. Some of the bateaux[29] also were there. Oars, paddles, and the like proved somewhat lacking, and not

Meanwhile Arnold was concluding his adieus to civilisation and his preparations for the fateful plunge into the wilderness. All his doings since Newburyport faded from sight were reported to Washington, and he cast a cheerful glance forward.

"I design Chaudiere Pond," he wrote, "as a general rendezvous, & from thence to march in a body . . . I have engaged a number of good pilots, & believe, by the best information I can procure, we shall be able to perform the march in twenty days; the distance is about 180 miles. . . . There is at present the greatest harmony among the officers."

At last his preparations for the march were all complete ;[31] his armament was perfected by the arrival of some manifestoes[32] designed for distribution among the Canadians ; and about noon on Friday,[33] the 29th, he set out in a birch-bark canoe, intending to overtake the head of the army as quickly as possible. The canoe proved leaky, and at Vassalborough he exchanged it for a dug-out. The next day he arrived at Fort Halifax ; Sunday he passed Skowhegan Falls ; and, after pausing from October 2d to October 9th at Norridgewock Falls, he reached the Great Carrying-place on the 11th, and Dead River on the 16th.[34]

We have taken pains to note the chief settlements from the mouth of the Kennebec to Fort Western. Nothing like a military base existed there; nor was anything of the sort established by Arnold.[35]

VI


FORT WESTERN TO NORRIDGEWOCK FALLS

FOR half a mile beyond Fort Western impassable falls blocked the river, as we have seen; but along the eastern side lay a road,— the road to Fort Halifax, eighteen miles above.[1] No king's highway was this, we may be sure, for though made passable for wheels the year Fort Western rose, it was used but little, and had not been kept in order. Still it was a road, and very likely it received a little mending at this time.

The first step was to get the boats and stores beyond the falls. One assumes that country people gathered from far and near with their oxen and their horses. Waggons of every description were no doubt employed, and sleds also, probably[2]; and in one way and another the bateaux and all the stores travelled northward to the point of embarkation. Then the boats were launched and loaded; three, four, or five soldiers[3] usually took places

in each of them as a crew, and the fleet set off by water, while the rest of the army proceeded by land.[4] Neither party had much to suffer during this first stage of the long journey. The footmen were most of the time in the forest, but occasionally the river came into view, and in Vassalborough[5] a number of houses were discovered.

The bateaumen—little used to such work, or not at all—found the task of combating the rapid current of the Kennebec wearisome enough, and it was rather more than wearisome, when, as they approached Fort Halifax, they were compelled to push up through a long piece of extremely quick water[6]; but the labour did no more than stretch the hemlock


SKETCH MAP
OF THE
MIDDLE KENNEBEC
SCALE
N
OLD BLUFF
CARRATUNK FALLS
SOLON
ANSON
MADISON
NORRIDGE WOLK FALLS
OLD POINT
NORRIDGE WOLK
SKOWHEGAN
FAIRFIELD
WATERVILLE
FORT HALIFAX
SEBASTICOOK R.
AUGUSTA



there were a few acres of level ground raised some twenty feet above the water, while a tongue of the prevailing plateau of the region, forty or fifty feet higher still, came to an end near the Sebasticook about a furlong from the Kennebec. There was need of guarding both the point and the tongue, and the plan provided for both objects. It was proposed by General John Winslow, the officer directly in charge of the works, to build a pretty extensive affair, but only a small part of his design went into effect. That, however, was enough to lodge one hundred men on the point, and shelter a dozen, with a couple of two-pounders and a swivel, in a redoubt on the tip of the tongue.[9] By the 3d of September, 1754, so much was accomplished, and a garrison then took possession.

Winslow was succeeded by Captain William Lithgow[10] and a less ambitious plan. A second and stronger redoubt[11] appeared the ensuing year on the tongue, but the fort as a whole was only about a third as large as Winslow had proposed.[12] A palisade of posts enclosed a square of one hundred and seventeen feet each way. At the north-east corner stood a blockhouse twenty feet square, and at the south-west corner a second one: the latter has



survived the storms of time.[13] Inside the enclosure on the east side were barracks eighty feet by twenty, one story high, while on the north side a building supposed to have been of the same length but twice as wide contained the officers' quarters, armory, and some other departments.

Naturally, when the French and Indian War had ended, Fort Halifax appeared valueless, and soon it was dismantled and abandoned by the military.[14] Even before that, it had not been kept well in repair, for the victory at Quebec in 1759 seemed to make the Kennebec safe. Montresor described the post in his journal of 1761 :

> "It is square; its defence a bad palisade . . . by two blockhouses, in which there are some guns mounted; but, as the fort is entirely commanded by a rising ground behind it, they have been obliged to erect two other blockhouses and to clear the woods for some distance around. They [*i. e.*, the upper blockhouses or redoubts] are capable of making a better defence, and it must be confessed that either of them are more than sufficient against an enemy who has no other offensive weapons than small arms."

When Arnold and his party arrived, the fort retained no doubt the same general appearance. Dearborn speaks of the two blockhouses, "a large barrack," and the palisade.

But the whole affair had greatly decayed. "In a ruinous state" it was, wrote Henry, so that it "did not admit of much comfort." Ezekiel Pattee lived in one of the redoubts, but a "Captain Harrison or Huddlestone" seemed to Henry's party a real godsend when he invited the company to his house.[15] In short, Fort Halifax was not a fort at all in 1775, and could render no assistance to Arnold's expedition. Still less than Fort Western could it be called a base, except as Arnold ordered his surplus provisions stored there.

Half a mile above Fort Halifax the Kennebec ran over a series of ledges, and broke into what we call the Ticonic Falls.[16] No boat could possibly ascend the stream here, and so this became the first carrying-place.[17] The most irksome and fatiguing sort of labour was now required. As each bateau came to the bank on the western side of the river just below the falls, the crew leaped into the water and rapidly took the lading ashore. Two handspikes were then passed under the bottom of the craft,[18] and four men raised and carried it up the bank. If a portage were short and the load not too heavy, the bateau might not be emptied, but here, as often, it was necessary to divide the weight, and even to make a number

of journeys back and forth. The length of the Ticonic Falls was about half a mile,[19] but apparently it proved possible to find smooth water along the shore at each end, and so the portage measured only three-fifths as long.[20]

Still the labour was immense. According to Senter's Account, each bateau weighed "not less than four hundred pounds,"—a total of forty tons. Provisions for forty-three days,[21] at the rate of twelve ounces of flour[22] and of meat for each man, would make about thirty-five tons, besides the sugar, salt, yeast, butter, and other extras of the commissary's department. If a hundred rounds of ammunition were provided for every man, we must add

kitchen utensils, and a dozen other categories we ignore; but even without them our estimates figure up to something over one hundred tons. A part of this fearful weight was probably dragged across the carry by horses or oxen, but all of it had to be unloaded, taken up the river bank, and finally replaced in the boats by the men, and probably the greater part of it was taken across by them.[24] In general, at Ticonic Falls, the better part of a day seems to have been required for this work by each lot of men. Evidently the land party crossed the river and assisted, else the toil would have been still harder. Finally it was done, the footmen marched on again, and the boats breasted the stream once more.[25]

Not far beyond Ticonic Falls began the "Five Mile Ripples," a long stretch of swift water, not violent enough to be genuine falls, but still, as Arnold[26] wrote, "very dangerous and difficult to pass."[27] Arnold himself avoided them by hiring a settler named Crosier to convey his baggage by team to the slower current beyond; but for the army no such happy escape was possible. It began to be "cold and uncomfortable," too; and the bateaux were already leaking profusely.

But the wilderness was not yet reached; the

men did not yet feel the abandonment of complete exile from inhabitants and homes. Not far above the Five Mile Ripples was a little settlement, and scattering families may have settled elsewhere; but there were not many, for the oldest inhabitant had been on the ground but a year.[28] Farther on, about eighteen miles beyond the Sebasticook, were Great Island and Ten Acre Island, with a few pioneers on each. The army had now reached Canaan, or, as the town is named at present, Skowhegan.[29]

Five men had come here in the spring of 1772, but three of them went back to Massachusetts; yet the tide had flowed again, and

Even the approach to the falls was arduous. About half a mile below, the course of the river made about a right angle, and perhaps created then, as it does now, a triple whirlpool. Just above the turn stood a sort of natural gateway. Two ledges, projecting from the two sides of the stream, left a passage only some twenty-five feet wide between them, and forced the river to drive on like a mill-race. Through this gateway the shaky bateaux were somehow driven, for there is nothing in the records to suggest their being taken from the water at this point,[32] and local tradition agrees with the records. Then came the long run of exceedingly swift current. At the foot of the southern side log-drivers are able to walk, and it seems likely that men on the shore drew the bateaux along by the painters, while men in the boats kept them off the rocks with the poles. Finally they reached a pretty abrupt fall that is now called more than twenty-two feet high,[33] where Colburn had a primitive sort of a mill. A Mr. Howard resided at this place.

The stream was divided here by a rocky, craggy islet in the middle of it, so that about a half of the falls was in each of the channels; and the Indians were accustomed to take their

canoes up through a slight break in the almost vertical wall at the lower end of the islet, twenty-five or thirty feet high. It must have been a hard task to carry up even a birch canoe, for one can see—aided by tradition—where the ascent was made, and far worse to transport the heavy bateaux of green pine by such a route[34]; but up they went, and we can believe that the tired soldiers rested a while on the point of the island above, which the Indians are said to have cleared for a camping-ground. The portage itself was only sixty rods long,[35] but we are not surprised when Stocking tells us that "it occasioned much delay and great fatigue." Dearborn was able to make only three miles the day he passed these falls. Nor was that all. A touch of cold weather saluted a part of the army here on the night of the 29th, and the soldiers had to sleep in clothes that would have been wet had they not been frozen "a pain Glass thick"[36]; and it was already necessary to caulk the bateaux, or at least some of them.

For about five miles above these falls the current of the stream is at present gentle, and the river seems almost like a pond. But that is evidently owing to the dams at Skowhegan, for Arnold records that a great part of the

way there were small falls—that is to say, rapids—and quick water. So much the pleasanter was it no doubt when he arrived at the Widow Warren's, near the present village of Norridgewock, and was able to sleep off his fatigue under a roof.

Then the river veered around once more, and began to come from the north-west, and serious trouble for the boatmen was again in order. First it was the Bombazee Rips,[37] or at least this was the first nodal point, not quite three miles above the widow's. Here two ledges approached each other from the opposite sides of the river and pinched it pretty closely. The water rushed down like a torrent; but fortunately the change of level was not great, and the boatmen were able to get through.

About six miles and a half from the widow's, in the midst of a natural garden, opposite the mouth of Sandy River, appeared the site of Old Norridgewock,[38] once the capital of an Indian tribe called by that name, where Râle[39] had preached. Remains of the town were still visible, though nothing can be discovered there now. A fort and chapel were noted by Dearborn; Meigs observed the signs of entrenchments and of a covered way to the

river, as well as the grave of a priest, no doubt the unfortunate Râle, and Thayer tells us that on the grave a cross had been erected.

Two or three families had recently settled in this vicinity,[40] and one of them possessed a baby, fourteen months old. But no base of operations existed here, not even as much as at Georgetown or Gardinerston, Fort Western or Fort Halifax. And this was the end. Civilisation ceased; and, a mile[41] farther on, the army found itself confronted by the great falls of Norridgewock.[42]

VII

FROM NORRIDGEWOCK FALLS TO THE GREAT CARRYING-PLACE

FROM Fort Western the part of the army that went by land followed the left or easterly bank[1] of the river to Fort Halifax, and there it evidently crossed.[2] The marching to Skowhegan was probably better on the right bank,[3] and the distance was less that way on account of the angle in the Kennebec. Just above Skowhegan Falls another crossing appears to have been made, for this would give the troops a short route across the next great bend of the river, and, marching on the northern side, they would not have to cross the Sandy River.[4]

In this way the army arrived at Norridgewock Falls on the left bank, and so had to cross again, since the carrying-place was on the other side.[5] Of course the bateaux had to be unloaded anyway at all these falls, and with so large a number of boats to use, the men could cross very quickly.

Norridgewock Falls are not in the present Norridgewock at all, but near the northern edge of the town of Starks. Very far indeed they appear from Lossing's picture of them. The reality is about a mile of swift water, with low but violent falls at each end and in the middle. No high cataract exists anywhere; each series of falls is a rather short but very tumultuous course of rapids. The upper one appears to be the longest and the greatest in actual descent, but the second is the most dramatic. No boat could possibly live a moment there. The total drop of the river in the course of a mile or so is given as ninety feet.[6]

To carry the boats and all they contained such a distance[7] and up such an ascent was a herculean labour. The people of the region turned out, of course, with all their "teams." Two sleds drawn by oxen[8] were "going constantly" with baggage. But, as Dearborn tells us, there were only two or three families, and all they could do was little. The men had to transport the bateaux on their shoulders, we learn from Morison, and no doubt much besides. Indeed, the labour was so great that all the divisions lost a good deal of time, and this became, perforce, a sort of rendezvous, though the earliest companies left before the

last arrived. When Arnold reached there, Monday forenoon, October 2d, the first division had just got its baggage well across, and the second was approaching; while Meigs and the third division came up two days later, and Enos with the fourth division appeared on the 6th.

Arnold himself remained at the falls a week, for there was a deal of work to be supervised. Not merely had the boats and baggage to be carried; they required to be thoroughly overhauled. Caulking had been necessary at Skowhegan; now many of the bateaux were "nothing but wrecks," as we are told by Senter, and "some stove to pieces." On the 4th Colburn arrived, doubtless with his company of artificers, and then the work of patching up the miserable boats proceeded still more vigorously.

But this was by no means the full extent of the mischief. Moisture had no doubt entered the bateaux both at bottom and at top, — at bottom because the bateaux leaked, at the top because the boatmen were not expert at their business, and could not get up through the "ripples" without shipping water. The consequence was that the provisions had been much injured. A great part of Greene's bread

he boats, had lost its salt, and could or
thrown away. Casks of biscuit and dri
s had absorbed water, burst, and spoil
rst of all, perhaps, the salt beef, which h
n put up in hot weather, was found wor
. Flour and pork were to be the t
tches of life henceforward, though no dou
remnants of biscuit and other suppl
ed a little while. But finally the dishea
ng and tiresome work of patching batea
inspecting and throwing away provisic
done, and before the close of October
last company had probably moved on.[10]
Arnold camped that night with McCobb
rear division, while Scott of the same
on, though behind them, had advanced n
es beyond the falls during the day. T
ops going by land were now perhaps on
tern side of the river again, for they se
have crossed back after passing the carr
that way they avoided meeting the Se

Dr. Senter reckoned it, from the end of Norridgewock Falls, passed the mouth of Seven Mile Stream, or Carrabasset River, as it is known to-day. A little below this point the Kennebec flowed more than a mile around a long projection of land to make thirty rods. Arnold, who gives us this information, crossed the neck of land with his light boat, and saved the long, hard pull; but the rest of the army had to toil on. About eight miles above[12] came another portage at Carritunk Falls,[13] which are said to produce more water-power than any others on the Kennebec. At present the drop is given as twenty-one feet, for a dam has been built. In 1775 it was about six feet less, according to Arnold, but still the falls were very impressive. The carry over such a pitch was of course a hard one, but fortunately not very long, probably not more than a quarter of a mile, and perhaps considerably less than that.

As soon as the army left Norridgewock the men began to feel they were now in the wilderness, for no more inhabitants could be looked for until the French settlements were reached. But while the fact of the wilderness had met them, the reality of it had not. Between Norridgewock Falls and Carritunk

Falls lay the Eden of the Kennebec,—perhaps the Eden of Maine. "The land we passed to-day was exceeding good," wrote Dearborn. In particular there were many islands of extraordinary fertility; Arnold dined at one and spent the night on another. But when Carritunk Falls had been passed, the outlook became extremely dark. That name itself was ominous. It is said to mean something very rough or broken, and to have been applied to the whole district beyond the falls. Anyhow, this point marks now, and marked then, the transition from lowlands to mountains, the entrance to the real wilderness.

The Kennebec, minus now the waters of the Carrabasset, assumed the guise of a highland stream, shallow, swifter even than before, and broken by many islands.[14] On the western bank, foothills came down to the very water, leaving no passage for the soldiers; but on the other side, the hills were more hospitable, and by marching on the high ground [15]—sometimes half a mile from the river—the troops were able to avoid both the tangled growth of the moist ground, and the many "logans," as the people call them now, where the water of the Kennebec "made up" into depressions between the hills.

Frequent tracks of moose testified to the wildness of the surrounding country. The weather turned bleak, and heavy, cold rains set in, drenching the men and injuring the stores. Minor difficulties were not small, even if there were a temporary surcease of major ones. The river did not fail to be vexatious and fatiguing now, when it was nothing worse, and marching over rough ground through pathless forests is not all pleasure. Finally the third and largest division reached the Great Carrying-place October 9th and 10th, and found there both of the preceding divisions.[16] Arnold arrived the next forenoon, and a part of the fourth division came later in the day.

The Kennebec River is formed by the junction of the East Branch, the outlet of Moosehead Lake by the way of Indian Pond, and the West Branch, the outlet of a series of ponds extending to the "height of land." The West Branch, or Dead River as it is usually called, pursues a south-easterly course aimed at the Kennebec valley, but just when it has arrived within some ten miles of its destination, the mountains drive it sharply toward the north for about that distance, and then send it eastward, to join the East Branch about fourteen miles above the Great Carrying-place. For

much of the way on this last stage, Dead River is wide, rapid, and shallow, and it has one large break, called Grand Falls; so that the stream is not navigable. Partly to atone for this, Nature has placed between the Kennebec valley and the place where Dead River turns north a triad of sizable ponds or small lakes, to suggest that boatmen "carry" across from the Kennebec to Dead River here; and since the earliest days of boating in this region the suggestion has been followed.

The precise point where the army left the Kennebec is readily found. As Arnold wrote in his journal, it

"is very remarkable, a large brook emptying itself into

proprietor of one of these places, as I did everywhere, for traditions and especially for relics.

"Oh, yes, there used to be a big rock in my mowing field, with 'B. D. A. 1775' on it; but the durned thing was in the way, and I blasted it out."

"What did those letters mean,—'B. D. A.'?"

"Why, Bennie Dick Arnold, of course."

And this illustrates very fairly a great part of the local information that one may pick up from uneducated people along the route.[18]

We have now reached another nodal point of the march: Arnold leaves the Kennebec, a stream partially known, and certainly a highway back to civilisation. So far the difficulties have been many enough and trying enough; but they have been difficulties that human energy and human intelligence could combat. The general health of the troops has been excellent.[19] Their exertions, however arduous, have not endangered either physique or morale. Provisions have been ample,—too ample, perhaps; for this is a democratic army serving the cause of independence, and there is reason to believe that a salutary closeness in dealing out the supplies would have been resented,

as the strictness of Morgan's discipline was. And besides the free use of army stores, which we may be sure was tolerated, other sources of supply have been found. Certain articles of food, such as beaver tails, dried salmon, and dried moose-meat, have been purchased of the people to an extent that we cannot measure, and carried by the men until used up. Some fresh meat has been obtained. Oxen have been driven along, and slaughtered at the proper time, very probably. Just below Carritunk Falls, Hendricks's company have killed a young moose, estimated to weigh two hundred pounds; farther on Dearborn tells us of catching fish; and we cannot doubt that


VIII

ON THE GREAT CARRYING-PLACE

SETH ADAMS, who lived on the Kennebec near where Arnold left it, died in 1882 at the age of about eighty-five. He had two sons who used to go to the first of the ponds mentioned in the last chapter to fish. In fact they made a business of fishing. In a single season, it is said, they took eleven hundred pounds of trout. This means that they went back and forth a good deal, and for years kept the trail pretty well marked.

Now when they began, Arnold's road was distinctly traceable. So people say, and so we can readily believe. They began as boys, and, as we may assume, about 1830, fifty-five years after the American army was here. It is well known that when evergreen woods are cut down—and, as the journals prove,[1] the forests of this region were of evergreens—a growth of hardwood takes their place. This is a fact constantly relied upon by woodsmen in finding

the absence of anything to oppose
ory, to accept the tradition that the Ad
s followed this line,—especially as Arn
d, based on an Indian trail, was doubt
best route. It is even easier to bel
t the path so long travelled by them
path one finds to-day, for people soon
to be numerous, and they were very
keep the trail alive, since it became
ular route from the Kennebec valley
ad River. We appear, then, to hav
igree for the present road.
Even were that not the case, we could ha
s Arnold's trail. The point of depart
destination, and the direction by com
known; and for a part of the way, a c
ge, where the outlet of the first pond fl
nds the possibilities on that side. So
safely be confident that we are here
route of the army.


SKETCH MAP
OF THE
GREAT CARRYING-PLACE.
PRESENT TRAILS
EXTINCT TRAILS, PROBABLY
USED BY ARNOLD.
N
S
KENNEBEC
RIVER
CAMP
EAST
CARRY
POND
LITTLE
CARRY
POND
DAN
WEST
CARRY
POND
CARRYING-
PLACE
MT.
EAST BRANCH OF
BOG BROOK
DEAD
RIVER
BROOK
BOG
DEAD
RIVER
MT. BIGELOW



ground brings one to the pond. Near where this level ground begins, the trail crosses diagonally what is called the Old Canada Road, a lane four rods wide, it is said, cut through the forest some fifty years ago, the first waggon road from the Maine settlements to Quebec. As one approaches the pond, the present path turns abruptly toward the north a short distance from the water, and runs a strong quarter of a mile along the shore to a group of sportsmen's cabins called "Arnold Camp"; but the soldiers, we may be sure, carried their burdens as short a distance as possible, and laid them down at the south-eastern extremity of the pond.[3]

Morgan's division was sent forward, it will be remembered, to clear a road across the Great Carrying-place. The route was not hard to discover, for, according to Henry, Steele's party had found the trail "tolerably distinct," and had made it still more so by blazing the trees and "snagging" the bushes with tomahawks.[4] The road, if we call it by that name, was of course bad, but "capable of being made good," as Lieutenant Church reported, because the ground was generally firm; and the pioneers proceeded at once to clear it for the army.

Unfortunately they had but very little time. Hendricks's company of riflemen did not reach the Great Carrying-place until October 7th, and were prevented from working the next day by a heavy rain. Morgan was probably a little in advance, but not much, for all the "riflars" left Norridgewock at about the same time[5]; and the rest of the army began to arrive on the 7th.[6] Consequently it became necessary to detail men of later companies to assist in the road-making.

Unfortunately, also, the hard rains of October 8th and 9th soaked the firm ground very thoroughly, while soft spots—and there are many of them on this portage—became positively miry. It was impossible for the riflemen to find a dry place to camp, and for two nights the men passed the hours chiefly in sitting around the fires. Staggering along under the weight of a bateau,—often filled or partly filled with lading[7]—they sank "half-leg deep" in the wet earth, and now and then, slipping in the mud, fell and brought their burden down with them. Too often the rickety boat smashed in the process, and the strain of such a tussle fatigued and even exhausted the men.

Doubtless the ground became firmer after a time, and the later divisions experienced

less difficulty. But the labour was tremendous at best. Some of the commanders, if not all, had the pork unpacked and strung on sticks for convenience of transportation, but the heavy bateaux had to be carried up the hills and across the sloughs on the sore and aching shoulders of the men; and Senter's Account assures us that seven trips, or even eight, were necessary to get everything across. Happily youth, strength, patience, and pluck are equal to any hardship. Every mishap was turned into a joke. The officers took their full share of everything disagreeable,[8] and cheered the men with inspiring words; and so at length all came to the first pond, where, according to Arnold, the soldiers "caught a prodigious number of fine salmon trout, nothing being more common than a man's taking eight or ten dozen in one hour's time, which generally weigh half a pound apiece." The main thing, however, was to get across.

This body of water—East or Big Carry Pond, it is called—is quite irregular in form, though very roughly lemon-shaped, and according to Lieutenant Church's estimate—doubtless the best, for he had a surveyor, and made a business of measuring and estimating—one and one-fourth miles long. Unluckily

the great rain was followed by a great wind, with occasional squalls of snow. One man was fatally injured by the blowing down of a tree, and for several days boating was hindered or prevented. When the water became passable, half a mile of rowing brought the army to the other side.[9]

But where? Certainly not at the trail used now. Perhaps the voyage ended at a huge overhanging boulder, called Arnold's Rock, which is half a mile or so from the point where the army probably struck the pond. Signs of a path from this point are still visible, and it was formerly the usual trail, for the distance to the second pond is thought by the guides to be less by that route than by any other. It is natural to suppose that the shortest line was the one the Indians and the army took, but certainly we can feel no confidence here.

The second portage, running almost due west according to the surveyor's compass, measured twenty rods more than half a mile, and was not only short but pretty good, for the ground, though rough, was hard. Probably it reached the second lake, Little Carry Pond, about where the trail of to-day finds it, for on crossing the pond in the same direction as Arnold, one arrives where he did.

Little Carry Pond was half a mile wide and two and one-half miles in length, according to Arnold,[10] but other estimates of the voyage across run from three-fourths of a mile to a mile and a half. In this case a reason may be found for the differences. After the pond, a muddy, unattractive piece of water, surrounded then, as now, with dead and moss-grown trees, had been crossed, the course lay, as it still lies, up an inlet or arm about three-fourths of a mile long,[11] and some of the journalists might very naturally include this distance in their figures for the width of the pond.

The trail between the second and the third ponds has been completely lost. The way was "very bad" then, and is very bad now,—so much resemblance there is. Arnold describes it as "extremely bad, being choaked up with roots which we could not clear away, it being a work of time." This indicates that a part at least of the road lay through low and swampy ground, and such ground may be seen to-day on the eastern side of the next pond, quite a little north of the termination of the path most used at present. However, the route had one thing in its favour: it was only a mile and three-eighths in length,[12] and certainly bateaux could be transported that

distance through pretty deep mud more easily than twice as far by a trail like the present one.

West Carry Pond, the last of the series, is also the largest. Three miles long and two miles wide it was called by the surveying party, while Arnold himself added half a mile to each figure. Its form is quite regular, but one distinguishing feature is very noticeable, — a long, narrow arm of land projecting into the lake from the south-eastern side. The present path, alluded to above, reaches the lake just south of this arm, but the boggy ground, where it has been suggested that Arnold may have arrived, is on the other side of it.[13]

Then came the fourth and hardest carry, only twenty rods less than three miles long.[14] Here again we find local information to guide us. Samuel Parsons of Dead River Post-office, a mile or so beyond the end of this portage, settled here about 1850; and he tells us that at that time it was easy to follow with the eye the line of the Arnold road as it came down the side of the mountain, for the foliage there was clearly different from the foliage on either side; and further, he tells us, the line marked out by this lighter green of the hard-wood trees ran substantially as the road goes

now. One can believe — and so the woodsmen assure us — that such a difference could easily persist from 1775 to 1850; but, aside from this aid to identification, we find a sufficient argument in the general correspondence between the present road [15] and the descriptions of 1775.

First there was a short mile of ascent. At the very start it was, and is, decidedly steep, and Captain Dearborn described it as a "Very-high-Hill." Next came about a mile of easy downward slope, and, finally, for nearly the same distance, a "savanna."

It was this last division of the portage that nearly broke the hearts of the toiling soldiers. At a distance the savanna seemed like "a beautiful plat of firm ground, covered by an elegant green moss," [16] divided by a large grove of spruces and cedars, with grey moss and half-withered bushes here and there, and in places almost impenetrable thickets; but at every step the men sank eight or ten inches through the treacherous moss into mud, and found at the bottom the sharp snags of dead trees. In a word, as Squier declared, the first part of this carrying-place was very bad, and the rest of it a hundred times worse; and Squier, we recall, belonged to the fourth

division, and therefore crossed after the road-makers had done what they could. But at last, with infinite patience and effort, this difficulty also was overcome. The army arrived then at what is called Bog Brook,[17] a small serpentine creek, running toward the north and emptying into Dead River. The distance to be navigated on this stream was a mile or a little less.[18]

Nowadays the brook is not navigable at all, for deposits of sand and mud have choked it up, but in 1775 it was about a dozen feet wide most of the way, and, according to Senter, "much deeper than wide." Joyfully the bateaux were launched in this natural canal, and in a little time Dead River came in sight.[19]

It was October 6th or 7th when the first of the soldiers[20] appeared at the Great Carrying-place; on the 13th, portions of the first and second divisions reached Dead River, and on October 20th the last of the troops were in motion up the river.[21] Arnold himself arrived at the carrying-place on the 11th, and left it five days later. During the interval he was of course attentive in a general way to the progress of the men, but there were certain special cares to occupy him.

So far the health of the army had mostly been excellent,[22] but that good fortune could not be expected to last for ever. The weather grew bad. Rain fell again on the 14th and the 19th, and some of the troops had no tents. Exposure and fatigue began to tell upon them, and indeed a small number were already ill. Of their own motion, the first division had thrown together a "bush hut"[23] for the sick on the second portage, but that was inadequate. So Arnold ordered the construction of a log hospital there, and the soldiers christened it "Arnold Hospital" and "Fort Meggs."[24] Dr. Irvin[25] and eight or ten sick men took immediate possession, and soon the number of invalids began, of course, to increase.

On the first portage a small log house was erected near the Kennebec the same day,[26]—the day after Arnold reached the Great Carrying-place. Its purpose was to serve as a dépôt for "men and provisions," so Arnold explains; and in order to carry out his plan of accumulating here a reserve of provisions for an emergency,—in particular to secure his retreat, as he informed Washington,—he ordered Colonel Farnsworth, his commissary, to hire men and bring up to this house the hundred barrels or so of provisions left behind.[27]

Architecture, however, was the least of the commander's employments. On his arrival the day before, Lieutenant Church had reported the courses and distances from the Kennebec to Dead River.[28] Now came Lieutenant Steele with his budget. The scouting party under his command left Fort Western on the 24th of September, as we recall, made their way to the last pond at the head of Dead River, crossed the height of land, and reached what they called the Chaudière River.[29] One of them, climbing a tree, was able to follow the meandering course of the stream, and even —as he thought—make out Chaudière Lake at a distance of fourteen or fifteen miles. This appeared to prove that the army was on the true path to Canada, and the company turned back at once.

The journey of the scouting party downstream was unfortunate. Their canoes were broken, and provisions ran out. Steele with two of his men, however, leaving the others to recruit their strength—as it was supposed they could—on the meat of two moose that were fortunately killed, hurried on to meet Arnold, and reported cheeringly a route free from Indians, a "fine deep river most part of the way," and a plenty of game. The distance to

the carry over the height of land he reckoned as eighty miles.[30]

Upon this the two lieutenants were immediately sent forward again[31] with twenty axe-men and a surveyor. They were "to clear the portages and take a survey of the country" to Lake Megantic,[32] and then Steele was to go down the Chaudière River till he approached the settlements, examine the falls and portages, and report at Lake Megantic.

The next day (October 13th) was not less busy for the commander. Washington had urged him to communicate with Schuyler if he could, and it now seemed time to make an attempt. Washington had also suggested that Indians of the St. Francis[33] tribe might be employed as messengers, and apparently one or more of them, who had been making a visit at the Cambridge camp, were now with Arnold for that purpose. However this may be, Arnold wrote a letter to friends[34] of his in Quebec, with an enclosure to be forwarded on to General Schuyler. The object of both letters was to announce his approach and request information. His purpose in coming was "to frustrate the arbitrary and unjust measures of the ministry and restore liberty to our brethren of Canada." The state of things

sentiments of the people were inqu
, and he promised rewards to any of
aintances who would come to meet h
letters were entrusted to Eneas and
r Indian, and John Hall, who could sp
ich, went with them.[35]
) far as announcing his approach was c
ed, these letters proved successful,—o
as the British Lieutenant-Governor v
ved the information; in other respe
were a total failure. Whether the Indi
me traitors or captives, surrendered th
ge willingly or unwillingly, we cannot
but Arnold was disposed to look up
l as false.[36] The white man, however, m
upposed to have done good service. H
rs were to ascertain the sentiments
people, gain all the information of ev
that he could, particularly about the Bi
troops and that other enemy, the riv
meet the army at Lake Megantic, wh

Washington, adding in a letter that he now had some nine hundred and fifty effective men and provisions for about twenty-five days.[37] It appears also from this letter that he did not feel sure of pushing on to Quebec. Only at Lake Megantic did he intend to determine his plan finally. Should it then be deemed necessary to retreat, there would still be sufficient provisions, he reckoned, to bring the army back to the Kennebec; and there, in the log house, would be found enough to carry them down to civilisation. For the men he had only praise, though he regretted that in general they did not understand the management of bateaux, and were compelled to wade and haul them more than half the way. But now he hoped the greatest difficulties were over.

Enos, the commander of the rear, was ordered to station a bateau on each of the ponds, so that sick men could pass back toward home, and to make other needful arrangements for them.[38] These matters all attended to, Arnold went on, and October 16th began to ascend Dead River.[39]

As the pioneers of the van were beginning to make the semblance of a road through the savanna of the last carry, a group of feeble and emaciated men staggered across it, and

ion to relieve their comrades, but
reason it did not reach them; and
of the scouting party, after waiting seve
for the promised succour to arrive, a
ing meanwhile on a diet of nothing b
moose meat, concluded that the army h
ated, and set out with their remnant
gth to overtake it.[40]

IX


LOWER DEAD RIVER

IT was an interesting spot where the army found itself after crossing the morass of the fourth portage. Below this point, Bog Brook and Dead River were nearly parallel, though soon to unite. Between the two lay a meadow covered with a luxuriant growth of native grass, and apparently extending westward for several miles. Out of this floor rose a lofty mountain, the front of a short but rugged chain, Mt. Bigelow.[1] Still more interesting to the army, and hardly less beautiful, were the smooth black waters of Dead River, about sixty yards wide, as Arnold thought.[2]

The first stage of a considerable part of the army on this highway seemed a backward move, for a journey of a mile up the river brought them back to the grassy meadow that lay between it and Bog Brook.[3] But, of course, it was vastly easier to make the two miles, or something less, down the brook and up the

river, than to transport the boats and baggage across a wide field.

Regular rations were fixed on October 15th as three-quarters of a pound of flour — almost exactly a pint — and an equal weight of pork each day, and after devouring a yoke of oxen that were driven to this point, the army settled down to this limited regimen with good grace. So mild was the current of the river, apparently, that rapid progress appeared sure, but this natural expectation was disappointed. As Arnold remarked, the river seemed reluctant to leave Mt. Bigelow, and meandered to and fro without permitting the impatient army to advance. "Two hours passed away, and we had gained nothing in our course," wrote Arnold. But gradually the stream "returned to its proper course." The river was very uniform in width, and the water deep and still.[4] The banks rose probably eight or ten feet high, well clothed with bushes, and on either side stretched a large expanse of flood-plain,—covered thinly with trees which sometimes grew to be large, or with grass that stood waist high in places, but faded out in the spots of cold soil,—bounded at a distance of a few miles with hills or mountains. Unfortunately, the current proved stronger than


A
FIRST POND
SARAMPUS FALLS
ARNOLD'S CAMP, OCT. 24?
SHADAGEE FALLS
"CAMP DISASTER", OCT. 23?
ALDER STREAM
"CAMP FLOOD", ARNOLD, OCT. 21 AND 22?
LEDGE FALLS
TIM BROOK
BLACK CAT RAPIDS
EUSTIS DAM
APPROXIMATE DIAGRAM
OF A PORTION OF
DEAD RIVER.
SOUTH BRANCH
ARNOLD FALLS
B
ARNOLD'S CAMP, OCT. 19 AND 20.
"CAMP GREENE" ARNOLD, OCT. 16-18.
C
FLAGSTAFF POINT.
HURRICANE FALLS
DEARBORN'S CAMP, OCT. 16.
APPROXIMATE GENERAL COURSE
FROM A TO B, SOUTH 40° EAST
" B " C, NORTH 52° EAST
" C " D, SOUTH 60° EAST
" D " E, NORTH-EAST
D
BOG BROOK
E



it seemed, and as the boats were not all supplied with enough oars or paddles, perhaps, in spite of Arnold's anxiety about them at Fort Western, and as the water was too deep for the poles to serve, progress had to be made or aided in some cases by pulling at the bushes of the river's bank.[5]

Eight miles or a little more from Bog Brook by the river came a pronounced interruption, called nowadays Hurricane Falls, which it was necessary to carry forty yards around.[6] Like most of the other falls that annoyed the army in its passage up the stream, this was not a vertical drop, a cataract, but a series of tumultuous ripples,—in short, violent rapids. The drop in the level of the river was about eight feet, and it was useless for Arnold's boatmen to think of taking their loaded bateaux through such water. Five miles farther on,[7] a point of land some twenty feet higher than the river made out against it from the north, and seemingly drove the stream the opposite way. The point was indeed "beautifully situated," as Dearborn wrote, commanding an outlook on the river both up and down, and a noble view of the whole range of Bigelow on the other side of the valley.

Here, in a considerable clearing, Natanis,

something still more substantial, the villa
Flagstaff.[8] Steele and the scouting party
given particular orders to capture or kil
"noted villain," as Arnold styled him, be
ıe declared himself a partisan and spy o
British. Steele did what he could, but in
or instead of letting himself be caugh
Indian was hovering about the party, an
serving its manœuvres, from the mome
built a fire in Dead River valley. No
was lost and much was gained by this fa
or Natanis—whether or no he was ma
sport of Berry and Getchell, when he c
ıimself a scout of Carleton's — joined
Americans later, as we shall see, and pro
faithful friend.

Morgan's division was intended to lea
ırmy. It left Fort Western in the van, a
ırrived first at the Great Carrying-place.
here it seems to have been delayed b
engineering duties, and Greene's comm

camped on the evening of October 16th three or four miles beyond the house of Natanis, on the south side of the river, at a place that may be named for convenience Camp Greene. They were eager to get on as far as possible, and must have been grievously vexed by the aimless wanderings of the stream.[9] The distance from Flagstaff to Eustis is eight miles by land, but more than twice as much by water. In paddling for two hours beyond the Point they cannot have gained a mile, and the veerings of the course did more than "box the compass." What was far more vexing still, after finally reaching Camp Greene, the division could not leave it for five days.

The cause was even more disquieting than the fact: provisions were on the point of giving out. According to Humphrey and Topham, the men were "brought to one-half pint of flour for each" on the morning of the 16th. Thayer also mentions half rations that day, and both he and Humphrey speak of beginning the next with "but 5 or 6 lb. of flour" for fifty or sixty men.[10] Arnold's account of the situation is more favourable, but certainly alarming.

We cannot possibly understand the case: on the 15th, as already mentioned, Arnold wrote Enos that the first three divisions had

provisions enough for more than three weeks; yet the very next day Greene's men were put on shortened rations, and saw starvation at the tent door. No journal undertakes to explain the situation. There is no mention of any disaster since the Kennebec was left behind; there was no occasion for any serious accident. Humphrey, Thayer, and Topham only state the facts; Arnold merely adds in parentheses, "great part of their bread being damaged." Perhaps we are simply to conclude that all of the damage was done on the Kennebec, but much of it not discovered until this time. Yet how could it escape discovery? The worst of the navigation on the Kennebec was below Norridgewock Falls, for the journals have

The attempt to replenish the store of provisions was even more alarming than the discovery of a lack. Arnold himself had reached Camp Greene on the evening of the 16th,[11] and the next day undertook to help the division obtain supplies. Major Bigelow was directed to go back with men and boats for provisions,[12] and Enos was ordered by letter to give him all that could be spared. Bigelow set out accordingly with twelve bateaux, three lieutenants, six sergeants, and eighty-seven men to get the supplies, while the rest of the men were ordered to employ their time in making cartridges. Judge of the astonishment of the division, when the boats returned four days later with nothing but a barrel or two of flour.[13] It was a desperate dilemma; yet the officers did not hesitate. They decided to send back all who were unfit for "actual duty," and the next day, October 22d, they pushed on. They counted on getting supplies at the French settlements on the Chaudière, and supposed that these were not far away.

Meantime the rest of the army had been advancing. Morgan's division passed Greene's at noon on the 17th, and resumed the lead. Meigs and his division spent the night of the 18th in Camp Greene,[14] and went forward the

meantime detail men to clear the car
ace over the height of land [15]; and on the
rt of the fourth division arrived at the c
But an unexpected enemy now assail
my. On the 19th there were "small r
Arnold called them, all day; but at
clock the storm abated,[17] and Arnold p
to a carrying-place of fifteen perches,
ntly at what we now call Arnold Falls
fore this Arnold mentions nothing c
rt except what may be identified clea
urricane Falls, and he calls this "the s
rrying-place." Besides, this is in abou
ght spot for Arnold Falls, and he re
other such obstacle, until, after adva
ne miles farther, he came to a group of r
t at all like Arnold Falls. As the latte
t small, and the boats certainly must
en carried here, it seems perfectly sa
y that we have now reached Arnold
t this point he camped for the nigh

The next day (October 21st), more rain fell. The river had already risen several feet, and still it poured, while a furious gale from the south-west[18] filled the river with broken or uprooted trees, and the men in camp listened in terror to the smashing and crashing near them in the forest. In spite of weather the army moved,—all but the hungry division in Camp Greene,[19] which had made its cartridges and packed them in casks "ready for immediate embarkation," but had still to wait for provisions. Arnold himself camped a mile in advance of Morgan that evening, while the third division (Meigs's) lay between them and Arnold Falls, and the fourth division was partly in Camp Greene, and partly a little way below. Then came the flood.

Dead River drains a large number of ponds, and now all these natural reservoirs were combining their forces. Suddenly in the darkness the river swelled portentously. In nine hours it rose eight feet.[20] At four o'clock in the morning, Arnold and his party were awakened by the rush of waters, and before they could remove their baggage, it was all in the flood.[21] The riflemen, just below, had camped in a bad place, and they also were driven away from their beds during the night by the rising

stream.[22] The rest of the divisions were more fortunate, but Squier noted that in the morning four feet of water stood where the fire had been the evening before.[23] And this was not all. The weather grew rapidly cold ; and, as many of the soldiers had no protection but the boughs of trees, they suffered greatly.[24]

Sunday, the 22d, found the army in a desperate plight. Many of the boats were now under water or half submerged. The current of the river proved so swift that head could scarcely be made against it. All the landmarks were altered. Portages had disappeared under water, and in one or two instances the boats were floated over a carrying-place. The soldiers who went by land fared no better,—

X

UPPER DEAD RIVER

HERE we come to a crisis of the expedition, and also to a crisis of our study. We are now to share the embarrassments of the troops. Up to Arnold Falls one can easily keep pace with the march of the expedition; beyond that point it is hard to do so.

There are several reasons for this. As we have already found, estimates of distance differed widely even in the case of a short course by land. To estimate distances by water was far more difficult, because the rate of speed could not be so accurately gauged; and on Dead River this difficulty was increased by having to allow for a current of unknown and varying swiftness. Embarassment arises also from the fact that not one of the journals is complete in enumerating the natural features of the river, particularly falls and affluents, and most of them are very incomplete indeed. Again, we find on comparing the journals that

our various authors give widely differing accounts of the same courses. Take, for instance, the series of portages between Arnold Falls and the first pond above, as figured in rods. Arnold's series is: 10, 26, 75, 73, 7, 12, 6, 40, 100; Dearborn's: 35, 30, 74, 74, 74, 4, 4, 90. It is of course impossible to harmonise the two series, though some of the numbers appear to correspond. The distance from the outlet of Bog Brook to Camp Greene is reckoned almost as variously: Arnold, eighteen miles; Dearborn, twenty-six miles; Meigs, (apparently) twenty miles; Melvin, twenty-five miles. Many such differences may be due — in part, at least — to the flood, which changed the whole aspect of the river just at

hammered the banks, and very possibly have shortened the stream in some places by cutting through the isthmus of an "ox-bow." As they come down over falls they dig up the bottom, and perhaps they have in this way closed the old channel; and of course the usual wearing process of a rapid stream has to be counted upon.

But an effort at least must be made to solve the mysteries of the next few days, and in Arnold's journal we may find a guide that is mainly satisfactory.

According to his account, no carrying was necessary for nine miles beyond the violent rapids which we have identified as Arnold Falls, and in fact one can paddle easily there now for a distance reckoned as about nine miles by the most competent guides and residents. Five "ripples" are met with, but none of them is at all serious. At one point, at least, blasting has been done, but nothing suggests that falls of any importance existed there before. So close an agreement between Arnold's figure and the present estimate is almost suspicious; but this is the easiest place on the river to guess distance, perhaps, and Arnold had not exceeded the truth very much below this point. We are surprised to find

ious difficulty, Arnold seems to have
ered it, as well as other affluents, not v
ntion. Yet it is a considerable river.
t, at the point of junction it looks l
in Dead River itself; and, accordin
enry, some of Morgan's men went that
quite a distance, believing it the
irse.

At the upper end of the nine-mile stret
e village of Eustis, the last settlement,
lam across Dead River. The high w
the mill-pond disguises the natural ch
of the stream, but it looks as if rather
oids had existed formerly at this p
iat, however, does not appear to have l
e fact, for a careful and trustworthy resi
tes that when a former dam was car
ay by a freshet many years ago, the
re only a few rods in extent. There
en blasting here, yet little more than
cessary to secure a good foundation for

turn. The bow is half a mile long, while the string is considerably less than a quarter of a mile.[3] At present the boatmen travel by the string, taking their canoes from the water a little way below the dam. In 1775, however, when the present road was covered with trees, they seem to have made a short carry at the falls, and returned to the water, for Arnold now speaks of going half a mile by the river. This distance would have brought him to the next bar encountered by the boatmen of to-day. That is Black Cat Rapids, not quite two hundred rods by water above the dam. Arnold mentions here a portage of twenty-six rods. At present a rod or two suffice; but the dam has raised the water considerably, and it may well be that in 1775 the rapids were longer. Besides, gunpowder or dynamite has been at work there. Perhaps wet ground made a slight detour necessary.

We come now to a difficulty. The next carrying-place at present is at Ledge Falls, which begin about a mile and a half above; but Arnold reports only half a mile of paddling here, which, with the twenty-six rods of portage, would be less than three-fourths of a mile. That is not the whole truth, however, for while his items of water travel for the day

tacts of the river. The chara
that he describes, also, seems t
we are still on the right trac
journal—if no error has been m
it — is simply mistaken about t
seemed to create our difficulty.

The most pronounced feature
tion of Dead River between B
the ponds is undoubtedly Ledge
are usually spoken of as Upper
but the Lower Fall itself may be
The length of the first part of
about sixty rods; then come th
rods of navigable water; and
fifty rods of almost continuous
bring one to the dam at Upper
This last stretch is so bad, howe
almost impassable; and, accordin
tion which seems highly reason
dian practice was to avoid it.

Arnold's journal shows no evidence of this great obstruction except at one point. That point we reach in his account precisely where we meet Ledge Falls in the river, if we accept the theory of a slight mistake proposed above, and the features of the account seem to fit pretty closely the peculiar nature of the spot, for there was a portage of seventy-five rods separated by navigable water from a portage of seventy-three rods, and the fall avoided by the latter was "very considerable and long."[5]

The length of the navigable water, however, Arnold called ninety rods. Possibly there is a copyist's error here. A figure four is often written so that it looks like a nine, and one of the other journalists, referring apparently to this piece of water, calls it forty rods long. Possibly, too, the appearance of the river has changed. At present there are two half-dams — wing-dams, they are called — in the course of the Lower Falls, designed to throw the entire stream into the channel best fitted to be a sluiceway for the logs; and perhaps, were they not in existence, the intermediate space would be longer. In that case the seventy-five rods of the first portage would be obtained by beginning to carry a little lower down, so as to cut off an angle of the river.[6]

the distance to Black Cat Rapi
lessened." But the main argum
facts, all taken together, seem
Ledge Falls belong at this
journal, and therefore some exp
exist for slight apparent disagre

At the upper end of this hard s
overtook the riflemen on the ev
tober 21st; but, as they had enca
place, he went on a mile farthe
pitched his tents in what we may
venience, Camp Flood. Here, a
Upper Ledge Falls, he was ass
rising waters before morning, an
mained through the following da
baggage and preparing to move
Morgan passed with his compa
o'clock in the morning, and Meig
of his division, came up at five o
afternoon.

stream by reason of the freshet very quick; in ab^{t} 3 miles we came to the crotch of the river. Our Co [urse] was ab^{t} W^{t} Here we found that the land [party] had by mistake taken the S. W. or wrong course which we rowed up two miles, and sent men ahead to inform them of their mistake and direct their march. This mistake occasioned a detention of the Battoes and whole division near 2 hours; when the whole were formed, we proceeded up the river against a very rapid stream ab^{t} 3 miles to 7th carrying place, Co[urse] over N^{o} 35 E. distant ^{10} 7 perches; here we had the misfortune of oversetting 7 Battoes and loosing all the provisions. Here the whole division encamped, the river continues high and rapid, and as our provisions are but short and no intelligence from Canada, I ordered a counsell of Warr."

About three miles beyond the place where we have fixed Camp Flood, Alder Stream enters Dead River. The junction may properly be called a crotch, for the two streams are nearly equal in apparent size, and the angle between them is only half of a right angle. Dearborn states that he sent his bateau four miles up the affluent in search of the land party, and found that the party had struck across to Dead River. Now Alder Stream is navigable for that distance, and the nature of the country is such that the lumbermen often make such a "cross-cut." One difficulty, meets us, however: Arnold's statement

:ad River ran here from about twen
grees west of north.[11] But Meigs state
: affluent came from the westward, an
could hardly have done had he under
at Dead River was flowing there fro
:st. In short, we must conclude that A
oke loosely, if he wrote what we now h
Two miles or something more, as
nated, above the mouth of Alder St
e Upper Shadagee Falls,[13] which ar
the description of the next obstru
entioned by Arnold, for there is a
ough short pitch,[14] such as his portag
ven rods would circumvent, with a
ece of swift, hard water below. Just as
proaches the pitch, going up-stream,
'er makes a short double turn arou
ff, running very swiftly. Meigs's acc
ems to fit the spot precisely: "At this
e stream is very rapid, in passing which
six battoes filled and overset"; and at

to Arnold's account, of "such officers as were present," and apparently these were Meigs and his subordinates, Captain Hendricks, Captain Smith,[16] and very likely Captain Morgan, also.[17]

In accordance with the decisions of the council, twenty-six invalids[18] were sent back the next morning under the care of an officer and doctor, while Captain Hanchet of Meigs's division hurried forward, with a picked company[19] of fifty men, to secure provisions for the army in the French settlements of the Chaudière valley. At the same time Greene and Enos were ordered to press on with as many of their best men as they could supply with rations for fifteen days, and send all the rest back.[20] The next day, after seeing these matters attended to, exhorting the soldiers to persevere, and getting them also started forward, the commander set out with a small party, and pushed for the head of the column.

Here came the part of the river where estimates of distance are most likely to err. One's only helps in reckoning are time and fatigue, and in rapid, shallow water like this, where oars and paddles can seldom be used, where every yard of advance means a dead thrust against the current, and where time is constantly lost by grounding or by catching on

...ly on the swiftly passing water, I
ves in that way an impression of m
ore rapidly than he does. For these re
must now be prepared to discount Ar
ures a good deal.

Setting out at noon on October 24t
cords advancing "about 7 miles —
oid water," and then arriving at a p
ort falls about a hundred yards apart.
scription seems to fit Sarampus Falls,
five miles above Upper Shadagee.
per one of the pair is a sharp drop of a
e feet, and the blasting that has been
out it does not seem to have altere
sential character. Only a short car
eded at such a place, and Arnold's fi
the one he made is six rods. The por
twelve rods at the lower rapids is like
fficient. We still seem to be on the
ack.[21]

Beyond these falls, Arnold thought h

but at four o'clock in the morning the wind swung around to the north, and the weather cleared. Daylight found two inches of snow on the ground.[22]

From Sarampus Falls to the first pond is perhaps three miles, but in 1775 the foot of the pond was about a quarter of a mile above the present dam. Arnold reports proceeding a mile and a half, crossing a portage of forty rods, advancing a mile, carrying a hundred rods, and finally pushing on half a mile more through rapid water to the pond. This would make, in all, a little less than four and a half miles by his reckoning, against about three and a quarter according to present estimates. All things considered, the difference is not surprising, and — in a word — we seem to have made the journal fit the river as well as could reasonably have been expected. With but very slight allowances for error in the original or the copy of Arnold's report, we have found all the principal features of the stream, both the falls and the long reaches of smoother water, dropping into their proper places.[23]

The other journals do not compare with Arnold's in completeness or carefulness. In general, they confirm us at some points, differ at others, and at still others add more or less

useful details; but their evidence is no way decisive.[24]

At Camp Disaster the third division, the companies of Smith and Hendricks, and perhaps Morgan's company also, passed the night of the 23d. The next morning they set forward again. Several boats were capsized, and not a little baggage, provisions, and ammunition — besides a few guns and considerable money — was lost.[25] Whether the first division passed from river to pond late on the 25th or early on the 26th, we are unable to determine. Close behind followed the third division. Nothing eventful seems to have marked its hard labour for these two days. Like those who went before, it had to cross one carrying-place more than a quarter of a mile long, where the water proved too swift and rocky, and perhaps also too shallow, for navigation; and on the 26th all arrived — some early and some late[26] — at the first pond.[27] The land-party, meanwhile, had continued to struggle with difficulties that constantly increased. The only testimony bearing upon the matter shows that they travelled on the west side of the river, and the topography of the district seems to confirm this. More and more sternly the valley closed upon them, and at places the

precipices came sheer to the water's edge as they do at present.[28]

Experiences decidedly more dramatic befell the rest of the detachment at this juncture. Greene and his division were proceeding a few miles ahead of the fourth division.[29] Just how far they had advanced by the night of the 24th we cannot say with any certainty, for neither Humphrey, Topham, nor Thayer has given a precise account of his doings at this time; but apparently they were not far from Camp Disaster.[30] Here they remained in camp the next forenoon, while forty-eight sick men were sent off with a subaltern to the rear, and Greene went forward to inquire of Arnold, what could be done about provisions[31]; and before long Enos with some of his officers came up. Greene returned before or about noon, quite unsuccessful, for Arnold was beyond his reach[32]; and then the division went on three miles, while the leaders held a conference with Enos and his officers. Next, sending some boats back to bring provisions from the fourth division, Greene's troops encamped to await their return.[33]

The essential question before the conference was a momentous one: Should these two divisions keep on or turn back? Or what

should be done? The situation was discouraging enough[34]; but duty and honour bade the troops advance, until the order to retreat had been given by the commander; and the commander, instead of sending such an order, had just written Greene and Enos to press on.

Evidently the officers of the fourth division had resolved upon returning, and perhaps the council was called in the hope that it might give them a semblance of authorisation. That it did not do. Williams, McCobb, and Scott, Adjutant Hyde and Lieutenant Peters — all of the fourth division — voted for the return of the whole party, while Greene, Bigelow, Topham, Thayer, and Hubbard[35] voted that only a portion — doubtless the sick, and those who


The officers who resolved at all hazards on going forward counted, at least, on a division of supplies. In fact they had been given ground for doing so. But they were mistaken. Thayer and a volunteer, borrowing a boat of Major Colburn, "ran rapidly down with the current" until they met the fourth division; but, to their utter astonishment, no supplies were given them. Enos declared that his men were beyond his control, and had resolved to keep all they possessed. He declared also, we may assume, since that was his contention later, that he had only enough provisions left for four days. Entreaties, arguments, and reproaches were used in vain for a long while; but finally Captain Williams aided the petitioners, and they were given two barrels of flour.[87] With this "small pittance," as Senter calls it, the resolute on-goers had to be content; and some of them, throwing aside everything except what each man could carry on his back, pushed on at once,[88] resolved to perish rather than abandon the expedition.[89] The rest followed the next day.

XI

ARNOLD CROSSES THE HEIGHT OF LAND

ON Tuesday, October 24th, Arnold, as we saw, embarked at noon in a bateau,[1] passed his troops, and pushed on with all speed, intending to reach the French settlements in the quickest possible time, and send provisions back to the army. The next day, quite early in the forenoon, he passed from Dead River into what is now called the Chain of Ponds, and for a considerable distance followed a route that is unmistakable, though a very high dam[2] has been placed at the outlet, and the aspect of all the lower ponds a good deal modified by the resulting change of level.

According to Arnold's account, the first pond—or lake, as he called it—was three and one half miles long, but contracted to a width of two rods a mile and a half below the upper end. Evidently one might as well say there were two ponds; and in most cases people now give the names Lower Pond and Bag Pond to


HORSESHOE POND
OTTER POND
WOBURN TOTE ROAD
HORSE SHOE STREAM
SPIDER LAKE TRAIL
BEAR BROOK
ROUND POND
NATANIS POND
MEGANTIC CLUB CAMP
LITTLE POCKET POND
POCKET POND
BROOK
CLEARWATER
LONG POND
INDIAN STREAM
BAG POND
LOWER POND
DAM
DEAD RIVER
CANADA
2200
2165
2100
1000
1965
1626
1825
1460
1370
1400
N
S
MAP OF CHAIN OF PONDS.
ONE MILE.

this portion of the Chain.[3] By the best surveys the total length of the two is only a couple of miles; though, as already mentioned, the first pond is longer than it used to be.

Next, Arnold came to some marshy ground, —covered pretty well with water at present,— found a rivulet, which has become now a wide strait, and after half a mile of rowing entered what is to-day Long Pond, though the upper end of it, partly cut off by a projection from the western shore,[4] bears also a name of its own, Natanis Pond.[5] To Arnold the two lakes appeared to be five miles long, while we can allow but half that extent; but his mistake is not surprising—indeed he suspected the error himself—for the wind was blowing heavily against him, blustering snow squalls cut off his view, and several times his party had to go ashore to bail out the bateaux.[6]


Natanis Pond is closed by a very long sandy tongue of land running out from the western side. So it was in 1775. Arnold noted that a passage or strait only three rods wide was left open for a short distance, and that beyond it lay "a small round Pond or rather the north end of the Lake." This description is clear and correct, and the body of water beyond the tongue is now called Round Pond, though, to

one still is, unless thoroughly familiar
place. It looked as if they could not
pond except by land, and no portage c
found. At length they discovered "a s
ook,"—in effect a part of Dead River
present more commonly spoken of by
des as Horse Shoe Stream. The wat
brook was shallow, the current often s
l the way barred with drift logs in n
ces. Night began to approach; and,
cing his way a mile and a half, as he thou
nold found himself compelled to halt.
s eleven o'clock before the party "coulc
nfortable to lie down"; and even then s
s not easy, for either the scouts had n
marks, or Arnold had missed them, an
uld not feel satisfied whether he had l
ng right or not.
Thursday morning one of the party was
tched up the stream to look for sign
portage, while the rest had breakfast

though the "loggers" have probably widened it somewhat in clearing the way for their "drives," it must be still very much as it was a century and a quarter ago, and at present its frequent shallows and swift water and its endless meanderings make it seem interminable. The region itself added to the tediousness of the stream, for while the ponds had been walled up with what Arnold called "prodigious high mountains," the country on either side for a considerable distance was now either swampy or monotonously rolling.

The journey on Horse Shoe Stream was reckoned by Arnold as five miles,—at least a mile too much, probably; and then he came to the portage so long expected. Carrying the bateaux a dozen rods or so to the left, he found a lake, which—as none of the many guides and sportsmen whom I consulted about the topography of the district, knew of it—we may name the Lost Pond.[7] It was almost a perfect ellipse, walled completely around, except for two narrow breaks at the lower end, with a high wooded rim. One of the breaks permitted the overflow of the pond to find its way into Horse Shoe Stream; and it was here that Arnold's party, forcing a passage through a screen of alders, made their entrance across the portage.[8]

...ke, and replaced them in the br
as they had now passed above a consi
affluent of the Stream,[9] it would have l
n harder and more wearisome than be
oat it. So the bateaux were shoulde
transported—no doubt along the l
of the ridge[10]—to Horse Shoe Pond, a
e only twenty-seven rods less than a n
ast half a mile was the extent that Arn
gned to Horse Shoe Pond,[11] and proba
figure represented fairly the length of
age across it. Then it became necess
arry again; and the party, turning alm
west,[12] struck through the woods t
ewhat roundish lake called Mud Pon
ifle less than a quarter of a mile dista
Arnold's eyes this rather unattractive l
about half a mile wide; but probably
bled its real size, and in fact an unfamil
y of water is always likely to seem lar
n it is. Once more the party carri


SKETCH MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
ARNOLD'S ROUTE
FROM
DEAD RIVER
TO
LAKE MEGANTIC
ONE MILE
LAKE MEGANTIC
WOBURN WHARF
SPIDER LAKE
ANNANCE RIVER
BLACK ARNOLD
RUSH LAKE
BOG
TRAIL TO SPIDER LAKE
ISLAND BOG
LOUSE ROAD
WEST BRANCH ARNOLD RIVER
ARNOLD RIVER
TRAIL TO SPIDER LAKE BY PHILLIPS
UPPER HATHAN BOG
CROSSED POND
CAMP
CHAMBAY CHURCH
MUD BROOK
CEDAR SWAMP
BOUNDARY
ARNOLD POND
LOWER HATHAN BOG
HORSESHOE POND
MUD POND
EAMERONS
DEAD RIVER (HORSESHOE STREAM)
LOST POND
TO ROUND POND

Moosehorn or Arnold Pond, the largest and perhaps the most beautiful of all.[15]

But the impatient leader could not pause to enjoy the scene, and without delay he began the long portage over the height of land, which has frequently been called the Great Carrying-place, though we, to prevent confusion, will name it the Boundary Portage.

Our quest now becomes more difficult. Thus far, lake and river have guided us. Chances of erring there have been, as we may discover soon ; but they were only at certain points. At present we have before us, after leaving the few regular trails, only mountains, valleys, swamps, and trackless woods,—trackless except as here and there the deer have worn a path. The guides who conduct hunters and fishermen through other parts of the region have little acquaintance here, and the compass has to be one's reliance, aided only by the sun and the occult signs of woodcraft.

Indeed, the territory is not only trackless, but in many places impassable. Here and there are "blow-downs," where many acres of trees have been laid flat, and one must go far around, recovering the line as best one can. Mire-holes, swamps, treacherous bogs, thickets where the dead twigs snap into one's eyes,

The first and main problem is to disco
e fitting certain conditions. If the line
ove to connect with Arnold Pond, our
sions as to the route will seem verific
t, it will be necessary to lay out a d
: approach to the height of land. The
ions are these: Arnold went two r
out north [16] from the last pond on this sic
: present boundary, and came to the he
land "at an elevation of about 35°"; the
de an abrupt wheel to the left of 10° r
n a right angle, and advanced a mile a
f; an equally abrupt return to the north
f a mile brought him next to a "beau
adow"; and finally, after marching a q
of a mile more in the same direction
ne to a very crooked stream. Down
paddled about ten miles, and then arri
Lake Megantic.

Montresor's account also requires our at
n. He too, reached the height of land a

tiful meadow," decorated with occasional "knots of most beautiful elms," as well as a few oaks and ash trees, came then to the Megantic River, and after six miles of rowing, as he thought, entered Megantic Lake. According to Arnold the distance from pond to river was four miles and sixty rods; but Montresor said: "The New Englanders who measured this carrying place call it a little more than 4½ miles. This must be understood only from the last lake to the river Megantick; though even that did not seem less to us than 6 miles."

In the course of my trips I crossed the height of land seven times, and became rather familiar with the district. Then, with the aid of one of the first settlers in the Lake Megantic region, I found where the meadow is likely to have been,— not a very difficult matter, since there is at present a particular place where the ground is low and flat, where the wild grass reaches to one's shoulder, and where elms and ash trees at least may still be admired, while below are swamps, and above are highlands. Looking eastwardly from this point at the mountains, I saw a gap, and said to my guide, "That is probably where we ought to cross the height of land from the other side, if I have calculated rightly."

On inquiry I was told that by the river it was about ten miles to Lake Megantic from the place where we stood. Behind us ran a crooked brook, and beyond that Arnold River, the Megantic River of Montresor. And on the other side, between us and the foot of the mountains, lay a tract of cedar swamp, quite sufficiently "disagreeable." "If now," I said to myself, "we go back to the pond, follow the indications of Arnold's journal, and arrive at this spot, we can feel satisfied that he came by about the same route."

That is just what happened. Entirely out of sight of our destination, of course, guided only by the compass, and reckoning distance as carefully as possible, though pretty roughly, we climbed and descended the mountain, crossed the cedar swamp, and arrived almost exactly at the place where we had stood before. Then, looking back, we saw that unless greatly mistaken, we had come over the mountain through the gap that had appeared likely to have been Arnold's way. Only one point was unsatisfactory: we had spent more time than seemed equivalent to four miles and sixty rods. But as there was no trail, frequent aberrations from the true direction and efforts to regain the line were necessary; and

besides, as we have seen, Montresor felt that the measurement was a good deal too small, while Washington, in describing the route for Congress, gave the length of this portage as six miles. In short, there seems to be a fairly complete correspondence between this route and Arnold's journal, and the route is further supported by its correspondence with Montresor's account of it, for we have no reason to doubt that Arnold intended to pursue Montresor's course, or to suppose that he could not do so.

There are certain other confirmations. Following Arnold's direction, we found the final ridge, the height of land, rising before us at an angle that looked like 35°, and then understood, as I thought, what had seemed a very mysterious passage in his account: "which brought us to the heighth of Land at an elevation of abt 35°." I believed we understood, too, why the trail took so eccentric a course—north, south of west, north—instead of about north-west all the way, for this enabled one, first, to keep the easily ascending ground of the valley, and then to avail oneself of the gap in the mountains, whereas a direct line would not have been very feasible. Probably there was another reason. One of my guides,

open a passage by the stream. He was p
ve that we saw axe-work, and as no logg
is ever been done hereabouts, and suc
ece of hackmatack would never decay un
ater, he felt no doubt that one of Arno
en swung the axe; for the Indians did
ork in that way. Now one of the jourr
akes mention of trailing the bateaux he
inally, this route seems to be corroborat
ot only by Montresor's journal, but by
ap, for his representation of the last p
ist of the height of land is an evident thou
ot quite successful attempt to draw the sh
Arnold Pond, and is not in the least l
rosby Pond.

Shall we then conclude that Arnold pas
is way?[18]

All have not been of that opinion. So
the guides—for Arnold's expedition i
ery interesting subject to them—believe t

1820, and wrote an account of Arnold's expedition, speaks of "the erroneous belief that it [*i. e.*, Arnold River] was passed by the detachment under his command."[19] In 1777 Sauthier brought out a map of "The Inhabited Part of Canada," engraved by Faden. Arnold's route is indicated, and the army would not have passed by Arnold Pond. A "Map of the Boundary Lines between the United States and the Adjacent British Provinces . . . as settled in 1842 by the Treaty of Washington, Compiled . . . under the direction of Major J. D. Graham, Corps of Topographical Engineers, one of the Comm^rs for surveying and exploring the North Eastern Boundary of the United States under the Act of Congress of July 20, 1840,"—this portentously entitled map indicates what the maker supposed to have been Arnold's route, and a copy presented to the Bowditch Library of Boston by Major Graham himself has the line emphasised with little dots of red ink. Now in this map the ponds are not correctly done, but the route seems quite clearly intended to pass by Crosby Pond, and meet Arnold River far below the point referred to above.[20]

Admitting, then, that our line of march seems to fit Arnold's journal, one asks whether

Horse Shoe Stream there can be no qu
on, for the topography of the country led
olonel by a firm and not over gentle ha
it let us suppose that when he came
athan Stream, opposite Lost Pond, he
wed that to Lower Hathan Bog,[21] proceed
en to Upper Hathan Bog and Crosby Po
ossed the height of land by a gap openi
ward the north-west, and so reached Arn
ver a little distance above Lake Megant
his would bring him to his destination,
ubtedly; but the number of ponds, eve
rection, and every distance but one, wo
out of keeping with the journal.

Another supposition: did not Arnold
re Lost Pond, keep on up the Stream till
me to Horse Shoe Pond, and then stri
r Crosby Pond? He could have done s
found an old trail connecting these t
ces. But the same objections arise as
re, and in some respects are even stronger.

about his passage over it. At four o'clock in the afternoon of October 26th, the second day after he left the army, his party entered upon the Boundary Portage. By nightfall they had gone up the brook to the height of land and crossed the ridge,—three miles in all. The day's work had been an arduous one, and they now halted for repose, thoroughly fatigued. But repose was slow in coming. The whole of the baggage did not arrive until very late, and it was nearly midnight before the tents could be pitched.

Meantime Arnold had something to think of. His army was liable to find even more trouble than he, so he sent back Nehemiah Getchell[23] "to pilot up the rear." On the other hand, Steele and Church were ahead, and no doubt he had been impatient for advices from them; here twenty of their men appeared, and of course they could give the desired information.[24] The next morning a letter was addressed to the second and fourth divisions, advising them to leave their bateaux, urging them to "make all possible despatch," and giving advice and encouragement about the travelling beyond the height of land.[25] Then the party set out, the rest of the portage was soon crossed, and at 11 o'clock they launched their boats on Arnold River.

XII

THE ARMY CROSSES THE HEIGHT OF LAND

ON the morning of October 26th, as we know, Arnold himself was breaking camp on Horse Shoe Stream, about a mile from Round Pond.[1] The "axe-men" under Steele and Church were engaged in clearing the trail over the Boundary Portage, though the lieutenants themselves had gone forward.[2]

vanced parties,[7] and their one thought now was to reach the French settlements.

But here rises a question: did the whole army take the same route as Arnold? At first sight the inquiry may seem unnecessary,—almost impertinent. The trail marked by the scouting and surveying parties, and followed by Arnold and Hanchet with their companies, must have been distinct enough, we naturally say; and, besides, the commander had thought it prudent to send a guide back to pilot the army. Under such circumstances who would venture, we are inclined to ask, to strike out on a route not followed by the leader?

But we shall presently find the army splitting up, and pursuing different courses. There may have been guides at that day, as we find now, who did not consider Arnold Pond the best gateway from Dead River to Lake Megantic. Finally, none of the descriptions of the route given us by the other journalists tallies exactly with Arnold's, and some of them appear to differ irreconcilably. No definite directions are found in these journals, and the statements of distance are incomplete; and this vagueness widens the range of possibilities.

As far as Round Pond the army must have followed its head.[8] The lakes were a plain

and indeed compulsory route for the bateaux, while the land parties could easily see the water, and had no temptation to leave it.

From Round Pond a trail now conducts one all the way across the height of land to Spider Lake, and there are hints, though not in the journals, that such a trail existed in 1775. The route is an easy and convenient one; but, as the army had its bateaux to care for, water navigation was extremely desirable.

Nor can a land party have gone this way, for the men took turns in the boats, and all were accustomed to help at the carries. Even the possibility of using the two Hathan Bogs does not make this route available, for they could have given only two miles of water in a

of the journalists,[9] except Meigs, Dearborn, and probably Senter, alludes to the Stream; but certainly no one mentions at this point a carry of three miles or more, so that we must simply consider some of the narratives defective on this point, as they clearly are on other points, particularly at this stage, and admit that what evidence they give is distinctly in favour of this view. Were other arguments needed, they could be offered; and several will appear before the end of the chapter.

Now let us suppose that the army went up Horse Shoe Stream and thence up Hathan Stream,[10] rowed the length of Lower Hathan Bog, made its way next to Crosby Pond by a direct carry or via Upper Hathan Bog, and finally proceeded over a convenient gap in the mountains straight on, between Spider and Rush lakes, to Lake Megantic; or to Spider Lake on the right, or perhaps to the lower Arnold River on the left.

Let us try this route by Meigs's journal. Meigs does not agree with Arnold, for he records finding only three ponds after he entered the "crooked river," evidently Horse Shoe Stream, while Arnold mentions four; and, if he followed the route just suggested, he did find three ponds, provided he touched

the upper bog, and only three. But other points are not so favourable. He says that he went about three miles by the crooked river, but the distance by water from Round Pond to Lower Hathan Bog is between five and six miles, and would have seemed to him over six. Then he came to a portage of fifteen rods, which would oblige us to suppose that some large obstruction existed at the lower end of the bog, which nothing suggests at present.

He next found a pond "100 perches across," whereas the bog is nearly a mile in length and very narrow indeed. The carry of a mile that followed would have brought him to the upper bog; but his next pond was "50 rods

Spider Lake, and at least a mile more than that to pass around the swamps to Arnold River.

In short, our hypothesis does not agree with Meigs's journal, and it seems still less credible to us when we reflect that Hathan Stream, instead of being navigable, as—for the sake of the argument—we have assumed, is only a narrow, shallow, tumbling brook, full of rocks and little falls. On the other hand, if we suppose that Meigs accidentally omitted a pond in his count, he agrees almost perfectly with Arnold. The carry into Lost Pond appears as fifteen rods, a mere variant from Arnold's twelve, and his estimate of the length of the pond—one hundred instead of eighty—may be understood the same way. At this point, too, he makes a remark that is decidedly significant. After crossing Lost Pond he "encamped on the northwest side, upon a high hill, which is a carrying place." North-west from the upper end of this pond the rim is at least one hundred and fifty feet high, one may guess, and, in order to reach the level ridge mentioned in the preceding chapter, it was necessary to carry up the hill. Finally, if we are not mistaken, we shall discover Meigs in the grassy meadows beside Arnold River, and

there he would not have arrived by the suggested route.

Dearborn's ponds and carries, while they do not measure exactly the same as Meigs's, correspond so nearly that the same discussion covers both. The other accounts are too fragmentary to throw any light on our present theory.

Next let us suppose that Meigs went on like Arnold to Horse Shoe Pond, but there turned north, carried over to Crosby Pond, nd then made his way across the height of land. This would agree with the number of his ponds, but the length of the portage, about a mile and an eighth, would not agree with his "44 perches," and several of the other difficulties would confront us.

One more scheme presents itself. Let us assume that Meigs did not find Lost Pond at all, but followed Horse Shoe Stream to the pond of that name, underestimating the length of the stream and the width of the pond. Let us assume further that a few rods north of the pond there existed a body of water which does not exist now; that this pond, which Meigs called "50 rods wide," was a mile in length; and that Meigs crossed it the longest way on his passage to Crosby Pond.

This assumption that a pond has vanished, is not so extravagant as one might imagine. Formerly the beaver abounded here, and some have outwitted the trappers even down to the present hour. In Horse Shoe Pond, the dome of a beaver house may be seen on a bit of an islet. Not far away I counted twenty poplars freshly gnawed off,—one of the stumps not less than eight inches across. In Lower Pond, one night, as we were paddling silently along, we suddenly heard a loud splash close by, as if an aërolite had dashed into the lake: it was a beaver that had come up just there, and, finding enemies near, had made the customary signal by slapping the water with his tail, as he dove under. There can be no doubt, probably, that some of the ponds and streams have been changed by the destruction or natural decay of old beaver dams. Little Carry Pond, on the Great Carrying-place, is said to have a lower level than formerly for this reason. The proprietors of the dam were caught or frightened away, their works fell out of repair, and the lake broke through.

Has this been the case between Crosby and Horse Shoe Ponds? Certainly one finds low ground there, and flowing water. It is said that Crosby Pond, instead of having a brook

Meigs's narrative. On the other hand,
inds no signs of a beaver dam; the ass
ion that a pond a mile long once ex
here is rather violent; Meigs could not
estimated the whole length of Horse
Stream as only "about 3 miles"; and, be
hese objections to the hypothesis, we sh
ave all the other difficulties of the rout
Crosby Pond to encounter.

But there is one other possibility.
know that the Colonel went north from Ar
Pond, but we do not know in what direc
Meigs turned from that point. May he
ave gone where the present path—almo
oad—leads from the permanent camp on
western side of the pond to the beginnin
he highway at Cameron's house on the Ca
side? This distance is something less th
nile, and it presents no difficulties exce
ew short, but rather steep, pitches. A

It does not seem probable, however, that Meigs went this way. He says that it was two miles from the pond to the dividing ridge of the height of land; but by this western course the distance is less than one mile. Again, it was easiest to march where a trail existed; the trails were made by Indians; the Indians usually followed water-courses, as did the trail pursued here by Arnold; and there is no water-course running toward Cameron's.

Meigs tells us further that the length of the portage was four miles and sixty perches. This reminds us at once of the portage that Arnold took; and while the distance by Cameron's to the meadows, where Meigs will presently appear to have been, is not very much longer, it is enough longer so that we cannot suppose it was called precisely the same. Neither would Meigs have been likely to know the exact length of his portage, if he went by another path than the regular one. Finally, those who kept on after their leader had not only a trail, but a trail cleared by the pioneers. All things considered, it seems plain that Meigs followed his chief.

The same reasoning holds all the way along for Dearborn, but at the last stage we have a curious corroboration. About half a mile

forward on the Boundary Portage, Dearborn found a fine canoe, apparently an Indian's, carefully laid up. Why had it been brought so far from the pond? Not merely for concealment,—twenty rods would have been far enough for that. Apparently it had gone by water from the pond to the point where it was found, and this argues that Dearborn went north by the brook, as Arnold did.

If both Meigs and Dearborn adopted this route, the presumption that all the rest did so is a good deal strengthened. None of the journalists in the first division helps us here. Henry and Morison are plainly inaccurate, and they, like "Provincial," are very incomplete. Thayer, Topham, and Humphrey give the

route.[13] It only remains, then, to note the incidents of the journey.[14]

They were not many. During Thursday, the 26th, all moved forward, the bateaux on the water and the land parties on the south-western side of them.[15] The weather was cold, the ground covered with several inches of snow, and the journey on foot extremely arduous; for below Round Pond the men had to struggle against rocks and mountains, and beyond that point against swamps. The boatmen, too, had difficulties apparently, even after the Chain of Ponds was entered, for several of the journals mention one carry a quarter of a mile in length.[16] At night the first division appears to have camped between Horse Shoe and Mud ponds, the third division at the two ends of Lost Pond, and the second division somewhere on the Chain of Ponds, very likely on the level ground near the foot of Long Pond, where the "Upper Farm" now is.

Friday, October 27th, all advanced again. The first division reached the Boundary Portage early in the day, crossed the height of land, and encamped in the meadows by Arnold River to await the rest of the army. It was a fearful day's work. In consequence, very likely, of the letter written that morning by

the commander,[17] the captains appear to have decided that it would not be worth while to try to carry the bateaux across this long portage; but Morgan saw that bateaux would be useful beyond the mountain, and would be needed, in particular, to carry his military stores.[18] So he ordered his command to take their boats along; and they obeyed, though we are told that their shoulders were worn to the bone. Smith's and Hendricks's companies carried only one bateau each to Arnold River,[19] but, even so, Morison drew a heartrending picture of what he named "The Terrible Carrying Place."

Meigs and the third division made no attempt to transport their bateaux (except a

it encamped that night at Horse Shoe Pond.[22]

Saturday, the third division found it easy to join the first on the meadows, while the second, making greater exertions, and taking but one boat for each company across the height of land, was able to arrive at the same place by the middle of the afternoon.

XIII

FROM THE BOUNDARY PORTAGE TO LAKE MEGANTIC

AS Arnold came to the river, about 11 o'clock A.M., October 27th, important and welcome news greeted him. Steele and Church were there, or soon met him, and with them Jaquin, a man who had been sent down to the French settlements to learn the state of sentiment among them.[1]

Arnold, after writing — but not despatching[2] — a letter of cheer, advice, and orders to his men, set out down-stream, reached the lake at four o'clock, rowed about three miles farther — as he called it — to a "very considerable wigwam," or house of bark, on the eastern shore, and stopped for the night.

A letter to Washington was next in order.[3] Arnold explained that he found he had been greatly deceived as to the difficulties of the undertaking, gave an account of the situation and the army, expressed the opinion that his troops would not all reach fresh supplies in less than eight or ten days, and finally announced what course he should adopt on arriving at Quebec. The letter was despatched to Enos, for Arnold had not yet heard of his defection; and Enos was directed to forward it to Cambridge, and to "take particular care of the sick and those who are returning, as well as of any other matters that are necessary."[4]

Hanchet and sixty men[5] left the Boundary Portage with Arnold, but their course was by land.[6] The journey proved not a pleasant one, but finally, after wading "two miles thro' water to their waists," they reached "at ab^{t} Sun set" a low, marshy point on the eastern side of the lake, some two miles from

the bark wigwam.[7] Arnold, seeing them in that place, divined their difficulty, and sent his bateaux for them. "Three and four" trips proved necessary, but a little before midnight the men were all brought off.

The next day was Saturday. Arnold despatched his letters, and ordered Hull,[8] the bearer, to "pilot up" the fourth division, which he still counted upon. Then, with Steele, Church, Oswald, and thirteen men, he embarked about 7 o'clock, A.M., in four bateaux and a birch canoe,[9] paddled briskly down the lake a distance that he called thirteen miles, though it was really much less, and at 10 o'clock reached the outlet. By that time his rear bateaux were nearly four miles astern, so

rived, and been "embodied" in their proper commands.[10]

Here all heard of the defection of Enos.[11] Earlier news of this had reached, of course, the hindmost companies. Dearborn learned of it on the Boundary Portage. But the riflemen, we may infer, first knew of the misfortune on the meadows, and indeed this is evident from Henry's narrative. That men in the rear, whose way had been made easy for them by the preceding companies, should have been the quickest to give up, roused bitter resentment; and such a reduction of numbers, with the loss of so much ammunition, seemed to doom the expedition to certain failure.

In order that all might know what provisions there were to count upon, and also, no doubt, that all might share justly, whatever supplies the army still had were now brought together, and a distribution made.[12] How much was a soldier given to support him during the fatigues and hardships of the coming six days? Four or five pints of flour, but no meat at all, except, in some cases, two or four ounces of pork. The distribution took place before Arnold's letter arrived,[13] and the forward movement began at once.

Morgan seems to have found it necessary

to let his men rest a little more after the excessive toil of bringing their boats across the Boundary Portage, but Goodrich's and Dearborn's contingents were in good trim, and set off immediately down the river, followed by Smith's riflemen and later by Ward's company.[14] Enterprise, however, was this time a mistake. At four o'clock, after these troops had moved, Arnold's letter to the field officers and captains arrived, and the soldiers that had already gone forward missed several important things.

One was the announcement that in three days Arnold hoped to reach the inhabitants, and in as many more to have provisions halfway up the Chaudière River to meet the army.


From
Montresor's
Map of 1761.



of Schuyler's operations, and the whole army — Meigs in particular — rejoiced exceedingly.

The danger of starvation now seemed almost over. In fact, the story went abroad among the hungry soldiers that provisions would *reach them* in three days. The consequence was that rations began to be eaten extravagantly, and we are told that some of the men actually hastened to devour their whole share.

The army was now split into three parts. Four companies had begun to march down beside the river; Morgan, having his boats, naturally determined to proceed by water; and the remaining five companies, in obedience to their colonel's directions, moved back to the high ground, and either camped on the portage, or advanced a little way to the north before stopping for the night.[16]

We come now to the grand crisis of the march, a crisis threatening nothing less than the complete extinction of the whole army, except the parties under Arnold and Hanchet. Our first step must be to study the ground.

Arnold River takes its rise not far from the sources of the Connecticut, but on the northern instead of the southern side of the New Hampshire boundary; and thence it flows almost due north, receiving a number of tributaries.

One, Muddy Brook, enters it in, or close by, the meadows where Arnold's men encamped, and not very far below this it is joined by its largest affluent, a stream called the West Branch. The descent of the river is considerable; it winds interminably; it must rise quickly and high in the spring and after heavy rains, for its basin is narrow and bounded chiefly by high, steep slopes; and as a consequence of these conditions, it has carried a large amount of earth toward the lake.

The last few miles of its course lie through low and swampy ground. About a mile and a half below the meadows the land begins to be wet, and is covered with a fairly dense growth of alders; while in some places many small

Arnold River. There the latter turns again, and flowing north for about three-quarters or seven-eighths of a mile, empties into Lake Megantic. About eight rods above the juncture of the river and the outlet, Arnold River sends a very small part of its waters into a lagoon-like stream called the Dead Arnold, which seeks the lake by a course considerably west of north; while from the point where the Arnold veers so sharply eastward (A on the map), another small part of its volume finds its way, through a very crooked stream called the Black or Little Arnold, to the common receptacle. Most of this lowest region is occupied with standing water, swamp grass, many dead and a few living trees, some alders, and scattering bushes of other kinds.

In 1775 the state of things was unmistakably similar. Doubtless the many floods of turbid water have extended the delta somewhat, but not nearly so much as if the stream had not been free to spread over the miles of swamp, and lay down its burden of mud before arriving at its mouth. A dam has been constructed recently in the Chaudière River about two miles below its source; but, although the dam is a high one, it has not raised the level of the lake very much, because, as we know,

the descent of the river in the intervening distance was quite rapid. Eighteen inches probably would measure the change of level; and, while this was rise enough to kill a great many trees, I believe the change in the plane of the water, compared with that of the soil, cannot have been great, for the spring floods and the storm floods of more than one hundred and twenty-five years must have built up the swamp a good deal.

Turning now to the advance of Goodrich's and Dearborn's men, we find that they reached the border of the lake [17]; but, on attempting to proceed along to the eastern shore, they were soon stopped by two rivers, the second even

and he alone; but, as he was in a canoe with Captain Dearborn and Mr. Ayres, leader of the pioneers, his opinion very likely reflects theirs. Melvin says that the first of the two rivers crossed Sunday morning in a boat, was one which they had forded the night before. Now a moment's reflection will show that his statement was the only natural one to make about the Dead Arnold, if they had waded the eastward Arnold the previous evening, for that eastward Arnold was of course bound for the lake, and they were sure, therefore, by all ordinary reckoning, to come to it again before they could come to any other river, when they moved toward the east along the shore. So it is evident that according to Melvin's statement, the eastward Arnold was crossed Saturday evening.[18] But, as we saw, that stream is not fordable. How then did they ford it?

Montresor's map is the next thing to consider. It represents the direction of the Arnold River as essentially north all the way to the lake, and shows that Montresor entered the lake near its western — not its eastern — side, turned to the left, and camped. Plainly he went down the Black Arnold, and did not see Rush River or Rush Lake, for neither his map nor his journal gives a hint of them. Had the

Arnold flowed at that time as it flows now, there is not one chance in a hundred that he would have gone down the Black Arnold. He would have paddled through the eastward Arnold, noted Rush River, noted also Rush Lake, which is visible from the junction of the two rivers, followed the Arnold to Lake Megantic, and camped close by on the eastern — not the western — shore. Even had he chosen, for some unimaginable reason, to follow the Black Arnold, he could not possibly have failed to observe the eastward Arnold, for although he passed that river after sunset, there must have been some light, or his men could not have made their way along such a stream. Able

river was not the swamp, but the complete trap formed by Arnold and Rush rivers and Rush Lake. Still further, he would have seen that Hanchet's men were sure to get into trouble, and would have stayed by to help them.

There is evidence even more convincing. Arnold, after entering Lake Megantic, paddled a distance that he called three miles to reach the bark house or wigwam on the easterly shore, but Hanchet was stopped by a river at a point considerably nearer the bark house. This was of course impossible, unless Arnold passed down the Black Arnold, and so entered the lake west of the river that stopped Hanchet.

But how can we explain such a change in the eastward Arnold?

The Black Arnold is exceedingly crooked, and, I should think, about a couple of miles long. To drive logs through it would be extremely tedious. On the other hand the eastward Arnold and the lower Arnold, while there are two great bends, do not meander, and probably measure less than a mile and a quarter together. It was very natural for loggers to clear out the eastward Arnold and use it. The removal of obstructions quickened the current, and that of course both deepened and

widened the channel, especially as the soil is extremely soft and watery; and at the present time this is the regular and sole highway of the logs. Natural causes assisted. The crookedness of the Black Arnold checks the current, and the stream has become so clogged that continuous navigation is impossible, even for a canoe.

Late Saturday afternoon, then, Goodrich's men waded the eastward Arnold, and forced their way through the swamp, waist deep in mud and water most of the time, to the edge of the lake or near it. One bateau belonged to the company, but it carried their stock of flour and went ahead, and there was no boat

would paddle farther, and look for a place to wade the river. Going then into the lake, he discovered Goodrich, and learned that no ford could be found. He was told also that probably the bateau was not far off. So Goodrich clambered into the canoe, and, as it was now beginning to be dark, and a light became visible, apparently three miles away, the captains made off in that direction in the hope of overtaking the bateau.

The light proved to be at the bark wigwam or house where Arnold had stopped. One of Hanchet's party had used up his provisions, and so was left here to "join his Company"[19]; and he had built a fire. As this point the officers halted, while their crew went on in search of the bateau. Unable to overtake it, the canoe returned an hour and a half later; and, as nothing more could be done at that time, the two captains remained at the wigwam, very anxious about their companies.

The soldiers had been able, meanwhile, to arrange with a dismal show of comfort for the night. Dearborn's men got onto a knoll, very small and very low, and at last, dragging wood from the water, succeeded in making a blaze. A mouthful of pork was eaten, and they lay down with their feet to the fire and their

heads close to the water. The other company did about the same.

As soon as day broke, Sunday morning, Dearborn and Goodrich went back to their men, and began to ferry them over the rivers in the one boat. It was an exceedingly slow process and very ticklish also, for merely to get into a canoe from a swamp without splitting the bark was a difficult feat. But luckily Captain Smith's bateau came along, attended more or less closely by his company. This boat was hired by Dearborn and Goodrich, and finally, before nightfall, the three companies crossed the Dead Arnold, marched forty or fifty rods to the main stream, crossed that also, and set out for the bark house. Dearborn undertook to lead his men around through the forest, but his compass was bad, and after advancing about a couple of miles, they had to return and make a fresh start.

While they were in the woods, Morgan's company came down the river. Whether all of his men could get into the bateaux we cannot say, but with seven boats he was of course able to pass the swamps without serious difficulty. Stopping at the bark house, the men helped themselves to some provisions left there by Dearborn, Melvin,[20] and others, and then

pressed on for the Chaudière River. Dearborn's company finally reached the bark house, and there camped for the night. Goodrich's men hurried on in the hope of overtaking their bateau and flour, Smith's,[21] if we may trust Henry's account, pushed forward with equal speed, and Ward's, we have evidence, were not far behind.[22]

Greene with his three companies, Meigs with Hanchet's company, and Hendricks with his riflemen remain to be accounted for. At four o'clock on Saturday afternoon all of these appear to have been together in the meadows by Arnold River, as we saw.[23] There the general distribution of provisions took place,[24] and there Arnold's letter arrived. The advice of the letter was heeded, and all moved back to the high ground. The second division, resuming its place before what there was of the third, then proceeded a little distance toward Lake Megantic, and all encamped for the night in fine spirits.[25]

Early on Sunday morning the advance began. Greene, Topham, Thayer, Senter, the guide,[26] and some of the other officers led, and the men followed, though in separate companies.[27] The general course of their march was a little east of north.[28] At first they were

in woods, and the spurs of the mountains intersected their line of advance. After a time they came to a brook that ran from the height of land in a north-westerly direction.[29] No attention should have been paid to it; but, as they knew of no lake in the region except Lake Megantic, it was very natural to suppose that the brook would conduct them there. Whether they followed it or not, they certainly left the high ground and descended into the miserable swamp south of Rush Lake, full of slippery roots and icy water. Their feet were soon reduced to a state of insensibility, and at every step they risked a fall and a sprained or broken limb that could only mean abandon-

grand opportunity.[30] Had the stream been crossed, and a course toward the north-west pursued, Greene and his followers would soon have stood on the shore of Lake Megantic, where the other companies had passed or were soon to come. But the guide was ignorant of this fact, and indeed no better posted than the rest. It seemed far safer, we may suppose, to follow the water, than to strike off into a trackless forest; and so the march continued until Nepiss Lake, as it was then called, appeared in view. The modern name of this piece of water—Spider Lake—suggests its irregular outline. Not daring to leave its margin, the men toiled on, in and out of the tongues of land between the bays, and in and out of the low and swampy spots along the shore, and finally had to encamp for the night with no idea where they were.[31]

The next morning an early start was made, for the preparation of breakfast consisted only in stirring a gill of flour with some water, and baking it a little on the coals or the ashes.[32] In a short time Spider River[33] was met. It seemed too deep to cross, and the leaders took their followers a considerable distance toward the south in search of a way around the stream.[34] That idea, however, was soon

given up, and when a place about four feet deep and three or four rods wide presented itself, all waded through, some in their clothes and others naked, though there was ice on both margins. The leaders proceeded then to a high eminence,[35] and, after getting such an outlook as they could, changed the course of the march to west-north-west.

By this time the soldiers began to despair. Many were soon ready to give up. What semblance of military order had been maintained until now was discarded, and those who could walk fastest went ahead. But their wanderings were nearly over. According to Fobes, a young Indian, who possessed "some practical knowledge of the country," was found

XIV

FROM LAKE MEGANTIC TO THE FIRST INHABITANTS

SATURDAY morning, October 28th, Arnold set out from the bark house, or wigwam, on Lake Megantic with four bateaux, a birch-bark canoe,[1] and fifteen men besides Captain Oswald, "being Resolved to proceed on to the french Inhabitants, & at all events send back provisions to meet the rear." He seems to have chosen the canoe as his own conveyance, and his men paddled on so briskly that at ten o'clock, when he reached the outlet of the lake, the Chaudière River, he was—as we recall—four miles in advance of his rear bateaux; but by eleven o'clock the bateaux had arrived, the baggage was lashed to the boats, and the descent of the river began.

The word Chaudière means caldron, and it pictures very well the boiling, foaming stream. Lake Megantic lies almost eleven hundred feet[2] above the St. Lawrence near

rocks. Everybody familiar with the
stands in awe of it. In looking for a b
I heard of a few guides who had atten
go down, but only one had succeede
tially, at that — and he showed no d
repeat the experiment.[3]

The danger of Arnold's party w
great. They probably had had lit
perience, or none at all, in such nav
Only the best of canoes could hope
the swift water and avoid the rock
Arnold sat in a brittle thing of bark
most of his party had only the clum
rickety bateaux. However, they brave
mitted themselves to the current, and
along at the rate of eight or ten m
hour.[4] Fifteen miles had been passe
nold thought, when suddenly the litt
capsized amidst the rocks of some bad
Three of the boats were damaged, a
of them smashed to pieces. Four m

thought it a mercy in disguise, for no sooner were the men dry and in their boats again, than one of them, who was in advance, cried out that falls lay just ahead. These were decidedly worse than the rapids that had just caused their mishap; and had no warning been given, it looked as if the boats must have been dashed in pieces, and the lives of all been destroyed.[5]

On examining the shore, Arnold found a portage of 146 rods, carried across it, embarked again, with eyes and ears alert, went a half-mile or so, observed "more dangerous Rapids," reconnoitred them from the shore, and concluded to encamp. Provisions were then re-distributed, and it appeared that each member of the party had eight ounces of pork and two ounces of flour.[6]

Sunday, while one part of his army was getting across the rivers at the head of Lake Megantic, and another wandering through the swamps and thickets near Rush and Spider lakes, Arnold again took his chances on the Chaudière. Embarking at seven o'clock in the morning with only about one-third of his party, while the rest proceeded by land, he reckoned that he made some forty miles in the course of the short day. His two bateaux

it received no large affluents, was gr
volume and even faster in width,
Arnold estimated, it was twenty rods
most places.[7] Less width and great
would have rendered it easier to pass.

Monday morning the party made
start, and after going about ten miles
estimated, came to some very swift w
filled a bateau. Luckily nothing v
and, by lowering the boats with the
they were got safely through. Tw
more, and the Great Falls appeared.[8]
a cataract fully twenty feet high, c
guess, it was of course vain to think
ning. In fact some rapids quite a
above seemed too fierce to be attemp
portage of half a mile provided a
escape; and, as two friendly Penob
dians were met there and aided in t
it was crossed without much delay.
half-mile of paddling as Arnold

It was now evening, but the party hurried on ; and, some four miles below the junction, the first house of the French settlements gave them a welcome to civilisation.[9]

At this point Arnold's account, as we have it, suddenly breaks off in the middle of a sentence ; but we know that he lost no time in redeeming his promise, and sending men, with cattle and other supplies, to meet his famishing army.[10] We must now turn back and inquire how that army fared.


Hanchet's party, leaving the bark house at six o'clock on Saturday morning, October 28th, made their way as rapidly as possible, we may assume, to the pale of civilisation. We know nothing as to the details of their march.

To understand the order of the next men requires a bit of calculation.[11] Of the companies that went down Arnold River, Smith's would naturally have been the one to cross the two streams at the lake first, for it owned the bateau ; Goodrich's, having led the advance and being anxious to overtake its provisions, was probably given the second place ; Dearborn's would come next, for it had arrived next, and, after Goodrich's, it had suffered most ; Ward's would then follow, as we find

...ersy, and went along in it.

While Dearborn's men were n
through the woods, Morgan's probabl
them, and went forward; but a mi
which overtook this company soon
began to descend the Chaudière, che
advance. Goodrich's company also,
see, became demoralised by a disaste
result was that Smith's and Dearbor
were, as Dearborn states, the first
main body who reached the settlement

As for the companies that rounded
Lake, they did not begin the descent
Chaudière until Tuesday forenoon, whil
born, Smith, and Ward had made
march there on Monday; and so the
themselves considerably in the rear.
with his three companies, went fir
Hendricks followed, for the former
to have camped that evening nearly si
below the latter. Hanchet's men were


DIAGRAM OF THE MARCH
ON THE UPPER CHAUDIÈRE.
LARGELY CONJECTURAL.
LAKE MEGANTIC
A
ARNOLD, MORGAN, McCLELLAN WRECKED?
DEARBORN'S CAMP, OCT 30?
HENDRICK'S CAMP, OCT 31?
GREENE'S CAMP, OCT 31?
GENERAL DIRECTION FROM A TO B
ABOUT NORTH 30° EAST
WARD'S CAMP, OCT 31?
"PROVINCIAL'S" CAMP, NOV 1?
DEARBORN'S CAMP, OCT 31?
B
ST. GÉDÉON
SENTER'S CAMP, NOV. 1?
GENERAL DIRECTION
FROM B TO C ABOUT
NORTH 8° WEST
200 CAMPED, NOV. 2?
SENTER MET CATTLE, NOV. 2?
DEARBORN'S CAMP, NOV. 1.
ST. MARTIN
WARD'S CAMP, NOV. 2
DEARBORN MET CATTLE, NOV. 2.
GREAT FALLS
SENTERS CAMP, NOV. 2.
GREENE'S CAMP, NOV. 3.
RIVER DU LOUP
60 MILES, AS THE MEN MARCHED,
FROM LAKE MEGANTIC?
C

of all, for his seven bateaux were capsized, his precious freight of ammunition was lost, substantially all of his provisions met the same fate, one man was drowned, and the rest barely escaped with their lives.[12] Unless other companies divided their starvation supplies with these unfortunates, it is very hard to see how they existed for the next three or four days.

Captain Smith also was wrecked, and he, too, lost everything. Poor Lieutenant McClellan of Hendricks's company, lying sick with pneumonia in the bateau that was carried expressly for him across the height of land, happily escaped drowning at the same falls; but his bateau was ruined, and the invalid had to be left there, in the care of two lads, after Dr. Senter had done everything possible for his disease. Goodrich's boat was wrecked and all the flour of the company lost, reports Melvin, with details that seem to confirm the truth of his account; and Tolman records a similar misfortune as befalling Ward's company, though his language has a suspicious resemblance to Melvin's, and Haskell, travelling at that time in a bateau, does not mention it. Both of these companies are reported as eating dog-meat afterward, and certainly Goodrich's did so.[13]

we do not know the length o
Lake Megantic to the Du Lo
where the army marched is
knowable; but we may pretty
journey about sixty miles.[14]
trail existed, was very proba
one.[15] While the country is r
the river had cut through it
bounded—now closely, now
with high bluffs; and at time
to march up and then down
because it crowded sheer agai
Swamps were to be crossed,
and cold streams waded.
been a hard experience for f
fed soldiers; but for tired men,
on half-rations or less for a con
and now possessed but the mea
the hardship was extremely dis
Tuesday night, October 31s
born's and Smith's[17] companie

dricks's and Hanchet's companies a little way north of that unfortunate spot, and Morgan's and Goodrich's men somewhere at intermediate points.[18] On November 1st, all pressed forward as rapidly as possible, leaving behind those who could not keep up, for it was thought best that the strong should save themselves and send back relief, rather than make a vain effort to help their comrades along. In fact, Goodrich's company, at least, had broken up two days before. No military order was observed, and many of the men had no food whatever.

The next day Arnold's relief reached the head of the column. Dearborn appears to have met the cattle before noon, four miles above the Great Falls, apparently a little earlier than his men and Smith's. Ward's company seem to have been still farther behind, though not far; they were about six or seven miles above the Great Falls when the relief party came in sight.[19] At evening Morison and "Provincial" met the cattle; and, according to the former, two hundred men camped together at that point,—six miles above Ward. Hendricks's rifle company and a considerable part of the second division, with stragglers from the three forward companies, probably

work their way nine miles farther, t
ported that they had succoured Gree
distance below. This camp appears t
been about five or six miles above S
tin. The evening was spent by the
party in looking for those who had fa
the way, and many such men were pic
and brought into camp on the horses.
vember 3d, Thayer and Topham, w
been behind, urging on the straggle
the relieving party at about noon, but
permit it to stop. Meigs reports getti
visions at the same hour.[21] Beyond thi
we lose sight of the rescuers, but may
that they kept on until all the soldiers ap
to have been found.

Dearborn reached the first house
o'clock P.M. on November 2d. Smith
pany and fifty-two members of Dearbo
rived an hour later. The first of Warc
appeared at about two o'clock the nex

fore, as Topham did.[23] Meigs and the rest followed on.

Once the relief party had come in sight, all danger of starvation was over, especially as the natives appear to have grasped the idea that a good business could be done by furnishing the troops with eatables. Thayer obtained some potatoes at an Indian's hut.[24] And, at the first house, Arnold had ready a sufficient stock of simple food.

Three questions arise here. To begin with, the relief party described by Arnold does not correspond to that pictured in the journals. Arnold wrote of sending Lieutenant Church, Mr. Barrin, and eight Frenchmen with a quantity of flour[25]; while the journalists mention horses, cattle for slaughter, oatmeal and mutton, eighteen Canadians, and two persons in a canoe. But it is only necessary to suppose that Arnold sent a second party, not only to the falls, but beyond them. As the forward one stopped, the second would overtake it, and the two might appear, and be described, as one.

The next question is whether the soldiers did in reality suffer very much. Most of the men seem to have received about five pints of flour[26] on the afternoon of October 28th; so

quately supplied, they fared as well a
or most of them had been faring fo
while before. No doubt this was tl
with a considerable number. Dearborı
that when he met the relief party he ı
in need of provisions.[27] Fobes, of Hu
company, speaks of the men as "nearly
out food for several days, adding tha
of his company died.

Those who had the same supply, bu
to meet the relief before November 3(
have been severely pinched, even if th
banded their flour closely. Many, no
permitting themselves to be optimisti
sumed more than a pint a day at firs
had to pay the penalty later. Thos
received only four pints of flour orig
came to the end of their supply the s
and "Provincial," a sober witness, info
that "several" of his company were
provisions on October 31st. Some as w

was told that some of the soldiers, who ate their whole allowance the morning after our provisions were divided in the wilderness, were obliged, in order to sustain life, to eat their dogs, cartridge-boxes, old shoes and clothes."

To these we must add a perhaps larger class, the unfortunates.[28] It is impossible to see how Goodrich's and Morgan's men can have escaped extreme suffering, and Ward's appear to have been little better off. Haskell of Ward's, a matter-of-fact man, wrote October 31st: "There is scarcely any one who has any more than one day's provision, and that small, and a great number none at all. Some have had none at all for two days. Captain Goodrich's company have nothing but a large dog, which they killed and ate tonight."

Finally, there were the tender-hearted, who gave to others. Some of this kind belonged to Hendricks's company, and shared their flour with McClellan. Perhaps Topham was of the same class, for November 2d we find him saying,[29] "I have now been 48 hours without victuals." And no doubt many more showed equal kindness to unfortunate comrades.

Perplexities still remain, and probably we cannot fully understand the situation. Dearborn wrote, for example, on October 30th:

for men in some companies," it is diff
explain the statement. Yet one thing i
there is ample evidence of hunger to th
of starvation; only we must not th
every soldier as undergoing this extre
fering.[80] Having to march barefoot, a
did at this time, was a real though
hardship.

Our third question is, How many p
at this crisis of the march? It is imp
to answer with definiteness. Some un
edly died. Fobes, who escaped from ca
the following year and fled up the Cha
reports finding "a number" of ble
skeletons in this part of the route.
born's journal, under date of Novemb
contains these interlined words, appare
his own hand: "Many of our men died
the last three days"; but this is a very g
statement. Morison wrote:

back from Dead River including those ordered to take care of them amounted to 200. The force that escaped the perils of the Wilderness and reached the banks of the St. Lawrence, amounted to 510. We, therefore, lost in the wilds between 70 and 80. But I am inclined to believe that some of these got to the inhabitants, in a state no doubt that required weeks to revive."

This is the only attempt in the journals to give details, and it is not at all reliable.[31] Arnold himself had no precise information on these points. October 13th he wrote Washington, "I intended making an exact return, but must defer it until I come to Chaudiere." At the Chaudière, of course, nothing of the sort received attention. Morison, a private, cannot have been better posted than his commander. The original number was less than he states, and the number who reached the St. Lawrence was more. December 5th Arnold wrote Washington: "Enclosed is a return of my detachment amounting to 675 men, for whom I have received clothing of Gen. Montgomery."[32] It is possible that he included a party of Indians; but the Indians did not in fact belong to his "detachment" and he would not be likely to include them in an official return to the Commander-in-chief. We have no reason to suppose they specially needed clothing at that time; and even had

who perished can be stated; but, after
been done, we can only say that "a nu
were lost."[3] The escape of others v
extremely narrow one, however. A
day would have made a vast difference
had the weather been severe, instead of
and fair, during the most critical period,
a soldier must, no doubt, have succumbe

XV


FROM THE FIRST INHABITANTS TO ST. MARY

THE American troops had now reached inhabitants; but the question remains, where were they? According to the journals, the first houses were at Sertigan[1] or Sartigan, and this name has been accepted as an adequate reply to our question. In fact, we find indicated on many of the old maps a place bearing one of these names.

But how does it happen that no village so named exists in the region now, or has existed there within the recollection of the oldest inhabitants? How does it happen that on the maps it appears at various points on the Chaudière between the Du Loup and the St. Lawrence?[2] Why was it customary in Quebec, years ago, to say of any rough-looking fellow hailing from the general direction of the Chaudière that he came "from Sertigan"? And how does it happen that Dearborn speaks

gested in these words of Dearborn's. S
was not a village or spot, but a vaguely
region, though it is not at all surprisi
our soldiers, knowing that Sertigan wa
people would be found, should have
down, on coming to a settlement, that tl
reached "Sertigan." Neither would
been strange had these first people
asked the name of the place, replied tha
"Sertigan," for the good reason that it
the district so named, and had no othe
The very name suggests its application, i
a word of the aborigines, and signifies '
river." In short, Sertigan meant the
watered by the Chaudière, from the Du
to St. Isidore de Lauzon,—that is to s
most to the St. Lawrence.[3]

Rightly or not, however, the America
plied the name to a particular spot, a
nold used it in the headings of three l
Where then was the "Sertigan"


ISL. OF ORLEANS
QUEBEC
SILLERY
ST. FOY
POINT LEVI
POINT PIZEAG
R. DE LA SCIE
RIVER
ST LAWRENCE
FALLS
PIKE
ST HENRY
ST NICHOLAS
ROUTE JUSTINIENNE
ETCHEMIN R.
CHAUDIÈRE R.
SCOTTS
ST MARY
ST JOSEPH
ST FRANCIS
GILBERT
R. LA FAMINE
ST GEORGE
JERSEY MILL
R. DU LOUP
LESSER FALLS
GREAT FALLS
N
W.
E.
S.
THE LOWER CHAUDIÈRE
SCALE ——— EQUALS 4 MILES

ation about the matter, and he visited the spot in 1824. These are his words:

"There were then [1824] two houses at this fork of the river, one of them, inhabited by Mr. Annah or Hanna, who is called the Seigneur, having a venerable appearance. . . . It was probably Mr. Hanna's which was '*the first house*,' and inhabited by a Frenchman, as its situation accords with a description of it given me by General Dearborn. The settlement was called Sertigan, the distance was 25 leagues from Quebec."

On the other hand, the first settlement appears actually to have been several miles below the Du Loup. Arnold says that he found no house until four miles beyond that point.[6] Dearborn calls it in his journal eight miles from the Falls to the first stopping place, and thus agrees substantially with Arnold. Thayer, after camping a mile beyond the Great Falls, proceeded to a river (which we take to be the Du Loup, since there is only a brook between that stream and the Falls), and after fording it had to march five miles, as he estimated the distance, before he "could get to any house to warm" himself.

Topham went six miles beyond the Falls — that is to say, about three miles beyond the Du Loup — before coming to "the first house," while Humphrey called the distance

about five miles. Senter lodged at the Falls; and the next day, after fording two rivers, he arrived, at half-past ten o'clock, at "the first town, principally inhabited by the Aborigines." As no doubt he was in motion by eight o'clock, this town must have been a considerable distance below the Du Loup.

Haskell and Senter give a clue to the explanation, perhaps. The manuscript of Haskell's journal contains the statement — omitted in the printed version — that he "forded two rivers" the day he reached inhabitants, and Senter states that after wading one stream he came to another — and that a large one — just as he entered the town.[7] The first of the rivers was evidently the Du

an unpainted house look "venerable."[10] This place, then, was what Arnold referred to as "Sartigan," for of course he would have stopped, under circumstances so pressing, at the first settlement, and from "Sartigan" went his relief party.[11]

It was only a frontier village of the meagrest sort. Three or four small houses represented budding civilisation, and the wigwams of the savages outnumbered them. But it must have been a busy place after Arnold arrived there. Very possibly the work of collecting provisions for the army began on the evening of October 30th. In the morning it was certainly going on, and we are told by Arnold that the first instalment of relief was then despatched.

Hanchet arrived in the course of the 31st probably, and very likely the prosecution of the work at this point was turned over to him. For Arnold there were other things to do. Several times on the march he had tried to open communication with his acquaintances in Quebec; but no reply had come, and he feared his Indian messengers had betrayed him. Yet, as it would be exceedingly helpful to get information from the city and secure allies there, one more attempt was certainly worth

making; and so, November 1st, Arnold sent another letter to Mercier, begging to know the number of troops in Quebec and Montreal, and the sentiments of the French.[12] He inquired whether any ships of war were lying at Quebec, asked for news of General Schuyler, and declared that it would be "a particular favour" if a friend or two would come to meet him. Of course he was anxious to know also whether the authorities expected him.

Another letter was written that day. It was directed to Meigs, who seems to have acted as paymaster-general, and authorised him to let each captain have about $20 or $30 for himself and his men. The amount seems niggardly, but Arnold is entitled to so much

showed hearty good-will and a real zeal to supply their wants. The instincts of humanity, Washington's reassuring manifestoes, and admiration for the courage and endurance of the Americans, not unmingled with awe, contributed to make the natives friendly. Yet all these considerations might have counted little had they not been re-enforced with a liberal use of good money. Washington had particularly ordered that full value should be paid for supplies, and men on the point of starvation were easy to bargain with. Equal emphasis was laid by the journalists on the politeness and helpfulness of the peasants, and on their disposition to charge excessive prices.[16]

Provisions were plentiful,—indeed, even too much so, for some of the men made themselves ill by indulging their appetites, in spite of urgent warnings, and one at least died. But it was hardly the same with lodgings. Not until the army reached the more thickly settled parts below could men be provided for in houses; and it cannot be supposed that all were lodged under roofs anywhere along the Chaudière. At "Sertigan" there were practically no such accommodations. The weather, which was fine and warm on Thursday (November 2d), turned suddenly cold, and it snowed

on Friday and Friday night. Fires were built, and huts of one sort or another put up, but there was no little discomfort.

Besides the French, Arnold had Indians to reckon with, and these were soon in evidence. Melvin saw seventy or eighty of the braves, Thursday evening, at the first settlement, all decked out with "broaches, bracelets & other trinkets," their faces well painted. But Arnold was of course the object of their quest, and on Saturday a regular council met at his quarters near Gilbert.[17] Although doubtless the redskins understood well enough the aim of the expedition, they pretended the opposite, and through an interpreter demanded formally of Arnold the reason for this warlike invasion.

Stragglers were coming up hourly with tales of misery and escape.[20] Lieutenant McClellan, though left behind, had not been forgotten. Two Indians were sent up the river for him in a canoe as promptly as possible, and on the third evening they returned successful; but nothing could save the poor fellow, and he died the next day.

The first settlement was reckoned to be about seventy or seventy-five miles from Quebec. The greater part of the distance lay along the river.[21] Whether the village of St. Francis had begun to exist is more than doubtful, for no journalist mentions it; but St. Joseph already possessed a name. Gradually the country became thickly settled. Taverns and victualling houses, which were now to be found, made it easier to supply the army; and the people continued kind, "with few exceptions."

Their satisfaction over the visit of the liberal Americans received, however, a shock. Robbisho, Arnold's messenger from "Sertigan," was captured. News of this unfortunate accident arrived on November 5th, and with it came a story that the British were going to "burn and destroy all the inhabitants in the vicinity of Quebec, unless they came in and took up arms in defence of the garrison."

The Americans wasted no time. Expresses hurried back toward the rear, urging on the soldiers. As much as possible was done for their comfort. Arnold had beef and potatoes ready every ten or twelve miles, according to Melvin; though some of the men, hardly able to relish meat as yet, preferred to eat bread and butter, milk and eggs, when they could, and many necessaries — even shoes — were lacking. In this wise, the Colonel and a part of his officers and men, including Hanchet's advanced party, we may believe, reached St. Mary[22] by the 5th, and the main body of the troops arrived a day later. On the 6th Captain Dearborn, who had been ailing all the

XVI

FROM ST. MARY TO QUEBEC

ST. MARY was a village of some importance, especially because the manor-house of a gentleman and landed proprietor, Gabriel Elzéar Taschereau, stood near it. Taschereau is said to have been away from home when the Americans arrived, as was very natural[1]; but even had he been at hand, he would not have welcomed them as the peasants did, for the peasants desired freedom from the oppression of the noblesse, while the noblesse, realising that the British had treated them far more handsomely than the democratic Americans would do, were from the first our enemies.

But Messire Taschereau could not carry his mansion away; and there Arnold appears to have established his headquarters on Sunday, November 5th. This point became, then, a rendezvous for the army, and those who came early, besides ample rations, had a breathing

space. As for lodgings, LeMoine quotes a tradition that Father Verreau, the priest, mounted his pulpit that afternoon at vespers, and advised his people that the best thing they could do, under the circumstances, was to provide for Americans in need of accommodations; and this appears to be confirmed by Humphrey's statement that "the Minister was kind and let us have all that he had To spare."

The next morning, November 6th, "orders were given for every captain to get his company on as fast as possible," says Dr. Senter, "and not to leave a man behind unless unfit for duty"; and by afternoon a considerable part of the detachment had gathered at the rendezvous. Not all the officers occupied their

at two o'clock in the afternoon, for Point Levi on the St. Lawrence.

For about four miles the highway continued to follow the Chaudière; but a little beyond the present village of Scotts, the river suddenly turned a great angle toward the left, and the road sheered off almost as sharply to the right. Soon began a forest nearly or quite a dozen miles across, the "forest of Sertigan," not yet wholly cut down, which formed the boundary between the seigneurie of Beauce, whence the Provincials came, and the seigneurie of Lauzon, to which they were bound.

There was no uncertainty as to the route, however. Here lay the Justinian Road,[3] named after Father Justinien, the first missionary priest of the Beauce country. But direction was about the only good quality of the highway. For at least twelve miles not a dwelling was to be seen, and the soldiers tramped along through snowy mire half-leg deep. Supper was out of the question. Night set in, and still the march continued. Finally near midnight the woods came to an end, and the troops emerged at the village of St. Henry[4] on the Etchemin River, about twenty miles from St. Mary.

The next day they advanced along the right

more, and Quebec would be in sight; Quebec was another word for enemy, and tion became necessary. Scouting was in c and no doubt received attention. It is said that Jaquin and two Indians were se Quebec this day in a canoe.[6] Arnold u stood that his coming was expected there he knew that no boats would be found o south side of the St. Lawrence. Unde circumstances he deemed it wise to halt; so, after marching three miles in a snow-st and perhaps an equal distance later in the the army rested until night.[7]

Meanwhile he wrote another letter[8] to eral Schuyler, not yet knowing that M gomery now commanded the western arn invasion. All his troops were with hir within two days' march, he said and in or three days he hoped to cross the St. rence. Should an attack seem likely to ceed, he would make it at once; while, in

thirty men, probably riflemen, were sent forward to see whether the road was clear, and at two o'clock nothing but air and water lay between them and their destination, Quebec.[9] During the 8th, the army followed along the Pavement Road, crossed the highway that traversed the heights of Point Levi[10] to St. Nicholas,[11] a number of miles above on the St. Lawrence, then took the Mill Road,[12] arrived finally at the St. Lawrence, and found quarters in houses along the bluff, though many of the troops appear to have halted for the night a few miles back.[13]

At one o'clock that morning Arnold received Montgomery's letter of October 29th, and, when he found himself seven and one-half miles from Point Levi, wrote a reply, still calling himself, by mistake, at "St. Marie." Before the message was despatched, a friend arrived from Quebec and supplied a postscript. Only the previous Sunday a frigate of twenty-six guns was said to have reached the town, and also two transports with one hundred and fifty recruits from Newfoundland. These, with citizens forced to take up arms, made nearly three hundred men; but Arnold proposed to sever the communications of the city, and felt sure of taking it, or at least keeping it

sealed up until Montgomery could arrive. This makes it evident that he now intended to cross the St. Lawrence at all events, and not attempt to march up the right bank of the river toward Montreal.

About a quarter or a third of a mile above the end of the Mill Road, and some 3600 feet below the mouth of Etchemin River, a stream,[11] called in English "Saw River," brought down to the St. Lawrence the overflow of two ponds lying in Bellechasse County near St. Charles. It was a small stream, only a dozen miles in length; but it had no little importance at that day, for perhaps fifty rods from its mouth there was a sharp little fall, whence a conduit,

The approach of the Provincials had been known in the town on November 3d, and at that time the Lieutenant-Governor, Cramahé, took steps to remove or destroy all the boats found on the southern shore of the St. Lawrence and on the Island of Orleans.[17] On the 8th, Cramahé received notice that Arnold's advance guard had arrived the evening before "within two Leagues and a half of the St. Lawrence."[18] But it was not known precisely what their later movements had been, and on the 8th or 9th[19] a bold attempt was made to obtain some property[20] from Caldwell's mill. A boat rowed from the *Hunter*, a sloop-of-war lying in the river, under the command of a midshipman named McKenzie, a brother of the captain[21]; and after the midshipman had stepped ashore, the boat pushed off again[22] — perhaps, as Henry says, to find a better place to land—and McKenzie was captured. No information could be extracted from the prisoner, however. The *Hunter* opened fire on the Americans, but without effect.

Fortunately some one else made amends for McKenzie's silence. That same day appeared at Arnold's headquarters an Englishman named Halstead,[23] Caldwell's superintendent at the mill. Whatever his motives, he had espoused

Though not a soldier, he proved a mo
iceable ally, and a few days later pil
Provincials across the river.

The rest of the troops came up slo
when all were mustered the sight w
pitiable than formidable. Their cloth
by thickets and bushes, hung in strings.
had no shoes except the roughest of m
made of fresh hides.[24] Many had no h

Still worse, it was not possible to re
enemy. The river before them, abou
wide, was guarded by the *Lizard* frig
the *Hunter* sloop-of-war,[25] and all nig
their guard-boats were passing to a
And then, to cap it all, even an atte
cross the stream became impossible
Arnold had men enough to go. Fo
nights, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the
were so high that canoes dared not
upon the water.[26]

thirty-five or forty canoes and dugouts were collected.[28] Preparations were also made for scaling the walls, and the troops passed in review.

Monday, November 13th, the winds moderated. A council of war was held at three o'clock in the afternoon, and it resolved to cross the coming night.

Caldwell's mill was the rendezvous, for it afforded some shelter, provided a convenient place for embarkation, and stood nearly opposite a somewhat narrow part of the river. The canoes and dugouts, which had been kept out of harm's way in a cove of the Chaudière,[29] were brought down. At nine o'clock the work of crossing began.[30] It certainly looked like a desperate undertaking, for, according to the evidence, the Americans had to pass between the *Lizard* and the *Hunter*, and the British guard-boats were "plying every hour from ship to ship."[31] It was calm, cold, and "exceeding dark," as Senter informs us. No lights were used, and the utmost silence prevailed. In this way, three voyages back and forth across the mile or more of water[32] were made without discovery.

On the north side of the river, Point Pizeau makes out into the stream a little above the

way down to a small bay called Wolfe's
where, since the French war, a fair ro
been constructed to the plains above.
canoe, at least, broke on the voyage.
tenant Steele was dangerously chille
some guns and clothes were lost; t
fatal accidents occurred. No sentinel
encountered. Guards immediately too
above and below, and Captain Smith w
off with a detachment to reconnoitre.

By four o'clock about five hundred m
been landed in safety on the north
though by no means all at the same
Then the business came to an end. Tl
had been ebbing rapidly, and when the
out a large tract of rocks is expose
Caldwell's Mill. The wind became l
ous,[34] and the moon began to shine.[35]
sides these new difficulties, the Americ
the north shore were discovered. A fi
been lighted there in a vacant house

barge from reporting their discovery. So the boat was hailed, and ordered to come in. When it disobeyed, it was fired upon, with the intention, doubtless, of frightening the crew into compliance. But even this persuasion proved vain, and the barge pulled off with no little crying and lamentation.[37]

At about four o'clock, then, Arnold gave up trying to get more men across at that time, and after some discussion as to the best course to take,[38] he marched up to the plains with his men, and soon found quarters in the farm buildings where Major Caldwell had been living. The next night, or soon after,[39] all the rest, except a guard of sixty men under Hanchet, joined their comrades.[40] And so Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec was at last over.[41]

NOTES

The references by number are to the List of Authorities.

I: Pages 2–23.

1. In No. 108.
2. Also written "De l' Isle."
3. Supposed to have been issued in 1732.
4. Lake Megantic.
5. Râle spelled the name "Abnaki," and that form of the word is not uncommon. "Abenaqui" also is found.
6. He crossed from the St. Lawrence to the Kennebec, and passed down that river to its mouth in 1646. See No. 74, ii., 102, and No. 106, i., 327.
7. There are six ways to spell this name, it is said. On the monument that stands where he preached, it is Rasles. Râle was killed in 1724.
8. This evidently refers to the Great Carrying-place (Chapter VIII.).
9. The Wesserunsett. Similarly Noridgewaëg means Norridgewock, and Kenebaëg means Kennebec.
10. The Ticonic, or Taconic Falls, at Waterville.
11. The Sebasticook River.
12. That is to say, Cushnoc, Fort Western, or Augusta.
13. It empties, in fact, into a branch of the Kennebec.
14. That is, the great bow of Dead River,—the West Branch of the Kennebec.

1736, at Gibraltar. He served four years with h
as an assistant, and in 1754 came to America
engineer under General Braddock. He was p
the siege of Louisburg, in 1758, and at the ca
Quebec the following year. He was very act
gaged in America from this time on. In De
1775, the King appointed him "Chief Eng
America." June 26, 1799, he died at London.

Some confusion has existed about his wor
region crossed by Arnold. Even No. 218 is r
correct. It states that the route was suggeste
nold by Montresor's journal of *1760* (vol. vi.,
and it gives the map of 1761 in rough facsimil
of 1760 (p. 224). The facts are that he made t
across this region. January 26, 1760, he left
with verbal despatches from General Murray for
Amherst, and on February 3d he struck the C
River. He followed this stream to "Amaguntic
Lake St. Augustine" (Lake Megantic), kept or
the south, reached the "Ammerascagin" (Andro
River on February 16th, after suffering greatly,
days later entered Topsham, opposite Brunsw
He drew a map to illustrate this journey, and a c
in colours, bearing the date *20 February, 1760*, a
appears to be his signature belongs to the N

travelled from Quebec by the Chaudière and Du Loup Rivers to Moosehead Lake, or, as he called it, Lake Original, and then down the Kennebec to Fort Halifax, just below the present city of Waterville. On his return he followed the route taken later by Arnold.

When Arnold's papers were confiscated by the State of Connecticut, after he went over to the British, his copy of Montresor's journal was found among them. Pierpont Edwards, a Commissioner under the Act of Confiscation, took possession of it. On his death, the document passed into the hands of Ogden Edwards, and by him it was furnished to the Maine Historical Society for publication in the initial volume of its Collections (No. 106, 1831).

18. An account of this Report was printed in the *Sunday Times*, of Portland, Me., on January 27, 1901; but it gave an incorrect version of what the Report had to say about the Kennebec route. I am indebted to the owner of the MS., Mr. Thos. F. Murphy, for extracts from the original and a copy of the map.

19. This has reference to the East Branch and the West Branch (Dead River) of the Kennebec. Montresor came by the East and returned by the West Branch. In a similar way the River Du Loup was called the East and the upper Chaudière the West Branch of the Chaudière. For this letter see No. 54, series 4, vol. iii., col. 1084.

20. Goodwin's letters to the Rev. Jacob Bailey (MS.) prove that he was a royalist at heart; but, as he was probably a "trimmer," he desired very likely to stand well with both sides. "Sam" Goodwin, his son, was an ardent patriot, and there is a tradition that he insisted on his father's letting Arnold have these documents. On the other hand, it has been objected that he was only a boy in 1775; but this is doubtless a mistake.

them.

21. No. 223, vol. i., p. 414.

22. Roy cites the documents: No. 159, ii., 192,

23. No. 159, iii., 47.

24. This I quote at second hand, as I have not able to find a copy of the book.

25. See Chap. IV., note 34.

26. Consult Nos. 215 and 216.

27. The object was to draw Carleton and his to the eastward, and so lessen the danger of an in from the north by way of Lake Champlain.

28. No. 54, 4th series, vol. iii., col. 761.

29. No. 54, 4th series, vol. iii., col. 763.

II: Pages 24–55.

1. John Joseph Henry was born November 4, at Lancaster, Pa., and was trained as a gunsmith. for glory led him to volunteer clandestinely in the pany of riflemen that Mathew Smith, of Lancaster, in 1775. After his return from Quebec, a cap under Morgan in the Virginia Line, as well as a li ancy in the Pennsylvania army, was offered him the scurvy, a sequel of his Quebec prison life, di him for two years. He then studied law, and fron until 1793 practised his profession. Gov. Thoma

2. No extended biographical note on Benedict Arnold is required here, but a few facts will be found pertinent. He was born at Norwich, Conn., January 14, 1741; and so was thirty-four years old in 1775. From boyhood, he was noted for strength and activity, enterprise, audacity, a domineering temper, fertility of mental resources, moral indifference, and hasty judgment. He was a fine shot, a skilful horseman, no mean seaman, fearless, indefatigable. His exploits on Lake Champlain had already proved his energy, alertness, ability, and ambition. In his operations there he was a Massachusetts colonel; but he resigned in June, 1775, and returned to Cambridge to settle his accounts with the State. He was then appointed by Washington to lead the Kennebec expedition; for which he evidently possessed many special qualifications.

I have tried in vain to discover the original MS. of Arnold's journal. Formerly it belonged to Mr. S. L. M. Barlow of New York; but Mr. Barlow's library was sold at auction in 1889, and the dealer who finally purchased this MS. is unable to say how he disposed of it. Besides making many inquiries personally, I have written to about one hundred gentlemen and libraries that seemed most likely to be posted, but without result. However, the copy among the Sparks papers in the library of Harvard University, was no doubt carefully made, though imperfections clearly exist (compare Arnold's journal with Oswald's, October 3d, for example). This copy of the journal is printed without abbreviation in the appendix of this volume. Apparently Arnold penned the journal with his own hand, for he wrote Washington on October 27th: "As soon as I can get time, shall send your Excellency a continuation of my journal," *i. e.* a continuation of the journal (through October 13th) sent previously.

end in the middle of a sentence, October 30th.

3. September 15th to October 13th, both in
Mr. Codman speaks of this (No. 28, p. 314) as tl
ing first pages of Arnold's journal; but Arnold's
begins more than a fortnight before Oswald's c
an end, and during this period the two are not id

One may, however, suspect very strongly that i
(free) "copy of my journal" that Arnold sent to
ington on October 13th. In that case it *represe*
missing pages of Arnold's journal. But this is n
tain; and, for several reasons, it seems best to sp
the journal as Oswald's.

4. Eleazer Oswald was from New Haven, Con
served under Arnold at Ticonderoga, and volur
for the Quebec expedition. At the assault on Q
he led the forlorn hope under Arnold. For a ti
served with distinction in the French army wit
mouriez. In October, 1795, he died. Oswald
his name at the end of the journal as "Sec'y pro
For the journal, see No. 54, ser. 4, vol. iii., col. 1c

5. Henry Dearborn was born at North Ha
N. H., February 23, 1751, studied medicine, and
captain at the battle of Bunker Hill. He served th
the war, and then settled at Augusta, Me. His
honors are mentioned in the text. June 6, 18[illegible]

curl often occurring at the end of a word and a superfluous, but intentional, final *e* is not always observed.

7. Return J. Meigs was born in Middletown, Conn., December 28, 1740. He was engaged in mercantile pursuits in 1775, and also commanded a militia company of light infantry. When news of the battle of Lexington came, he and his men proceeded to the scene of action. His expedition from Guilford to Long Island in May, 1777, won him thanks and an "elegant" sword from Congress. Under Wayne, he took part in the storming of Stony Point. The end of the war found him a colonel. January 28, 1823, he died. His son became Postmaster-General. The following quotations suggest a close relation between his journal and Dearborn's: September 24th, Meigs (No. 6, Pt. II., p. 296): "At Fort Western preparing for our march to Quebec; this fort stands on the east side of the river Kennebec & consists of two block-houses & a large house 100 feet long, which were enclosed with pickets; this house is the property of Howard, Esq; where we were exceedingly well entertained." Dearborn (No. 113, April, 1886, p. 277): "We lay at Fort Western preparing for our March — Fort Western Stands on the East side of the River, and Consists of two Block-Houses, and a Large House 100 feet Long which are Inclos'd only with Picquets, this House is now the property of one Howard Esq^r^ where we were well entertained." Such a similarity could not be accidental. There are, however, not many cases of the sort (see September 29th, October 23d and 26th, and November 13th). Of course the copyist would seem to be Dearborn, since Meigs's journal was published in 1776, but Meigs may have used Dearborn's notes. It does not matter very much, for each preserved his individuality; but we have not quite two independent authorities here.

As Colonel Meigs was living at the time of its pub
by the Massachusetts Historical Society, it seems
able to suppose that he was consulted, but ther
evidence to that effect; and, even if he was cor
it does not follow that he carefully read the pro
one specific instance of revision in the American
mention may be made of its combining the en
September 25th and 26th, which are separate in
edition. The main evidence is the style.

10. Isaac Senter, son of Samuel Senter, 2d, w
in Londonderry, N. H., in 1753. His medical
were pursued at Newport, R. I., with Dr. Thomas
but, while he was still a student, the tidings of Le
impelled him to go to Cambridge as surgeon in the
Island contingent. Retiring from the army in 1
practised medicine in Cranston and then in N
R. I. He was conspicuous as physician, writer, and
man.

11. No. 140, vol. i. I am greatly indebted
Charles Allen Munn, the owner of the MS., for
portunity to compare the printed version with the o

12. For further remarks, see the edition prep
the author for the Rhode Island Historical Society
will probably be published during 1904. The a
comes to an end abruptly with October 27th. It is

letters, such as many people fall into in the course of time.

13. Simeon Thayer (sometimes written Thayre, though his signature was "Thayer"), son of David, was born at Mendon, Mass., April 30, 1737, and as a boy was apprenticed to a maker of perukes, probably in Providence. During the French and Indian War he served in a Rhode Island regiment, and when Fort William Henry was taken by Montcalm, escaped death by the narrowest of chances. He then returned to Providence, and followed his calling. We soon find him an officer of the "Grenadiers" of that city. In May, 1775, he was made a captain by the General Assembly, and in three days had a full company enlisted. When word came, May 19th, that the British were marching on Dorchester (near Boston), he called his company out, and in two hours every man was on the way to Cambridge. These troops were the first to arrive from his State. January 1, 1781, he retired from the army, and three years later he opened a hotel at Providence. October 14, 1800, was the day of his death. Thayer's journal, advertisements of both his earlier and his later businesses, with many further details, may be found in No. 153, vol. vi. Thayer seems to have been in the habit of keeping journals, for, in an application to the government (No. 189), we find him using these words: "An Extract from my Journal of some facts relative to my Sufferings during the last French War & the late War between Great Britain & America. . . . Many more Transactions of Importance I have omitted." The handwriting of the journal is not Thayer's; but the document evidently comes from him, for the heading states that it is the record of one of Greene's captains. This cannot mean Topham, as is shown by such entries as that of September 15th, and by the fact that we have

spelled "Thayre."

14. John Topham was a native of Newport, I no other facts of his early life are known. In was appointed "captain-lieutenant" in the Rhoc Army of Observation. (The captain-lieutenan lieutenant who acted as captain, because the served also as a field officer.) It is said that on of the battle of Lexington he raised a comp marched for Cambridge at once. After his retı Quebec he continued to serve, became a colo received the thanks of the Assembly. His lat were devoted to mercantile pursuits. Septer 1793, was his last day.

Mr. Codman (p. 317) is in error in say Topham's journal has never been published. I found in several instalments in the Newport beginning May 15, 1897. This version is subs correct, but it does not begin until October 14th, the MS. is in part readable as early as October it contains many slight and some astonishing de from the original. I am under obligation to th of the document, Mr. James G. Topham, a grar the author, for the privilege of revising the prin sion by the MS. The latter is on small sheets o

15. Mr. George Humphrey, of Providence, the present owner of the MS., has kindly given me the following facts: William Humphrey was born in Rehoboth (afterward Swansea), Mass., in 1752, and died in Tiverton, R. I., July 1, 1832. He was lieutenant in Varnum's Rhode Island regiment, June, 1775. After returning from Quebec and being exchanged, he was appointed lieutenant in Colonel Angell's regiment. January 1, 1777, he was made first lieutenant in the Second Rhode Island regiment. October 22, 1778, he became a captain. January 1, 1781, he was transferred to the First Rhode Island regiment. He served till the close of the war, and probably was appointed a major, though the cessation of hostilities appears to have prevented the issuing of a commission. After the war he was captain of the Tiverton militia, 1794, 1798, 1799, 1800–1804, and member of the Rhode Island Assembly, 1802–1812. He was genial and kindly, a man of sincere piety, a deacon of the Baptist church for many years, and one greatly loved by the community. His journal, like Topham's, has a capital at the beginning of each line, and very little punctuation.

It is a pleasure to record my special indebtedness to Mr. Clarence S. Brigham, Librarian of the Rhode Island Historical Society, who guided me to both Humphrey's and Thayer's MSS.

16. The differences are curious. Under Sept. 30 we find in Humphrey: "This day proceeded toward the aforesaid falls through rapid water here is the second Carrying place we found that the course of the river differ'd From the draught that we had seen I carr'd my Battow across the island & encamped on the main On the west side of the river here is a new Mill erected & the worst Instructed I ever saw, the people Call this

camped on the Main, on the west side (carrying place is crosst an Island here is ing—the property of Mr. Coplin—the v I ever saw. the People call this place (Indeed!"

It will be noted that Thayer's first s correct version of what Humphrey wrote added one fact to Humphrey's account

September 21. Humphrey: "our E very uncomfortable especially For th tents and not being Us'd to soldiers . . . "for those who had no tents much used to the inconveniences that a to undergo, suffer'd exceedingly."

17. In both cases further evidence c E. g., compare Humphrey and Thaye 24, 25 and Oct. 25; and Humphrey Oct. 19, 21 and 28.

18. The name usually appeared as from Frederick County, Virginia, and eye. Later he became a colonel.

19. Mr. William F. Havemeyer purc ing to the life of Washington, but he me that he has no knowledge of Heat evidence that Marshall used it, see No

Hanchet, though his name was occasionally written Hanchett by others. Mr. Codman (see p. 318) did not observe the difficulty connected with this journal.

22. According to the genealogy of the Stocking family (No. 124, 1896) he was born June 2, 1753, and the British list of prisoners made him twenty-three years old in July, 1776. Mr. Codman ranks him as a sergeant on pp. 85 and 100, but as a private on pp. 310 and 318. He was the latter. See "Ware's" list (No. 206).

23. Hanchet's company formed a part of the third division, as Arnold organised his army at Fort Western, and Arnold — fully corroborated by Oswald, Meigs, and Dearborn—states that the third division left Fort Western on September 27th; but Stocking says that he left on the 25th, the day when the first division set out, and his stages all the way along correspond with those of the first division, as we have them from journalists of that party. Had Stocking been specially detailed, he would have been pretty sure to indicate as much; and indeed it is hardly possible to imagine that he was detailed with Morgan, especially as the first division consisted of riflemen, while he was a musketman.

24. Until recently one gentleman named Stocking lived in Catskill; but he knows nothing of Abner nor of his journal, not even whether Abner was an ancestor of his. The oldest inhabitant of Catskill, almost one hundred years of age, is equally ignorant in this regard, and a search through the files of an old Catskill newspaper has thrown no light on the matter.

25. Mr. Codman states (No. 28, p. 316) that nothing is known of Melvin except that he was a private in Dearborn's company, but the Massachusetts archives do not quite agree with that.

In No. 111, vol. x., p. 623, we find: "Melven, James,

Winter Hill, Oct. 6, 1775 ; reported a
Quebec ; *also* list of men raised to se
ental Army from 7th Worcester Co. re
Capt. William Marean, dated Hubb
1777 ; residence Hubbardston."

"Melvin, James, Hubbardston, Priv
Marean's Co. of Minute-men, Capt.
which marched on the alarm of April
8 days."

Evidently these two men were the s
who wrote the journal. I looked up t
October 6th, and found the date. Mr.
seems to make the date October 15th l

James Melvin of Massachusetts
Dearborn's company on the British
tured December 31st. After he was ex
to have re-entered the army, and, und
to have served through the war.
1801.

26. His brother-in-law was a sea-ca
able in some instances to combine his
I have seen a chair—one of four—that
brought from Spain. He was also a fi
such in Ezra Hunt's company of Mose
of Newburyport men but he seems

28. Mr. Codman concurs in this without question (p. 317).

29. He would have appeared there unless he had died between June 6th (the last date in his journal) and July 27th (the date of the list); and at that time deaths were not likely to occur.

30. This man is listed in the Massachusetts archives as Wilds, but his grandson states that the last letter was intended as a flourish. See No. 113, 1890–91, pp. 39 and 40.

31. It seems pertinent to add that Ebenezer Wild's grandson is satisfied that he did not go to Canada. Harvard University has a MS. copy of the journal, but the original has disappeared, though I have seen and examined the journals of Wild's own campaigns.

32. Mr. Codman follows without question the lead of Justin Winsor in regard to it (p. 316). Winsor edited the journal for No. 124.

33. I have searched for the Ware MS. in libraries and among members of the Ware family, but without result.

34. In the British list of prisoners (No. 20) the name is written Wire, very plainly. But I have no doubt this was a mistake. The list called Ware's was copied like the rest of the journal from Tolman, as is proved by the fact that a copy of Tolman's MS., now in the possession of his grandson, includes the list. It is not in the least probable that Tolman and Ware would conspire to omit Wire's name and insert Ware's, when the fraud could be so easily detected at the time. The British officer doubtless took Ware's name orally, and, if it was spoken a trifle indistinctly, he might easily call it Wire, as any one may find by trying.

35. No. 99, p. 323.

37. This is confirmed by the grand
Tolman in a letter to me.

38. According to the son of Willi
owned it in 1850, Mr. Locke was (he
to have placed it for safekeeping in
library in Boston ; but I have not bee
In 1850 Tolman's MS. had become a gc
that Ware's and Wild's copies were p
Mr. Locke's statement that the Tolman
slightly from Ware's is supported by the
ment believed to have been copied fi
MS. and now in the possession of the T
substantially identical with Ware's jc
informed by the owner.

Ebenezer Tolman was the son of H
Attleboro, Mass., and when fourteen year
ticed to learn the carpenter's trade.
removed to Fitzwilliam, N. H., where
the outbreak of the war. He enlisted
take part in the battle of Bunker Hill.
in the Quebec campaign did not disc
he re-enlisted as sergeant. He die
1838. For these details and other
indebted to his grandson, Mr. W. O. T

39. Very little is known of Moriso

master, he had a dispute with a colonel of the Maryland Line. The colonel drew his sword upon him, and he promptly broke the colonel's sword-arm with a spade. A court-martial sentenced him to receive one thousand lashes; and, although the magnanimity of the colonel prevented the execution of the sentence, Morison quit the service in disgust.

40. "Provincial's" Journal: "Oct. 4. Pushed and dragged to Tentucket Falls (Hellgate). Carried 40 perches and encamped, 8 [miles]. 12, 13. Carried three-quarters of a mile to a second pond, a mile over; then two miles land to the third pond, two miles over, and encamped, 5 [miles]. Nov. 1. . . . I myself saw one of them offer a dollar, to one of our company, for a bit of cake not above two ounces. 2. This morning, when we arose, many of us were so weak that we could scarce stand; I myself staggered about like a drunken man. . . . 3. This day marched 20 miles, wading several small rivers, some of them up to our waists. . . . In the evening came in sight of a house, the first we had seen for four weeks. . . . 5. Continued our march down the river, the people kind and hospitable,—provisions plenty, at a high price. . . . 6. Came up with Col. Arnold and the advanced party. . . . 7. Marched this morning 3 miles, halted till evening, when a Lieut. with 20 men, was ordered forward to see if the way was clear."

Stocking: "Oct. 4. . . . We got forward 8 miles to Tentucket or Hell-gate falls . . . The land carriage here was but about 40 rods. 12 and 13. We carried our bateaus and baggage three quarters of a mile to another pond, one mile over,—then to a third, two miles over. . . . Nov. 1. . . . Our hunger was so great that many offered dollars for a single mouthful

we proceeded on down the river about
several small rivers, some of which wer
dles. . . . At evening we came in
which was the first we had seen in the
. . . 5. We continued our march
The people continued to be hospitabl
exceptions. Knowing our need of th
of them would extort from us an ex
. . . 6. This day we came up with
the advanced party. . . . 7. We t
down the river about three miles and h
A lieutenant with 20 men was sent forw
way was clear." It will be seen that
"I," but that Stocking does not. Up
inclusive) Stocking does not resemb
This is what suggested the remark in
that perhaps he began a journal but ga

Oct. 16, Stocking and Tolman agree
vance six miles, while "Provincial" an
ten. This would suggest that one of th
the other; but the next day we find t
It is clearly impossible to carry our infe
fine point. No doubt the men talked th
a rule used more or less independent ju

41 For a full account of Fobes and

Cambridge in Thomas Knowlton's company, re-enlisted before long in the artillery company of Captain Collander, and served at Bunker Hill. In July he entered a company at Roxbury under Captain Pomeroy, and signed for the Quebec expedition September 7, 1775. After coming back from Canada, he returned to the army. His death occurred August 19, 1841. His MS. was printed in No. 104, ii., 685.

43. Rev. Jacob Bailey was a missionary of the Church of England, and resided in Pownalborough (now Dresden), Me., from 1760 until, in June, 1779, his British sympathies—or rather his sense of obligation to keep his oath of allegiance—made it unsafe to remain there. His life has been written by W. S. Bartlett. He "was a close observer, an accurate writer." For Bailey's account of the expedition as well as other material my cordial thanks are due to Mr. Charles E. Allen, author of the *History of Dresden.*

44. Arnold's letters may be found in Nos. 54 and 106, i. The latter would seem to be the more reliable, for the paternity of the MS. is given (p. 341); but we find there some errors which do not appear in No. 54. I have not been able to discover the originals. According to No. 218, vi., p. 218, they have been preserved in the library of Bowdoin College; but nothing is known of them there at present. For a letter from Captain Ward, see No. 185, p. 85. For one from Dearborn, see No. 106, i., p. 400, note. Others may be found in No. 72, appendix.

45. A journal was kept by Charles Porterfield, sergeant of Morgan's company. The MS. is in the hands of the Southern Historical Society, and a considerable part of it has been printed in No. 202, October, 1901. But the portion relating to the march is missing.

been unable to find any trace of its present whe
Other journals may come to light, but those
probably contain all the important points.

In quotations from the journals, errors in
punctuation, etc., though somewhat annoying
essential to our inquiry, have in most cases
tained, as illustrating the characteristics of the

III: Pages 56–73.

1. No. 113, October, 1876. (According to M
man, No. 28, p. 28, orders "to draft the men for
were given on September 6th. He was probabl
by the loose statement in Meigs's journal, Septemb
See the same for the order of September 8th, give

2. This was commanded by Captain, afterwa
eral, Daniel Morgan. Graham (No. 64) states
company marched six hundred miles in three w
their way to Cambridge, without losing a mar
sounds incredible, but apparently is explained ir
p. 687, by the statement that the men were mou

3. The Lancaster County company was com
by Captain Matthew Smith, and the Cumberlanc
(Carlisle) company by Captain William He
The latter name has been given as Hendrick a

adjutants (Christian Febiger was the principal one) and two quartermasters. There has been considerable question as to the spelling of Febiger's name. I have seen two signatures of his, and in both it was spelled as here.

5. Matthias Ogden (who afterward acted as brigade-major), Eleazer Oswald (secretary, and, in effect, aide), and Aaron Burr were volunteers, as were Charles Porterfield, John McGuire, and Matthew Duncan.

6. According to Mr. Codman each company of musketmen was "filled up" at Cambridge to the number of "eighty-four effective men, rank and file" (p. 29); but the order of September 5th disproves this. Possibly the subject may be worth some further remarks. As nothing like complete rolls exist, we cannot be sure about the names or even the numbers of the soldiers in the companies of the detachment. No. 86 gives Captain Hanchet's complement as one hundred.

McCobb's company, on the other hand, seems to have left Cambridge considerably short of its quota. On the official roll of his regiment, Winter Hill, October 7, 1775, it is noted: "The captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 3 corporals, and 44 privates gone to Quebec" (No. 149, p. 56).

The following statements from Mr. P. McC. Reed, the historian of Bath, Me., bear on the case: "My father said to me and others that 'McCobb took a company of soldiers on board of the Arnold fleet when it was anchored at Parker's Flats.' This took place when my father was in his prime, and he had a remarkably retentive memory. . . . Evidently, not having enough at Winter Hill to form a full company, he hastened down to the Kennebec to raise the necessary quota.".

No. 173 states that men enlisted while Arnold was waiting at Newburyport, which seems to indicate that

roll of the Company under my command which n
from Cambridge for Canada, September, 1775."

Mr. Codman (p. 32) apportions the men to S
follows: Rhode Island, 250; Connecticut, 100;
chusetts (including Maine), 400; New Hampshi
Pennsylvania, 200; Virginia, 100; New Jersey, a
unteers. But (1) these figures would make the tot
than one hundred too great; (2) as the list of Arnol
cannot be made up, the residences of some are not
(3) there were men from New York, Marylar
North Carolina, though not many; (4) there w
few, if any, over 88 from New Hampshire (No.
212, 213, 214). This statement, however, requir
ment. No. 222 gives the names of 103 New Hampsh
as going with Arnold; and, while a few errors a
have crept into the list, the author does make
about one hundred went to "Canada." But d
prove that they went with Arnold? It hardly se
Washington requested the New Hampshire au
to pay up the New Hampshire men who were t
by the Kennebec; Deacon Brooks was appointe
this; and he reported later to the Committee o
that the amount paid and expense of paying
£348 7s. (No. 54, 4, iv., 1 and 2.) Now the
paid the eighty-eight New Hampshire men in De

same time were not; and Washington's message intimates that the pay of all was in arrears. How, then, did they go to "Canada"? That question we are not bound to answer, but it occurs to me that possibly they went with Bedel to Montgomery's army. (5) The rifle companies did not contain one hundred men each. The rolls in No. 97 show that Hendricks had 85 and Smith had 80. By the act of Congress of June 14, 1775 (No. 195), each rifle company was to consist of 68 privates, 12 officers, and a musician. (6) There can have been but very few Virginians outside of Morgan's company.

I regret having to refer so many times to No. 28 in terms of disagreement; but it has seemed necessary to discuss points of difference, else a reader might feel left in suspense between two opinions, and candor requires me to give a reference to the place where the other view may be found stated.

7. Meigs, also, had been at Roxbury (then a suburb of Boston).

8. Mr. Codman (p. 29) represents the whole detachment as remaining at Cambridge until the 13th; but (1) "Provincial" records a march of thirteen miles toward Newburyport on the 11th; (2) Morison recorded: "We began our march for Quebec" on the 11th; (3) Haskell and a small party reached Lynn on the 11th; and (4) Senter wrote under date of the 13th: "The detachment . . . had now been under marching orders since the 11th."

9. This was set off from Newbury in 1764. The distance from Boston to Newburyport was called about forty-five miles.

10. It is not recorded that all set out on the 11th; but it seems probable that these companies marched together and stopped at the same places, since we know

that they camped together at Newbury. Their two stopping-places I have not been able to identify.

11. Some of the journalists say "Mystick," taking the name, apparently, from the river.

12. Melvin stopped for the night in Lynn.

13. Thayer and Humphrey put Beverly first, but this is obviously a slip.

14. This arrangement of the battalions is given by Dearborn's journal. Mr. Codman (p. 31) puts McCobb into the first, and adds to the second a Captain Oliver Colburn. This last gentleman is a surprise. None of the journalists includes in the army an officer of that name, though more than one gives a list of the captains. The order of September 5th called for only thirteen captains. A list made out at a later time by Ward does not mention Colburn. Had there been fourteen companies averaging eighty-four men (Mr. Codman's figure), the total would have been about twelve hundred, instead of ten hundred and fifty men. In fact, only "Provincial"

ists fit into this scheme. From some of the companies we have no reports. Possibly these marched by themselves on a different schedule, but it does not seem probable.

Several of the officers were mentioned in the preceding chapter; a word or two may be added about a few others.

Christopher Greene was a descendant of one of the charter proprietors of Rhode Island under Charles II., and the son of Philip Greene, a judge of the Superior Court of the State. He was born in 1737; lived at what is now called Centreville; joined the "Kentish Guards" of East Greenwich, as lieutenant, in 1774, and in 1775 was appointed major in the Rhode Island army under his near relative and intimate friend, General Nathaniel Greene, but preferred to serve as captain in the Continental army. He rose to be a colonel, distinguished himself in the defence of Red Bank (Fort Mercer) in 1777, and was barbarously murdered by a gang of refugees near Croton Bridge, Croton River, N. Y., in the night of May 13, 1781. He was most highly esteemed.

Roger Enos was born in Simsbury, Conn., in 1729, but hailed now from Windsor, Conn. (Mr. Codman, p. 31, calls him "Roger Enos of Vermont," but he did not settle in Vermont until 1781). He served in the French and Indian War. In 1762 he was in the expedition against Havana. Died October 6, 1808.

Timothy Bigelow, son of Daniel, came from Worcester, Mass. On receiving news of the battle of Lexington, he marched at the head of some Minute Men to the scene of activity. After returning from Quebec, he became colonel of the Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment. He was born in 1740, and died in 1790.

Jonas Hubbard also was of Worcester, Mass. Though

Quebec he was wounded and soon died.

Daniel Morgan was born in New Jersey ir moved to Virginia in 1755, struggled for a ro hood as farmer and teamster, served under raised a company of riflemen in 1775, and m Cambridge. His exploits during the war ar to all. Later in life he was sent to Congress. in 1799.

Samuel Ward, born at Westerly, R. I., Nov 1756, was the son of Samuel Ward, Govern State. He studied at Brown University, j Rhode Island Army of Observation, was made in May, 1775, and soon found himself at C burning with patriotic ardour. After retur Quebec he rose to be a lieutenant-colonel. war ended he became a merchant, and settl time in New York. There he died in 1832. the grandfather of Mrs. Julia Ward Howe.

15. His formal instructions were dated S 14th; but naturally there were final preparatior and last conversations to have with the Comn chief. Mr. Codman thinks (p. 35) that he waite to receive the latest possible news from Schuy was not necessary to delay for that, since the toes were to be sent on to him, and information

special efforts were made to secure it for him in that city.

Dr. Senter, the surgeon, went only seven miles on Wednesday, travelled via Salem to Ipswich on Thursday, and lodged Friday night at Newbury. He was attended by his mate (Mr. Greene) and by his assistants (Barr and Jackson).

The march of the soldiers through these towns doubtless interested the people deeply, but no incidents of their passage seem to have been recorded.

17. Oswald says that the whole detachment arrived Saturday evening. This means, I suppose, that *by evening* the last of the army had put in an appearance.

18. The riflemen camped "at the corner" of Rolfe's Lane, since known as Green Street, and a stone about seven feet high has been set up opposite the spot on the edge of the Common, with a bronze tablet recording the fact. (For the inscription, see No. 175, January, 1903, p. 352.) I should call it about a mile from this point to the Old South Church.

19. Mr. Codman (p. 34) puts all the musketmen in the Presbyterian Church, Davenport's Inn, and the rope-walks; but (1) it seems to me doubtful whether many soldiers lodged in the meeting-house. They would hardly turn the church of a highly respected and friendly minister into barracks. Besides, what did they do with the seats? It was in this church that many attended divine service the following Sunday: did they stand? Mr. Codman's authority was doubtless Thayer. Thayer says: "[Sept. 15. Arri]ved at Newbury Port about sun set and Quarter'd our men [in] the Presbiterian Meeting House," but under date of the 16th he records: "Capt. Tophams Company together with mine arrived." Humphrey agrees with Thayer for the 15th.

We may conclude that probably some of that company, but not the greater part, lodged in the church, unless we prefer to reject entirely this portion of the two journals on account of its evident and gross inaccuracy (Note 13). (2) Haskell states that his company were quartered in the Town-house. (3) So far as we are aware, no soldiers, but only the surgeon and his "company" went to the inn, and (4) Squier, not a rifleman, says: "We pitched our tents."

20. Arnold wrote Tracy from Fort Western, thanking him warmly for "the many favors received" at Newburyport. Mr. Codman (p. 34) speaks of the "lavish hospitality" of "old Newbury"; but I find no evidence of any entertainment there. The hospitality appears to have been shown at Newburyport.

21. Washington to Tracy, September 2, 1775; but later five suitable vessels were found at Beverly and two at Newbury, so that Tracy had to provide only four (Joseph Reed to Tracy, September 5th).

ten, and this requires a comment. Oswald's official journal says of them, "eleven in number," and four others corroborate him, while about as many say ten. My own conclusion is that originally there were eleven; but, as the *Swallow* got on the rocks, was relieved of substantially all her passengers, and was left astern, some of the journalists very naturally reckoned only ten. The *Swallow* rejoined the fleet in the Kennebec (probably carrying freight as well as twelve men), and so there were actually eleven transports. We have the names of nearly all the vessels: *Broad Bay* (which led the way under the command of James Clarkson), *Houghton*, *Eagle*, *Hannah*, *Britannia*, *Conway*, *Abigail*, and *Admiral*.

Mr. Codman (p. 38) speaks of "the *Commodore*, the flagship, carrying Arnold"; but (1) the sailing-master of the fleet, as Mr. Codman himself says, was the captain of the *Broad Bay*, and confusion might have resulted had Arnold been on another vessel; (2) Senter sailed on the *Broad Bay* and states that Arnold was on the same vessel; (3) Humphrey and Thayer say the same; and (4) Oswald states that the signals (*e. g.*, for boarding a hostile ship) were to be given from the *Broad Bay;* therefore Arnold must have been on that vessel. Dearborn observes that Arnold's vessel was "called the Commodore"; but either he made a mistake, or the term "Commodore" was applied to this ship to indicate that it was the commanding one. As Dearborn states that the signals were to be given from the "Commodore," he must, in view of what Oswald says, have meant that Arnold was on the *Broad Bay*.

25. Arnold's letter to Washington of September 19th might add interesting details, but I have not been able to find it. It can hardly have been important.

26. Half-tide Rock and Gangway Rock are near the

wharves of Newburyport, while Lunt's Rock, Black Rocks, and Badger's Rock await ships near the sea. Shoals and bars are not wanting. Mr. Codman remarks (p. 38) that the other vessels lay to while the *Swallow* was "gotten safely off," and the testimony of Senter points that way; but (1) Oswald states that she could not be got off at that tide; (2) he says: "whom I [*i. e.*, Arnold, in whose name he wrote] ordered to follow us," which implies clearly that the *Swallow* was left behind; (3) Melvin noted that Arnold did wait awhile for the grounded schooner, but finally transferred her passengers and went ahead; and (4) Arnold wrote Washington, September 25th: "a small vessel which run on the rocks but is since off, without damage, and arrived safe," which indicates that the *Swallow* did not go on with the rest of the fleet.

Still further: Stocking speaks of the "evening tide" (referring to a high tide) on the next day, and it must have come pretty late in the evening for his vessel made

Popham Beach, inside Seguin Island; the other lies on the west side of Phippsburg Point.

30. Mr. Codman speaks (p. 38) of the mouth of the Kennebec as "150 miles from Newburyport," but that is a mistake; the air-line distance is about 84 miles. Just how many miles the fleet actually sailed we cannot say, for we do not know how straight its course was. But the shortness of the time and the direction of the wind, as well as Oswald's testimony, intimate that the course was, in the main, direct. The statement in the text was intended to make a fair allowance for departures from a straight line. The vessels, we must understand, did not all stop at exactly the same time. Dearborn says 10 o'clock.

31. Mr. Codman (p. 39) states that this point was reached at 1 o'clock P.M.; but I find no support for this view, except that Haskell mentions 12 o'clock: he may have been on a belated vessel. Dearborn entered the mouth at 10 A.M; Squier entered it early in the morning; Oswald says they were "in the mouth of Arrowsick" at 9 A.M.; "Provincial" says, "in the morning"; Thayer and Humphrey discovered the mouth about dawn; Meigs entered it soon after morning. In fact, Mr. Codman's statement is hardly consistent with itself: "They made sail early in the morning and arrived at one P.M. at the mouth of the Kennebec," since Wood Island, from which they "made sail," is close to the Kennebec.

32. Oswald notes that they anchored in Eel's Eddy (spelled *Ell* by Mr. Codman), but no such piece of water has been known at the mouth of the Kennebec for the past seventy years. Doubtless the name is a slip for Heal's Eddy. This lies at the very entrance of the river, east of Fort Popham. But it has never been

recognised as a proper anchorage, whereas Parker's Flats, a famous place for ships to lie, are within sight and only two miles distant. Some of the vessels are reported as anchoring there, and a direct tradition has it that Arnold himself did so. Putting these things together, and adding the fact that a local pilot was guiding the fleet, I have ventured to believe that Oswald is in error here,—as indeed would be very natural, since he was hearing many new names and had no reason to note them particularly. This view is confirmed by the fact that Oswald says they sent ashore for refreshments, while at anchor; refreshments were within easy reach from Parker's Flats, but not from Heal's Eddy. The Flats are merely extensive shallows.

33. Oswald says: "One of our fleet, viz, Capt. ——, overtook us," and, in his record of the next morning, adds: "After sailing a few miles discovered the other two of our fleet coming through Sheepscut Creek." Senter intimates that the fleet was pretty well scattered

last part of his day's journey in a rowboat or by land,—most likely by boat.

39. The water just below Swan Island is quite shallow. The term "Flats" is locally applied to the spot.

40. This has been known as Calf Island.

41. Apparently what Senter calls Hellgate.

42. No. 107, 2d ser., v., p. 128.

43. In 1754. See No. 215.

44. Named after Thomas Pownall, a former Governor of Massachusetts Bay.

45. It is occupied by a great-grandson of the Major Goodwin mentioned in the next sentence (1902).

46. No. 106, i., states that there was a blockhouse called Fort Pownall at Pownalborough; but this is doubtless a mistake. There was a Fort Pownall on the Penobscot. Fort Shirley was at first called Fort Frankfort. For a plan of it see No. 134, p. 47.

47. Mr. Codman has said (No. 28, p. 40) that the fleet waited at Pownalborough "during the 22^{d} and 23^{d}" for the vessels that ran aground. Such a delay would have been serious, and we must examine the matter. (1) None of the journalists mentions any such stop at Pownalborough; (2) it seems very improbable that the fleet would stop there when time was so extremely precious, and there was a deal of work to do a few miles above; (3) we know that five at least of the vessels reached Gardinerston on the 22d or earlier, and (4) the positive statements of the journalists are inconsistent with Mr. Codman's theory: Stocking and Tolman arrived at Fort Western on the 21st, and Melvin came only six miles short of it; Meigs was above Pownalborough on September 20th; Dearborn, Haskell, Senter, Squier, Humphrey, and Thayer were above Pownalborough on September 22d; Morison and "Provincial" reached Fort

Western on September 23d; and a party *left* Fort Western September 24th. Some of the journalists speak of *passing* Pownalborough on the 22d.

Mr. Codman says also that the missing vessels which went up Sheepscot River rejoined the fleet at Pownalborough (No. 28, p. 40); but Oswald saw them approaching as he sailed on "a few miles" above Georgetown. Melvin, Humphrey and Thayer corroborate this.

48. Arnold states that "many" of the transports ran aground, and in a letter to Nathaniel Tracy, September 28th, he speaks of the voyage to Fort Western as "very troublesome indeed."

49. This appears to have been a night affair, for the *Swallow* did not reach Arnold until 4 o'clock P.M., and is significant as illustrating Arnold's anxiety to lose no time.

IV: Pages 74–83.

1. Dr. Gardiner was a tory and for that reason the

of the boats used by Arnold, but there are strong suggestions. The present Kennebec bateau, used by the lumbermen, is very high and sharp at both ends, though the stem projects rather more than the stern; and the sides are high and flaring. There is a flat bottom; but, on account of the flaring sides and long, overhanging ends, it seems small. This boat is easily managed and hard to overturn. So far as the memory of old boatmen goes, it has always been the Kennebec type. My own opinion is that a less developed form of it was probably used by Arnold's men. It was easy to build, and comparatively light and cheap. The lake style of bateau would not have answered here at all.

5. The "setting pole" was doubtless a pole such as the boatmen use now to keep a boat off rocks or the shore, or to propel it by pushing against the bottom. At present the pole has a spike in the end. From Colburn's charge—"Setten poles and pikes"—we may infer that it was similar in 1775.

6. This indicates that Colburn was at Cambridge, for, as the end of the letter shows, he was not expected to come to Cambridge with an answer, and therefore he must have made this inquiry on his way home. Colburn's bills presented to Congress (heretofore unpublished) bear on this matter, as one of them mentions several trips to Cambridge. They throw light on a number of other matters, and are well worth printing in full:

The United States of America to Reuben Colburn . . Dr.

1775
Septem. 3. To 14 Days going on an Express @ 6/ by myself . . . 4: 4: 0

8	To Horse hire & my Expences going to Kennebeck with Joseph Farnsworth Comm[issary]	6:11: 2
15	To Dennis Gitchel going with an advance Party to [*i.e.* toward] Quebeck, by order of Col. Arnold, 17 Days @ 4/ . .	3: 8 —
	To Sam[l] Berry 20 Days for Ditto @ 4/	4 — —
	To Nehemiah Gitchel 16 Days for Ditto @ 4/ . . .	3: 4 —
	To Abraham Page 17 Days for Ditto @ 4/	3: 8 —
	To Isaac Hull 16 Days for Ditto @ 4/	3: 4 —
	To an Indian Guide 18 Days @ 4/	3:12 —
	To paid 2 men for assisting in hawling Baggage across Nor-	

23	To a birch Cannoe delivered Col Arnold	2 — —
	To James Stackpole's Bill for a birch Cannoe delivered Isaac Hull per order of Col Arnold .	2: 8 —
	To 200 Battoes @ 40/ . .	400 — —
	To 100 lbs. Oakam . . .	1: 4 —
	To 4000 Nails	1:12 —
		£445: 1: 7

1786—July. 3d—Errors, excepd

REUBEN COLBURN

Suffolk S— Boston July 3d 1786.

The above named Reuben Colburn personally appearing, made oath to the truth of the Forewritten Account, by him Subscribed,

Before me,

EDM. QUINCY J P

Another bill is as follows:

Gardnarston September yr [?] 1775 Dr

The younited staits of Amarika to Reuben Colburn

To 200 Battoes at 40/	400: 0: 0
To 480 Padels a /9	18: 0: 0
To 400 Setten poles and pikes a /9 . .	15: 0: 0
To 230 pair of oars a 2/ per pair . .	26: 0: 0
To 1 Barril of turpentine a 181 . . .	0:18: 0
The a Bove Delivered to General arnold	
To vittelin 21 carpenters and guids [or guide] three Days a 1/ per meal . .	3: 3: 0
To Soplien the Ingon Guids [or Guide] .	2: 0: 0
To Cash paid the Ingon intarpentur . .	1:15: 0

To Cash paid Cap Dennes Getchel and five other parsons for going up Cannibeck River as an exspres to queback . .	28: 7: 9
To Sundri Soplies to Cap Getchel and [?] .	3:16: 4
To My Self Going on Expres from Cannibeck to Cambridge 3 times and expences and hors hires and procurin Beef flouer and other [?] for the arme with arnold .	23:15: 9
	522:15:10
To the Contra	
By Cash at Sundri times . . .	155:10:6

December 9, 1818, General Henry Dearborn took oath to Colburn's claim (MS., Archives of Congress). Most of the charges were the same as in the bill last quoted, but the following items differed:

Myself going as an express from the Ken-
nebec river to Cambridge 2 times trav-

bateaux] with £100 I have lent him out of the pay." In Washington's accounts appear these entries: "Aug. 20, Reuben Colburn, £10; Sept. 7, Reuben Colburn, £16, *sh.* 6." Mr. Trofton, a member of the House of Representatives, who urged Colburn's claim, stated that these sums were on account of the boats; but as Arnold's letter of inquiry was not written until August 21st, this could hardly be true of the first one, at least. Trofton stated that Colburn received nothing except from Washington, but how can that statement be reconciled with Arnold's letter quoted above?

General Henry Dearborn stated that he saw a letter from Washington summoning Colburn to Cambridge.

It is said that Colburn went to Mount Vernon to consult Washington about the balance that he claimed, but arrived the day after Washington's death. For a final report on the claim see the Senate proceedings for March 12, 1824.

7. This sentence and the previous one help explain the care taken, by Washington's orders, to send scouting vessels out from Newburyport.

8. From the Archives of Congress; hitherto unpublished. Meigs wrote in his journal under date of September 20th: "This day makes 14 only since the orders were first given for building 200 battoes, etc.," and hence it has always been supposed that these orders were issued on September 6th.

9. Mr. Codman (No. 28, p. 29) states that "a company of carpenters was sent forward [from Cambridge] to Colburn's shipyard"; but Washington's order gives no hint of this. On the other hand, the order would allow Colburn no time to assemble a force of carpenters ready for a march to Gardinerston. Further, the fact that Colburn had a shipyard implies that he had work-

men, and as, of course, he would drop all other commissions for this one, they were perhaps able to do all the work that he had the facilities for handling. Again, Oliver Colburn, the major's brother, had a company of Minute Men in July and August, 1775, and thirty-six of them lived in Gardinerston, so that extra help could have been obtained there, no doubt. I do not know of any support for Mr. Codman's statement, and presume that it is incorrect for the same reason as the portion of the same sentence that precedes it (Chapter III., note 1). See also p. 301.

10. Here we have a definite and official reference to the mysterious "Colburn's Company," (Chapter III., note 14). The natural inference from the position of this paragraph is that what it orders was to be done after Colburn got home. This is confirmed (1) by the evident fact that guides could only be engaged near the region they were to traverse, and (2) by the fact that Colburn

West Branch, or Dead River. A family tradition has it that Oliver Colburn, who bore the title of captain, was in command of this company ; and it is easy to believe that Major Colburn, while retaining the general direction of it, would prefer not to limit his movements by attending to the details of actual command. But apparently Reuben himself was only "captain" in 1775 (note 16).

11. This word is not clear, as the paper is worn.

12. From the bill of 1786 we may infer that Joseph Farnsworth was appointed, and went to Gardinerston with Colburn. Farnsworth appears later in Arnold's correspondence as his commissary.

13. It will be seen that in drawing one of his bills Colburn made a charge for the oars, paddles, and poles, and that Dearborn did the same.

14. "Nails etc." was interlined.

15. Mr. Codman speaks (p. 29) of this as near Pittston, but it is *in* Pittston ; and of Colburn's shipyard as at Agry's Point (p. 40), whereas it was a little way *below* the Point.

There can be no doubt about the place where the bateaux were built. Rev. Jacob Bailey recorded : "200 bateaux were built at Colburn's." The price paid for the bateaux (40*s.*) would seem to have been ample, for we find Dr. Senter buying (September 30th) for $4 a much better one than he set out with.

16. These were evidently smaller or flimsier than the rest, for they cost much less. Agry's receipt for payment (MS., Archives of Congress) is as follows :

GARDNERSTON Sept^{r} the 30th 1775

Then rec^{d} of Capt. Reuben Colburn Twelve Pounds Lawful Money it being in full for the building the Last Twenty Battoes I Say rec^{d} by me

THOMAS AGRY.

This appears to prove, by the way, that in 1775 Reuben Colburn was called only captain ; and that he did not set out personally before September 30th.

Arnold's receipt (MS., Archives of Congress) runs thus:

Received Kenebeck Sep.r 1775 of Mr. Reuben Colburn, Two hundred & Twenty Batteau's for the Publick Service B.t Arnold Col.o

Mr. Codman says (p. 40) that the bateaux were "now nearly completed" (September 22d and 23d); but Arnold arrived there (Oswald's journal) September 21st, and wrote Washington (September 25th): "I found the batteaus completed" (No. 54, 4, iii., 960).

The use of "Mr." here and elsewhere with Reuben Colburn's name is evidence (1) that Washington's order to raise a company and attend the detachment did not make him and his men a part of the army, and (2) that Colburn held no regular captain's commission. Very

Apparently, then, work on the bateaux began in July. But this cannot have been; and the explanation may be that each of these five men was the employer of several workmen, and the number of days charged for in the receipt represents the total number of day's works contributed by his gang. For convenience, the four whose gangs happened to have contributed the same number (57) signed the same receipt. Possibly we may see here a hint of the method used by Colburn to execute so large a contract. Each of his regular workmen may have been made the foreman of a gang of specially employed helpers. Of course in such a community every man knew something about the use of ordinary tools.

The quotation from Morison appears under the date of September 28; of course it may represent later feelings.

17. From Joseph Reed's memorandum (No. 54, 4, iii., 962). Colburn's bill states that they were sent by Arnold's order, but there is no inconsistency, for the orders of the Commander-in-chief would very naturally be conveyed through Arnold.

18. Vassalborough, the town above Augusta, was incorporated in 1771. At that time it was astride the river, half on each side. Sidney, on the west bank, was set off in 1796. John, Dennis, and Nehemiah Getchell were the first settlers there (1760), and a fourth brother, Jeremiah, lived in Augusta. All these men served Arnold, particularly as "pilots." One of my guides gave me some interesting bits of information that came down in the Getchell family,—valuable, of course, only as tradition.

19. This report was put in writing for them by Remington Hobby (the first moderator of the town of Vassalborough), and sent by him to Colburn. (See No. 54, 4,

iii., 962, for Hobby's letter.) As the report was dated September 13th, it had, no doubt, been awaiting Arnold for some days. According to Mr. Codman (p. 43) Getchell and Berry "made their appearance and submitted their report to Arnold" at Fort Western; but (1) their report was evidently sent to Colburn before Arnold's arrival; and (2) as to their personal appearing, we only know that Arnold saw the men before he wrote his letter of September 25th to Washington (*i. e.*, there is nothing to indicate that they did not meet him at Colburn's). It is of considerable importance to note that Arnold received their report *before* reaching Fort Western, for this gave him time to mature the plan of sending off Steele's scouting party. He reached Fort Western at 6 P.M., September 23d, and must have issued orders for this expedition very promptly, for it set out early enough the next day to make eighteen miles of hard paddling before night. For a facsimile of the conclu-

6 Gallons Rum	4/	1 : 4 : 0
¼ cwt. [?] Sugar		0 : 12 : 6
½ bushel Meal		0 : 2 : 5
8 Meals Victuals		5 : 4

It will be seen that Getchell proposed to demand 5*s.* a day for services, while Colburn's bill shows that the charge was reduced to 4*s.* It will be noted that the day's works of the men were lumped, as was suggested may have been the case with the receipts given Colburn (note 16).

22. Partly confirmed by a receipt in the Archives of Congress:

GARNERS TOWN August the 31 Day 1775
Then I Received of Rueburn Colburn one Hundred and fifteen pound of salt Pork and one Hundred and Six pound of Shipp Brad one Half a Bushshall of Corn
SAMUEL BERRY

This shows that final preparations were made on the last day of August.

23. This appears from other evidence to have been at the site of Flagstaff village.

24. *I. e.*, "from."

25. According to Arnold's letter of September 25th to Washington (No. 54, 4, iii., 960) he was a Norridgewock Indian named "Nattarius." In reality his name appears to have been Natanis. More than once he appears as "Sataness" in the journals. The name Charlton in the next line means Carleton.

26. Natanis was not too hostile, however, to serve the party as guide, as is shown by a bill in the Archives of Congress:

Mr. Ruben Colburn to Dinis Gachel in behalf of the United Colinies –

To myself 17 Day going towards Quebeck at 5/p Day	4 : 5 : 0
½ Day work of Morris Fling assisting with his oxen	2 : 0
Mr. Howard halling the baggage over the Carring [carrying-place]	1 : 4
Cash p'd Nattanes the Indin for Giding us on our Jurney towards Quebeck	0 : 6 : 0

The Archives of Congress contain another bill of Dennis Getchell's, which is substantially like Colburn's of 1786. This bill of Getchell's makes it clear that the Indian guide "Went with us from Gaardnerstoun," and was paid for sixteen days. As Getchell and Berry were back at Vassalborough on September 13th, it seems plain that they went down to Gardinerston, and there settled with Colburn on the 15th, charging for their

32. Mr. Codman's account (pp. 43, 44) errs at several points: (1) he says the scouts reported "the water, though shoal, no more so than was inevitable at that season of the year," while in reality the scouts mentioned only "the *dry* season." In fact, there had been a drought. (2) He says that the Indian reported "more spies, both whites and Indians, stationed near the headwaters of the Chaudière," whereas Natanis said nothing of white scouts there. The presence of white scouts would have been particularly serious. (3) He says the scouts had gone fifty or sixty miles up Dead River. Even fifty miles would have carried them quite through the shoal water that turned them back.

33. This will appear in Chapter XV.

34. No. 3 states that Lieutenant-Governor Cramahé sent a guard to "Sartigan," and No. 148 (September 14th) mentions that some Royal Fusileers arrived the day before from "St. Igan" (a corruption of "Sertigan" formerly common in the region).

35. September 25th, from Fort Western.

36. As Goodwin was the surveyor for the Plymouth Company, one might suppose that copies of all his maps would be preserved among the company's papers; but, after inquiry in all the likely places, I have had to give up the hope of finding them.

37. Mr. Codman (p. 41) calls the distance six miles,—a slip.

38. So Humphrey noted. Dearborn speaks of leaving "a sergeant, corporal & 13 men" "to take a Long the Batteau's."

39. Senter states that most of the transports were left at Colburn's; but (1) Oswald (September 23d) recorded that "all the vessels weighed anchor, and stood up the river, and anchored above five miles short

arrival at Fort Western (except Haskell) rec
ing on the 23d or earlier, and he was only t
below that point on Saturday night. It is im
note that time was not wasted. Mr. Codm
represents the army as not going to Fort We
the 24th. To be sure, Humphrey (and,
Thayer) speaks of "getting our men up and
from gardners town" on the 24th; but we
clude that these were a small minority.

V: Pages 84–92

1. Some consider Cushenoc a more correc

2. By the river. Mr. Codman (No. 28, tab
p. 58) calls the distance 58 miles. Provinc
it 45 miles; Senter, 46; Dearborn and Meigs,
air-line distance is a little less than 40 miles.

3. He was Governor 1741–45, and began
term in 1753. It was after him that the fort i
borough was named. Fort Western was cor
the early autumn of 1754, equipped with ligl
and occupied with a small garrison. Goverr
then withdrew with his troops.

4. The present arrangement of chimn
is probably not the original one. It seen
able to suppose that they were built of s

5. These are still used by woodsmen, and are called "splits."



6. The blockhouses were no doubt like the one still standing on the site of Fort Halifax. One of them is said to have existed as late as 1834. Humphrey and Thayer mention the "two large and two small blockhouses."

7. No. 215 states that remains of circumvallation could be traced in 1830.

8. Mr. Codman writes (p. 41): "the army built itself a board camp, as tents were few and wood plenty." This appears to be based upon certain words of Squier's journal: "There made us a Board Camp, wood cut very handy." No doubt boards could be had at Fort Western in 1775. In 1769 Captain Howard himself had built a sawmill about one and a half miles above on the same side of the river, and another mill had been erected by John Jones nearly opposite the fort. But still we can-

says that "we" (*i. e.*, his party or company, a
vious sentences) built a board camp. (2) H
marks that "several [not *all* or *many*] of the c
have no tents here," but the barrack would l
hundred men, I should say, and we read of
slept in private houses, so that the number to l
in a board camp would not have been large.
know that a considerable part of the army
ployed in getting stores, etc., up from below, a
soldiers probably did not all lodge at Fort Wes
While wood was plenty at Fort Western, bc
must suppose, were not, for the two sawmills
had but small stocks on hand. And (5)
words appear to contradict Mr. Codman's
for he says: "We are very uncomfortable,
rainy and cold and nothing to cover us," fro
it is to be inferred that out of "several" c
which had no tents, a considerable number
without shelter. For all these reasons it can
been true that "the army" built itself a "boar
Haskell's words indicate also that boards
"plenty"; for had they been, no soldiers wo
remained unprotected. The point is worthy
tion, for a great waste of time and muscle wc
been involved in building board cabins for t
army for so short a stay. It seems impc

Howard's family resided. Dearborn and Meigs also mention Howard's hospitality.

11. The banquet is not mentioned by any of the journalists. Mr. Codman, however, accepts the tradition as history, and enlarges upon it (p. 41). But Arnold did not arrive at Fort Western until Saturday evening, and one whole division left on Monday, not late in the day. As the time when the army would arrive could not be foretold with certainty, the elaborate preparations and invitations to guests at a distance, described by Mr. Codman, were hardly feasible. On Sunday, Arnold was getting two scouting parties off, and Morgan's division was preparing to move,—a great labour; while some of the officers (Thayer and Humphrey, for example) and of course some of the men appear to have been employed in bringing things up from below. Humphrey wrote: "This Day we were busy'd in getting our men up and provisions from gardners town." On Monday, this last labour continued, Morgan's division was getting off, and Greene's division engaged in its final preparations. The amount of labour to be done was very great, and little time for elaborate festivities remained.

Further, had all the soldiers been "marched up" to the tables "to the sound of drum and fife" at "a monstrous barbecue of which three bears were" only "the most conspicuous victims," would not a hint of this event—truly grand for men just leaving the transports and just entering a wilderness—have crept into some one of the many narratives? Finally, Haskell tells us that Sunday, the 24th (the only day when the army was somewhat united), was cold and rainy (Mr. Codman is therefore in error in saying—p. 48—that fine "Indian summer" weather continued till September 29th). We all

have been agreeable to sit out a long feast
circumstances? And, even if the three b
have been properly barbecued, what would
the condition of Mr. Codman's "pumpkin
before, it should be made clear that Arnol
have understood the preciousness of time, a
kept himself and his army at work.

12. Apparently provisions were accumul
burn's; and probably a part of the stores br
Newburyport were loaded into the bateaux at
ton, in the hope that the transports, lighte
way, could carry the rest to Fort Westerr
vessels were all, or nearly all, stopped by t
water, and so had to be completely unloade
siderable distance below the Fort.

13. See note 19 on Chapter IV.

14. Arnold and Oswald agree that this
sisted of Steele and six men; but Henry, wh
to the number, gives the names of seven besi
Steele and two guides. Henry may be in err
haps Steele chose more men than he was
take.

15. Lake Megantic.

16. Henry gives an account (the only c

his Christian name or his place of residence. He does not appear in Ward's list of the officers who made the march through the wilderness, the list of prisoners appended to Tolman's journal, nor the British list. I have advertised for information in a Vassalborough paper, as well as made many inquiries, but have received no information except that formerly there had been a noted Indian fighter in those parts named Captain Church. It seems natural to conclude that he was a man of the locality, and that his title was similar to Colburn's.

18. Mr. Codman states (p. 44) that Church was to take the course and distances *of* Dead River; but (1) Oswald's journal says "to," (2) Arnold's letter of September 25th does the same, and (3) that is what Church did. He was *later* despatched up Dead River.

Mr. Codman represents the two advance parties as going in two canoes (p. 45). But Steele's party had two; and apparently some importance was attached to that fact, for it is mentioned both by Oswald and by Arnold. Possibly the intention was to show that provision was made for the possible loss of a canoe. Such an accident was conceivable; in fact, in this case, both of Steele's canoes were broken.

19. Strangely enough, Senter thought there were still only three divisions.

20. In reply, Washington wrote (see also his letter of October 5th to Hancock) to both Arnold and Morgan that he had been misunderstood, if supposed to mean this; but Arnold permitted the arrangement to continue. For Washington's wise letter to Morgan (October 4th), see No. 54, 4, iii., 946.

21. According to Mr. Codman the army did not reach Fort Western until the 24th, and then "lay" there "for

departures took place early on the
divisions were scheduled to set out
ning with the 25th. Once again w
was urging things forward with great

We must here note, however, that
agree in a surprising manner. Oswa
reached Fort Western at 6 P.M., Se
Steele and Church forward on the 24
the riflemen on the 25th, the second c
the third division on the 27th, and a
division on the 28th. The accoun
and seems perfectly consistent with
vious days. Seven of the other jou
matter confirm Oswald's reckoning;
nal, which begins in the course of S
firms Oswald's statement that on
division set out. Evidently Oswald
accepted. To be sure, Stocking and
pointed out in Chapter II., seem fr
place themselves out of the divisior
supposed to belong; but this has perh
and, even if the explanation be wron
not enough to shake Oswald and h
seems clearly to mean that Steele's p
ern on the 23d; but he is so often m
and other details, that we need not r

the 23d, that the riflemen went "yesterday," that the second division would go "today," the third division "tomorrow," and the rest "the next day," *i. e.*, the 27th. In short, he put everything one day earlier than Oswald did. How shall we explain this?

Did Arnold think that the 26th was the 25th, and simply misdate his letter? At first sight this looks probable, and such an error would explain the discrepancies. Oswald states that Arnold wrote Washington on the 26th; and the scrap of Arnold's journal for the 26th that has been preserved has the words "With [possibly a copyist's error for "write"] his Excellency, etc."

But an entry like that might refer to the completion and despatch of a letter, and this letter of Arnold's certainly was not completed the day it was begun. In fact, on a closer look we find that this proposed explanation does not answer. The letter contains a postscript stating that since the preceding part was written, Lieutenant Gray had arrived with the manifestoes; and we know from Oswald's journal (corroborated by Squier) that Gray arrived at about 3 o'clock P.M., on the 25th. Arnold's letter of that date, giving an account of the despatch of the troops, was therefore written before that day and hour, and not on the 26th.

So far as one can see, either Arnold blundered amazingly, or he intended to make Washington feel that he was getting on more rapidly than he really was. Washington had been very anxious that no time should be lost (see article one of Arnold's instructions, No. 54, 4, iii., 765), and Arnold evidently realised that his progress had been slower than might be expected. We shall find him still later writing to Quebec a misstatement that was sure to be discovered. Indeed, this same letter of September 25th gives an account of the arrival of the

orders, it may be urged that later he forwarc
ington a journal which did not agree wit
But Arnold was hasty and rash; and in the
confusion he could easily forget just what hc
Washington, or trust that should Washing
the disagreement, it could be explained as a

Does this discredit his journal? I thin
journal is particularly valuable for details th
have no desire to misrepresent; we can chc
by the others, and we do not find any oth
this.

22. A "carrying-place," "carry" or "pc
place where boats are carried from one piecc
another.

23. This was also called the Twelve-mi
place. The portage over the height of land
respects greater than this.

24. Oswald is supported by Dearborn
Arnold, in his letter to Washington, stated
with somewhat less precision: "to clear the
the carrying-places." Mr. Codman (p. 45)
siderably to their duties: "to follow the foot
exploring parties, examining the country alon
freeing the streams of all impediments to thei
and removing all obstacles from the road."
Kennebec and Dead River of "all impedime
navigation" [illegible]

ton, dated September 25th, says the same. Meigs and Dearborn record that the third division took forty-five days' provisions when they left Fort Western. As to the second division we have no direct information except in Arnold's rather loose letter of November 27th; but, as Arnold states about twenty days later (October 15th) that the three divisions had twenty-five days' supplies, we may conclude (as would be the only rational supposition) that they left Fort Western with an equal stock, as his letter of November 27th says. Dr. Senter tells us, however, under date of October 25th, that "the first companies took only two and three barrels of flour with several of bread, most in a small proportion," and Mr. Codman (p. 46) accepts this account. But (1) Senter was neither an officer nor connected with the commissary department, and often betrays great ignorance as to inside facts (*e. g.*, note 19); (2) it is not easy to believe his story in the face of what we are told by Arnold; (3) the facts of the march disprove it completely. There were certainly more than two hundred men (probably two hundred anc fifty) in Morgan's division, since guides and other helpers went naturally in the front. As the scale of rations, after supplies began to run low, allowed twelve ounces of flour for each man per day, we may infer that at first Morgan's division probably used up a barrel of flour every twenty-four hours. If they took three barrels for each company, their flour would have given out, even if none was damaged, about October 3d. "Several" barrels or casks of dry biscuit or bread would not have lasted long. But there is not the slightest hint of such a state of things. Morison does not mention scantiness of provisions until October 23d, and "Provincial" does not until October 24th; and they still had enough to last quite a while. The first division doubtless

four men ; but (1) since, as he himself s
ward companies carried much less weight
the rear, being regarded as "light infantry
at all likely to have had an equal number of
according to Mr. Codman's view (he rec
companies), 896 men were required to manag
while Senter estimated at 600 the number
land ; (3) the number of men in a boat can
as precisely fixed as Mr. Codman represen
tention was to have each accommodate six
their baggage, Senter says "about five,"
speaks of being alone in a bateau; and (4)
seems to disprove himself, for (p. 50) he
bateaux crews were divided into two squad
each, the relief marching along the shore,"
men would be required by his theory.

Stocking, to be sure, makes a remark a
about the bateaux having been reduced (
from sixteen to six for each company ; bu
be taken literally, for (1) Haskell says his
only three left on October 24th, (2) the com
not all lose the same number, and no gene
tion at frequent intervals or at any time was
and (3) Stocking, a private soldier near the
no position to know how companies miles in
been, and were, provided with boats. Stock

27. The journey of the troops will be studied in detail presently; the object here is to give a general idea of their progress. Aaron Burr and "several other gentlemen" (Senter) went with Greene.

28. Mr. Codman appears to take leave of Colburn at this point, after representing him as one of Enos's captains (p. 45). The family tradition is that Colburn returned with Enos. This seems every way probable, and agrees with Dearborn's statement (Chapter III., note 10). In that case he was as truly with Enos, and one of his captains at the time of the council as at any previous time. But on page 80 Mr. Codman writes: "the three captains of his [*i. e.*, Enos's] Division, McCobb, Williams, and Scott, held an informal council." Colburn's company does not, in fact, appear anywhere as an integral part of the army. Arnold never refers to it in that way, and Meigs spoke, October 12th, of "the 4th Division of the army [with which Colburn marched], consisting of three companies of musketmen." Reuben Colburn did not leave Gardinerston before September 30th (Chapter III., note 16).

29. Very likely some of those ordered by Arnold himself after he reached Colburn's, for they were not paid for until September 30th.

30. Apparently Colburn's company also. Some difficulties meet us here. 1. Oswald's journal does not agree with Arnold's. Oswald says, September 28th: "Part of the fourth and last Division, McCobb's and Scott's companies, embarked," but Arnold records, September 29th, "Capt. McCobb's and Scott's companies march at 10 A.M." Squier, of Scott's, states that they paraded on the 28th, intending to march, but proved not ready. The two accounts may be partially reconciled by supposing that some of McCobb's men left on

letters. September 28th the journals not
Col. Enos and the Commissary to come
burn's with all the men and batteaus (boa
have letters to a similar effect from A
gentlemen, and they are dated September
i., pp. 358, 359). But we may suppose th
written or verbal orders on the 28th, and t
he was leaving Fort Western, repeated the
ing. Again, September 28th Oswald not
the sick and criminal on board the Broad
find Arnold directing Enos and Farnswor
to put the sick on the *Broad Bay*. Th
may be explained in the same way as
one. A repetition of orders is not unu
Arnold's journal records the same orde
the 27th and on the 28th.—viz., that the b
sent up.

Mr. Codman says (p. 47): "That same
September 29th] the fourth Division, dela
ing provisions and finishing bateaux, left C
yard"; but (1) as we have seen, Arnol
agree in representing most of the fourt
having left Fort Western by about 10 A.M
and there is no probability that they had
the nine hard miles from Colburn's that
Squier, the only journalist in that divisio

employed on the construction of the bateaux; Arnold says some "were detained for Battoes to be mended, oars, paddles etc., etc."

31. James McCormick of Goodrich's company, who had killed Sergeant Reuben Bishop of Williams's company (the only man lost so far) and had been condemned to death by a court-martial, was sent to Washington for final judgment; the commissary was ordered to forward what provisions were left to Fort Halifax, to store there "such as the batteaux carry on," and to see that Howard should take good care of any articles remaining at Fort Western; Enos was directed to follow the route, ordering on the able-bodied stragglers, bringing with him the carpenters of Captain Colburn's company, and taking along all the provisions the bateaux would carry. Squier mentions that five men were punished for various offences on the 27th.

32. Mr. Codman speaks (p. 35) of Arnold's taking these with him from Cambridge; but (1) a letter from Joseph Reed to Arnold shows that they were despatched September 20th by the hand of Lieutenant Gray, (2) the postscript of Arnold's letter of September 25th mentions that Gray brought them, and (3) Oswald records that Lieutenant Gray arrived about 3 P.M., September 25th, "with a number of manifestoes."

33. Mr. Codman states (p. 47) that Arnold left Fort Western on the 28th, and was rowed by two Indians; but (1) both Arnold and Oswald record that he left on the 29th, (2) neither of them says that he was conducted by Indians, though he may have been, and (3) the Indians whom Arnold expected had not arrived (letter to Enos, September 29th). As to (1) Arnold, and Oswald are corroborated by a comparison of their accounts of September 30th with Meigs's.

with some Indians, but had not arriv
left Fort Western, and Enos was direc
Indians forward when they should ap
dians were these? I take it they were
François (St. Francis) on the St. Lav
recently made a visit to Washington's c
ing of this will be seen later (Chapter V

35. Mr. Codman (p. 41) speaks of t
at Fort Western to make "final prepa
march,—at this, the last place where s
obtained in the least adequate to their n
not mean that supplies could be tran
Western and there delivered to the
would be true of Fort Halifax, or Va
that stores of supplies adequate for tl
and were kept on hand, at Fort Western.
was by no means the case. There w
occasion for maintaining there stocks "
force of 1050 men.

In another place (p 51) Mr. Codma
Western as Arnold's "weak base of sup
nold wrote the commissary on Septembe
Western: "You will forward on all the
are] here as fast as possible to Ft. Hali
the batteaux carry on, order stored the
Halifax, rather than Fort Western, was tl

VI: Pages 93–106.

1. That was understood to be the distance, but perhaps this estimate was half a mile too large.

2. Sleds were used at Norridgewock Falls.

3. As already shown, the number of men in a bateau varied,—at least in the statements of the journalists. The bateaux were not all of the same size, and some doubtless carried more freight than others.


4. 220 bateaux were constructed, and, although some had to be left behind for the transportation of stores to Fort Halifax, the army may be assumed to have taken more than 200 with it. If we allow four men to each, less than 250 are left to go by land, so that there could not be an equal division of the army into crews and relief-crews. To be sure, some country-people were helping the army, but on the other hand the officers probably did no regular work as bateaumen.

5. Vassalborough began to be settled in 1760. Eight years later it could boast of ten families, and the town records show that in 1775, twenty-five voters attended the town meeting. The chief settlement in the town was called Gatchell's (Getchell's) Corner, after the first family that came there (this is now Vassalborough proper). The Fort Halifax road went through it. Of the Getchells who served Arnold we have already heard. Dennis was captain of the town in 1774, and John, an active and soon-to-be-wealthy business man. The name is said to have been usually pronounced Gatchell or Gitchell in former times. See note 18 on Chapter IV.

6. Arnold's name was Three Mile Falls; Oswald's, Six Mile Falls.

As Washington's order of September 5th (Chapter III.), shows, the importance of enlisting experienced bateau-

7. A Latin inscription indicated that t
compliment to the Earl of Halifax.



8. As early as September, 1763, a tr
established here.

9. This redoubt was a blockhouse, sur
palisade and perhaps a ditch, 61½ rods d
main fort. The upper story of the blockh
feet square.

10. Lithgow was appointed by Governo
leaving the ground. See No. 106, viii., p

11. This was 960 feet from the mai
square, 2 stories high, with a sentry box
a twelve-pound howitzer that was fired
and night. Mr. T. O. Paine has maint

on p. 198. On p. 272 the two plans of the fort are given, and on p. 281 is a picture of the corner-stone with the inscription (now preserved in the State House at Augusta).

13. Within the past few years a new roof has been put on it, and it has been otherwise repaired. Originally the centre post, about six inches square, projected some four feet above the roof. Like Fort Western, Fort Halifax was built of heavy pine timber.

14. Lithgow remained for some time as a trader. Then he removed to Georgetown (p. 70).

15. Some other names appear in the journals, and evidently a number of people resided in this locality; but more than this cannot be said. What are now known as Winslow, Waterville, and Oakland were then covered by the name Winslow (incorporated in 1771); but the town records make no mention of Arnold's expedition, and give no indication of the population at this time.

The gap in the quotation from Montresor is due to a break in the MS.

16. This name appears in the journals in various forms: Taconic, Tacunnick, Ticonnick, Ticonic, Ticonick, Toconock. Perhaps the correct spelling is none of these, for Tuconet, Ticonnet, or Taconnet is said to be the true word. But it seems hardly worth while to spend time on the niceties of Indian orthography in this case or in other cases. The territory around Fort Halifax is said to have been the seat of a tribe of Abenakis (or Abnakis) from whom the falls took their name. Another version is that there were four chiefs who bore this name, the last of whom died in 1765. See the Vassalborough (Me.) *Times*, June 17, 1902.

As Ticonic Falls were half a mile long, the statement of the text that they ran over ledges half a mile above Fort Halifax must, of course, be taken broadly.

water, most of the time to their waists. At
the falls a landing was made and the prov
bateaux carried around the rapids"; but n
was done at Three Mile Falls; this is perf
particularly because a number of the journ
that at Ticonic Falls was the first, or at Skowh
was the second portage. Arnold seems possi
Mr. Codman some support, for he says: "
Ft. Halifax, where I found Capt. Dearborn's
rich's companies just over the falls which are
over. Good carrying-place." But (1) a car
rods would not have taken them around the T
Falls, and (2) Dearborn recorded: "Proceed
river four miles to Ft. Halifax *against a very ra*
where we arrived at 11 o'clock A.M.," *i. e.*, l
carry around the Three Mile Falls. Arnold n
fore have said "Ft. Halifax" in a loose way
referred to Ticonic Falls.

18. Mr. Codman says that the men "ins
handspikes under the flat bottom" (p. 50), bu
no reason to think there was anything on tl
into which the handspikes could be inserted.
words are: "The method of carrying our b
by placing handspikes under them, carried by
alternately [in turn?]."

19. Senter so states. Of course the presen

Arnold, 60; Humphrey and Thayer, about 80; Dearborn and Meigs, 97; Haskell, 120.

21. The first and third divisions, as we have seen, left Fort Western with provisions for forty-five days; the second had the same, no doubt; the rear was supposed to have still more. See note 25 on Chapter V.

22. Or else of bread or biscuit. Very likely this is an underestimate, for at this time the men probably ate more than is suggested.

23. Mr. Codman speaks of "extra muskets and rifles" (p. 47); but we have no evidence that such were carried. On the other hand we find Henry lamenting desperately lest the accidental loss of his weapon should compel him to go back with the invalids, and correspondingly elated when he found himself able to buy a damaged rifle at a high price from a man who was returning. As is well-known, the Continental authorities had the utmost difficulty at this time to provide their soldiers with guns. Would they be likely to send an extra supply where it was practically certain that more or less of the men would soon be falling out, and might be induced to leave their arms behind, or, if necessary, compelled to do so, as was done in less urgent cases?

The estimate of ammunition may seem, and very possibly is, too small. The intention has been to avoid exaggerating the weight; and besides, since Arnold planned to surprise Quebec and then coöperate with Schuyler, he may have taken a light burden of ammunition, expecting to replenish his stock after reaching Canada. A great weight of it was highly undesirable.

24. Arnold, in his letter of August 21st to Colburn, estimated the baggage at one hundred pounds per man. This would be a total of about fifty-three tons. If we add forty tons for the boats, and allow for oars, paddles, and

carry provisions to Pt. Halifax, etc.


Mr. Codman says with reference to "carryi bateaux (p. 46): "Here, and *at all the other places*, the bateaux had first to be unloaded"; evident that the bateaux were sometimes carr their lading (see Morison, October 12th). T very sensible, if the carry was short and the lo With reference to the transportation of the othe he says (p. 47) that they all "had to be packe on the men's backs, for they had no pack animal there were draught cattle, and these could mc articles on carts, "drags," or sleds. Arnold st "baggage" was transported at Norridgewock sleds drawn by oxen. Humphrey also mentio sleds. Senter mentions "teams," etc.

25. According to "Provincial" and Morison, division went around Ticonic Falls on the 27th; advanced three miles beyond them on the 28 most, but not all, of the third division passed on Melvin speaks of going over on the 30th.

26. This form of expression is not intended that Arnold's journal was written by his own hanc question was touched upon in Chapter II.

27. Ticonic Falls are at Waterville. Fairfiel next on the north, and it is stated that in pass town the river falls thirty-four feet (No. 199) are the chief manufacturing establishments of t

ferry, with houses east of it, also. Thayer records that straggling, *i. e.* deserting, began here.



At this point we find the accounts of Arnold and Meigs disagreeing. They camped together September 30th; according to Arnold the camp was six and one-half miles from Fort Halifax, while according to Meigs it was twelve. Meigs is wrong, for his reckoning would make the distance from Fort Halifax to Skowhegan Falls too large.

Mr. Codman's narrative would suggest an inadequate idea of the difficulty of the Five Mile Ripples, for (p. 48) he represents Arnold as camping above the Ripples with men whom he had met below the Ripples in the forenoon, *i. e.*, they went as fast by water as he with Crosier's team did by land. They were in fact different men, though they belonged to the same division. Meigs, with whom Arnold camped, had passed the Ripples the day before.

29. This word is said to mean Place of Watch, and has been thought to have reference to the fishing. A part of the Canaan of 1775 still bears that name, but it does not touch the Kennebec.

In Thayer's journal we find these rather odd words:

seems to convey the opposite impression : " call this place Canaan, a canaan indeed for good land as I ever saw " etc. Perhaps T understood Humphrey's meaning, or had a opinion ; or, possibly, Thayer did not intend hi to be taken as ironical.

30. This I have from the grandson of one men. They were brothers named Weston. T reason to disbelieve the tradition. (Arnold dining at "Western's," three miles below S Falls.) Both patriotism and self-interest wo able-bodied settlers to aid the troops. No considerable, though constantly diminishing, n settlers attached themselves to the army wh within the borders of civilisation, and it can e lieved, as tradition affirms, that some of them all the way to Quebec.

31. Mr. Codman says (p. 49) that after division had passed the Five Mile Ripples, "led them for 18 miles through a fertile cou they "encamped . . . three or four miles next carry." This would make the distance fro Falls to Skowhegan Falls twenty-six or tw miles. (It is about twelve miles farther to Old wock. In his table, opposite p. 58, the *whole* given as nine miles.) It was in fact reckoned

ing between the Falls of Skowhegan, and in ascending 'Bumbazee's Rips,' 7 miles to Norridgewock, which they reached at noon"; which would seem to imply that these rips were seven miles in length, and extended from Skowhegan Falls to Norridgewock; but (1) Bombazee Rips (Rapids) are only a few rods long; (2) they are about seven and three-fourths miles above Skowhegan Falls; (3) they are about three and three-fourths miles below Old Norridgewock, while about two and three-fourths miles above the Norridgewock of to-day; (4) the total distance from Skowhegan Falls to Old Norridgewock was therefore about eleven and one-half miles; but (5) the place at which Thayer says that he arrived "about 12 o'clock," October 1st, was Norridgewock *Falls*, nearly or quite a mile beyond Old Norridgewock, and (6) the division as a whole did not reach that point at all on October 1st, for according to Oswald, Arnold "overtook Col. Greene, Major Bigelow, Capt. Topham, and company" on October *second*, about six miles below Norridgewock Falls. This, however, brings us to a perplexing point. While Thayer says that he reached Norridgewock Falls at noon on October 1st, Oswald states that he overtook Thayer at Skowhegan Falls at four o'clock P.M. that day. Which is right? On examining Thayer's journal closely, we discover that it represents him as doing in three and one-half or four days what Dearborn did in five. Next, turning to Humphrey, we find two entries for October 2d, and none for October 1st. The two accounts might be true of the same day,—one for the forenoon, the other for the afternoon, but the first of them appears under the date of October 1st in Thayer's journal. Accepting Humphrey's account as it stands, we find that Thayer required four and one-half or five days to do


the more reasonable because Oswald shows t
did not reach that point until about midd
2d, and it is not likely that Thayer was t
hours in advance of his immediate superior.
plain that Thayer, finding in Humphrey's j
entries for Oct. 2nd and none for Oct. 1st,
could improve the record.

Arnold called it twelve miles from Skowh
to Norridgewock Falls, but the loggers' est
best we have) adds about half a mile.

Doctor Senter's journal is rather puzzling
He mentions the Wassarunskeig Falls. There
falls in the Kennebec, but the Wesserunsett
the Wesserunsic) River goes over some high
two miles before emptying into the Kennebe
appears to mean that, as the Kennebec ma
bend, across which ran a carrying-place, he
go over by land in order to avoid the swift w
the carrying-place took him to the foot of the
Wesserunsett; that he crossed this river, c
the falls on the other side, and then carried
Kennebec above the bend.

Senter's obscurity may fairly suggest, perha
account was written some time after the ev
same inference may be drawn from the fact tha
the distance from Skowhegan Falls to Old Nor

33. Mr. Codman states (p. 49) that the fall *was* twenty-three feet high, but it cannot have been. The present dam has greatly emphasised the fall at this point,



of course, since it concentrates a descent formerly distributed over several miles. The river above is now like a mill-pond for a long distance, whereas Arnold recorded, "small falls and quick water." The total descent at Skowhegan — the falls and the half-mile below — is said to be twenty-eight feet. Besides Squhegan we find in the journals Scohegin, Scowhegan, Cohigin, Cohiggin, Cohegan, and Schouhegan.

34. Mr. Codman adds to the difficulties (p. 49): "the heavy bateaux had to be hoisted and dragged up the steep rocky banks while the men struggled in the fierce rush of the swirling current"; but (1) the current, being parted by the island, leaves a comparatively quiet place, of course, at its lower end, where the bateaux were taken from the water, and (2) it is difficult to see how the men could have been struggling in the river while they were going up steep, high banks.

35. But Meigs called it 250 paces; Melvin, 40 rods.

36. This, reported by Thayer, was on the night of the 29th; but by October 2d rain was again falling.

side." This would not be the right, but the
since the course of the river is here from the s

37. "Bombazee" (formerly Bombazeene
zeene, and spelled in still other ways) is said to
the name of Bomazeen, a great orator of the
tribe, who was shot here. His residence was at
"Rips" means ripples (rapids).

38. This name also is spelled in various w
form Norridgewog is preferred by some as the
the Indians of this region (simply those Kenn
dwelt here, just as the Kennebecs were sim
Abenakis who resided about the Kennebec Riv
Indian name of the village was Nanrantsouak
journals we find such corruptions of the nam
ridgewalt or -walk, Norridge Walk, and Norry
Norridgewock is now in the town of Starks,—
town of Norridgewock at all.

39. See note 7 on Chapter I.

40. From Dearborn's account it would ap
two or three families lived between Skowhegan
Norridgewock Falls, but that only one was livi
Norridgewock when the troops passed that poi

41. The loggers call it a mile; Meigs said
mile"; Dearborn thought the distance only ha

VII: Pages 107–116.

1. Of course the army would follow the military road here, especially as their starting point was on that side of the river.

2. Haskell expressly mentions going to Fort Halifax by land and crossing at that point. Crossing was necessary, for those who went by land were expected to help at the carrying-places, and this carrying-place was on the west side.

3. At present the highway on the eastern bank does not follow the river, presumably because there are obstructions, but the road on the other side does follow it. The inference is that better marching was to be found on the latter side. By going this way, the troops saved themselves the trouble of crossing the Wesserunsett River.

4. It seems clear that they did not march to Norridgewock Falls on the right bank, for (1) the left bank was shorter, (2) Dearborn mentions particularly the character of the land on the north (*i. e.*, left) side of the river, (3) Haskell speaks of encamping at Norridgewock, and this must mean the site of the Indian village (on the left bank), for he did not come to the falls until the next day, (4) Meigs passed the night at old Norridgewock village, which confirms our belief that a camp was there, and therefore that the army passed that way, and (5) we hear nothing about crossing Sandy River, which came in from the west. Thayer's and Humphrey's accounts seem inconsistent with this, for they did not see the village until after they arrived at the falls. But it is only necessary to suppose that they went by water, and this is probable.

The word "army" referring to the footmen at this

the west side, for (1) Henry expressly says Arnold camped on the west side, and of c needed to be on the same bank as the portage to supervise the operations; (3) the same i Humphrey and Thayer; (4) Meigs, after c Norridgewock village, speaks of crossing to the place, and the village was certainly on the east from the nature of the ground one would think side must have offered the better way; (6) tc upper end of Norridgewock Falls the river turi to the west, so that the distance by the west the shorter one.

6. See No. 199.

7. Arnold wrote "1500 yards"; Melvin, mile"; Morison, "a mile and 60 perches" Dearborn, Stocking, "Provincial," Haskell, man, a mile and a quarter; Humphrey and "about" a mile and a quarter; Squier, a m half.

8. Some of the oxen belonged to the army for later we find army oxen slaughtered for foc good many must have been required to dra sleds over bare ground and rocks. Morris Fli here, no doubt.

9. Senter says it all had to be discarded, l evidently an exaggeration.

men advanced on the 3d. He remarks also (p. 53) that the fourth division arrived at Carritunk Falls on the eighth; but Squier did not reach that point until the tenth. Further, on the night of the ninth, McCobb camped about two miles below these falls, and Scott was behind McCobb (Arnold and Oswald). Arnold's letter to Enos of September 29th indicates that Williams also was behind McCobb. Further we know that a part of the *third* division did not pass these falls until the ninth.

On p. 62 Mr. Codman refers to a "base of supplies" at Norridgewock; but we find Arnold ordering the commissary to forward the surplus provisions to Fort Halifax, and then ordering them forwarded to the Great Carrying-place (Arnold to Farnsworth, September 29th and October 14th). At these points there was a chance to shelter and protect them, but there was none, so far as we are informed, at Norridgewock, and we find no mention by Arnold of the latter place. See also note 18 on Chapter X.

Under date of the seventh, Senter makes the following record: "By a council of the officers it was thought advisable to send letters into Quebec informing some gentlemen of that city of our movements, etc. After the despatches were wrote it was concluded to send one Mr. Jackquith, inhabitant of this river and native of Germany, who spoke the French language, in company with two Penobscot Indians, by name Sabattis and Enneos."

Mr. Codman (p. 122) appears to accept this as correct, for he says of the Indians who met Arnold November 4th: "Among them also was Eneas, who with Sabattis had been despatched express from Norridgewock with letters to Quebec." But (1) this incident is

Sabatis is said by Henry (No. 72, p. 74) to h
brother of Natanis, and the latter was a Nor
not a Penobscot Indian (Henry was probabl
however); (4) no real council of officers
been held at Norridgewock on the seventh,
principal officers except Enos had gone on; (
letter of Arnold's, dated October seventh, i
ence; (6) Arnold's journal contradicts Senter,
(and so does Oswald's) that Eneas was sent
on October 13th; and we have the letter b
date; (7) Arnold refers more than once in l
to this one of the thirteenth but never to
seventh; (8) Mr. Codman, without observing
sistency, sends Eneas off on the thirteenth
well as on the seventh.

It is evident that Senter records under d
seventh an incorrect version of what occurr
thirteenth, and this is a very serious reflectio
journal. Later we shall try to find out what
on the thirteenth. Senter's Account seems t
peated the error of the journal about this n
there is a gap in the MS. at this point. No c
nalist blundered in this way.

11. Thayer speaks expressly of crossing
October 3d, but too much weight must not b
this fact. The tradition is that the army mar

(Seven Mile Stream), which is quite wide for several miles from the Kennebec. On the other side there was no river to cross. Above Carritunk Falls the topography is such that it would have been scarcely possible to march to the Great Carrying-place on the west side.

12. The distance from Norridgewock Falls to Carritunk Falls is given as follows: Arnold, eighteen miles; Dearborn, eighteen miles; "Provincial," nineteen miles; Haskell, nineteen miles; Morison, nineteen miles. These estimates are substantially identical. Senter, however, makes it thirteen miles, and—curiously enough—this is the distance reckoned now by the loggers. It seems pretty certain that the neck of land which Arnold crossed has been cut through since 1775 by current and logs, and that the extra distance around what is now an island would have been a good mile; so that Senter was not quite right. Mr. Codman (p. 52) gives the distance as eighteen miles.

13. The journalists have several names: Carratuncas, Carratunker, Caratuncah, Carritunkus, Carrytuck or Devil's, Divell's (Squier), Tentucket, Tintucket, Hellgate. Morison called them, by a slip, "Ticonic or Hellgate." The length of the carry is variously given: Arnold, "near 50 rods"; Meigs, 433 paces; Dearborn, ninety-five rods; Morison, sixty perches; several journalists, about forty rods; Haskell, half a mile; Humphrey and Thayer, about 8 rods. Dearborn's company passed these falls October 8th, at 3 o'clock, P. M.; Ward's passed them October 9th, at noon. The present spelling is either Carritunk or Carratunk.

14. Arnold observed here "a great number of small islands which appear very fertile"; and he was not the only one to do so. Humphrey and Thayer speak of the

fully confirmed by topography. *Logan* is, I
corruption of *lagoon*.

16. Melvin states that he arrived on the
Humphrey says that "two Companyes of
Batallion" (*i.e.*, the third division) came
"Provincial" and Morison agree that they a
the seventh. Morgan very likely came the d
Mr. Codman is thus in error (p. 54) in placing
of the second division on the ninth, for Hum
Topham arrived on the seventh, and in placin
pearance" of Meigs's division on the 10th.

The distance from Carritunk Falls to the Gr
ing-place is not given by Arnold, Oswald, Meigs,
Senter, Melvin, Humphrey, Thayer, or Stockt
kell made it four miles by water plus fourteen
land. Morison estimated that it was eighte
"Provincial" and Tolman called it twent
Squier, twenty or twenty-one by land. Get
Berry reckoned it as eighteen. The best esti
I have been able to obtain makes it seventeen
half. The whole distance from Norridgewock
the Great Carrying-place was therefore, in 1775
plus seventeen and one-half; total, thirty-one
half. Mr. Codman makes it thirty-seven in hi
distances (opposite p. 58).

17. It is not in reality a conical peak, but t

suggested to him that some of the soldiers camped there, but this does not seem at all probable. To arrive at his place, they would have had to ascend rapids which have a vertical fall of about seven feet, and they would not have undertaken such a labour needlessly.

18. Others affirm that the initials on the rock were B. A., and some declare that Arnold's own hand cut them!

19. There were, however, some cases of diarrhœa and dysentery.

VIII: Pages 117–134.

1. Henry wrote in connection with crossing the Great Carrying-place: "Here are neither oaks, hickories, poplars, maples nor locusts; but there is a great variety of other kinds of excellent timber, such as the white and yellow pines, hemlock, cedar, cypress, and all the species of the firs" (No. 72, p. 25). His testimony is valuable on a general matter like this, and the other journalists confirm it. Melvin remarks of the third portage of the Great Carrying-place: "The woods are cedar and hemlock." Meigs says the third pond was surrounded with cedars. The last part of the fourth portage was called a spruce swamp by Dearborn, and a spruce and cedar swamp by Senter. October 3d, Stocking recorded that they were entering woods mostly of pines and hemlocks, with patches of spruce and fir. Other testimony might be added. The untouched forests of the region are still of this kind. There were, however, a good many birches in spots, no doubt. There is a note on p. 49 of No. 72 which is contrary to all this, but the writer must have been mistaken or have made a slip of the pen.

2. Lieutenant Church surveyed the route from the

sent forward from Fort Western, as already r
nold met him and received his report at the
rying-place on October 11th, but Church
waiting three days. Church's figures for th
age were three and one-quarter miles. Th
distance from the Kennebec to Arnold Camp
three and one-half miles and thirty-eight rods
three and three-eighths to the pond).

The map of the Great Carrying-place pres
is by no means scientifically accurate, but giv
a fairly correct idea. It is based upon my o
gations and the reports of trustworthy and
guides.

3. Mr. Codman (No. 28, p. 56) represent
men as bearing "further to the north" than t
route to Arnold Camp; but this is because h
the lake was a mile wide where they crossed
which, as we shall see presently, has no f
Is it conceivable that the soldiers would ca
teaux and baggage, when these could be put
and rowed? They would certainly seek t
point of the pond, and, as the course was
of west, while the shore of the pond runs no
part, this point was the south-eastern extremit
had the trail borne more to the north, it woul
have been longer than Church made it.

imperfectly blazed trail" (p. 57). Morison, one of the advance party, called the way "trackless," but he was always looking out for effect.

5. October 3d, according to both Arnold and Oswald. "Provincial" gives that date for Hendricks's company.

6. Humphrey and Topham arrived that day. Mr. Codman says that if the riflemen had been "transported by magic" from Fort Western to the Great Carrying-place they would hardly have had time to cut their way through to the first pond (p. 57). This is worth looking into, for in that case Arnold was reprehensible for ordering anything so absurdly impossible as what the riflemen were told to do.

A road for the army needed to be eight feet wide, so that men carrying bateaux (the carriers stood at the ends of the bateaux, of course) could move in one direction, while empty-handed men filed past in the other; but, to make perfectly sure, let us assume that the road had to be of twice that width. The length of it was three and one-quarter miles, or ten hundred and forty rods. The number of working men in the three companies we will call two hundred and forty. Each man would have had, then, four and one-third rods of road to clear.

According to as good an authority as I could find, the trees may have stood as near together as four feet here in 1775, and have averaged a foot in diameter. This would have made it necessary to cut and clear away about fourteen trees in each rod of the road. An experienced "logger" tells me that this work would take seven hours. To clear four and one-third rods, then, would have required less than four days. But, had the riflemen been "transported by magic" to the point where their labours began, their axes would have been

swinging on September 25th, and they would have had twelve days for the work. It should be added that the trail now passes, and probably passed then, for a long distance over smooth ledges where trees could not grow, so that much less work than here estimated needed to be done.

Mr. Codman represents the soldiers (p. 58) as "hacking with tomahawk and hunting-knife" at the "giants of the forest"; but, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may assume that they were adequately supplied with axes, especially as it was fully understood beforehand that they were to make their way through forests. Besides, what woodsmen like Morgan's soldiers would have undertaken to cut down a four-foot hemlock with a hunting-knife?

7. So Morison's journal and Senter's Account represent, but it was not so in every case. Thayer speaks of unbarrelling his pork here and stringing it on poles, in

figures really refer, probably, to the length of the pond.

10. See his journal for October 14th. Church's estimate of its width was three-quarters of a mile. In suggesting (p. 123) that Church's estimates were doubtless the best, I am comparing him with the journalists in general; Arnold's figures may be regarded here as Church's revised. The pond was probably more extensive in 1775 than at present.

11. Mr. Codman states (p. 56) that this inlet ran from "the extremity" of the pond. But Arnold indicates that his course was across the main axis of the pond (*i. e.*, he says the pond lay north and south and he went east and west), so that the inlet was doubtless the one to be found now on the side of the pond. The inlet was not, as Mr. Codman represents (p. 56), "overhung" with grey moss,—nothing in the journals or in its present appearance indicates this; but dead trees beside it are and were moss-grown.

According to Arnold the length of the pond lay from north to south, but that is hardly correct; it is nearer N. N. W. Apparently his statement that he crossed it from east to west must be taken with equal allowance. In general, Arnold's bearings are often incorrect, if taken literally.

12. The direction of this portage was 10° north of west in 1775.

13. Besides the facts that this would give a shorter path than the present trail (which makes a wide detour to avoid the swamp), and that the ground seems to correspond better to Arnold's description, there is another argument. Arnold says: "a small elbow running into it from the S. E., on the west side of which it empties itself." This shows that he was not at the termination of

the present trail, for the outlet is in fact at the opposite end of the lake. Again, Arnold saw Mt. Bigelow plainly from the third pond, and therefore he must have been in this quarter, though his bearing does not seem right. The course over the third pond was "west by north."

It is rather curious that the three ponds empty in three directions: the first one to the east, into the Kennebec; the second to the south, into the Carrabasset; the third to the north, into Dead River.

14. The direction is given as 20° north of west.

15. Across this, as across the first of the four carries, there is now a buck-board road. The last mile does not cross a swamp, as the trail did in 1775, but it seems natural to believe that the Indian trail followed a brook, called the East Branch, which the present road crosses and abandons. In that case it soon entered a swamp. The East Branch was not deep enough to carry the bateaux.

16. This is from Henry. His usual inaccuracy is

was in danger there, the fact may well have become fixed in his memory; (5) Dearborn wrote of "a spruce swamp knee deep in mire all the way," and such deep and continuous mire is impossible where the interlaced roots of an "almost impenetrable" thicket exist; (6) Stocking called it a "sunken marsh"; and (7) what the men complained of was not "impenetrable" thickets but mire: "a sunken mire hole," wrote Squier. Doubtless there was more or less "low shrubbery" (Stocking).

Mr. Codman states that some of the men were "forced to spend a night there, camped in mud and stagnant water" (p. 61). But there is no need of exaggerating the sufferings of the army. Is it conceivable that officers so very solicitous for the welfare of their men as Arnold's officers were, would force them to camp in "mud and stagnant water" when good ground was not more than half a mile distant?

What makes all the struggles of the army on the last portage seem the more pitiful is the fact that they were probably needless. For about half a mile from the third pond its outlet is rapid and rocky, but my guide, who knows the stream very well, assured me that the rest of it is good water. Probably Arnold went the other way because there lay the trail, as Montresor's journal agrees. But why had not the Indians found the better route? Is it possible that the lake emptied at a different place in 1775? No, for Pownall (p. 16) spoke of its outlet as running northward. The route by the outlet was no doubt longer, and perhaps the Indians, using birch-bark canoes and having little baggage, did not mind carrying across. Possibly, too, Arnold, relying on Montresor's journal, gave Steele a wrong direction here. Montresor had special difficulty in finding this portage, and this suggests that it may not have been often

used. The Indians may have gone usually the other way.

17. Mr. Codman says (p. 57) that at the end of the swamp "Dead River was reached," but the passage down the creek to the river is mentioned by Arnold, Dearborn, Senter, Thayer, and others, and the creek is there to speak for itself.

18. Arnold says "about one mile." Dearborn speaks of coming to the stream within half a mile of the river. The former was the distance which Arnold rowed, while the latter was perhaps meant for the straight distance.

19. The length of the Great Carrying-place was about $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles, besides the journey on Bog Brook. This total was made up of four portages and three ponds: $3\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{9}{16}$, $1\frac{1}{4}$, $1\frac{3}{8}$, $2\frac{1}{2}$ (plus something on account of the obliquity of the course), and $2\frac{15}{16}$. Mr. Codman is therefore in error in speaking (p. 57) of "16 miles of lake and forest" at this carrying-place. Church made the second pond $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile wide, but Arnold reduced

Third portage (1⅜ miles): Dearborn, 1¾ miles; Haskell, 2 miles; Melvin, 1½ miles; "Provincial," 2 miles; Squier, 3 miles; Stocking, 2 miles; Humphrey and Thayer omit this portage; Tolman, 2 miles.

Fourth portage (2¾ miles plus 60 rods): Dearborn, 4 miles; Haskell, 2½ miles; Melvin, 4½ miles; "Provincial," 3¼ miles; Squier, 5 miles; Stocking, 4 miles; Humphrey and Thayer, 4¼ miles; Tolman, 3 miles; Morison, 3 miles; Senter, 4 miles. Meigs only says that the whole distance was 12½ miles.

20. As Morgan left Norridgewock Falls on the 3d and led his division, he very possibly reached the Great Carrying-place on the 6th.

21. Mr. Codman states (p. 61) that "by Oct. 16 the little army was at last across the carry"; but Haskell of Ward's company reports passing the night of the 16th near the third pond, and Squier's comrades of the fourth division did not reach Dead River until the 20th. Arnold's journal (October 13th) states that two divisions reached Dead River that day.

22. Mr. Codman has expressed the opinion (p. 60) that sickness "threatened already [*i. e.*, October 12th, when the hospital was erected—see note 26] to destroy the effectiveness of the force." This is clearly very important, if true, and requires investigation. (1) Arnold was unaware that his army was in such danger. Under date of October 12th, he reviewed in his journal the physical and moral condition of the men, and mentioned one death, as well as a very few accidents by water; but he had not a word to say of sickness, except that he mentioned having to leave sick men, "eight or ten in number," behind. Eight or ten in an army of one thousand were practically none at all. Arnold noted the spirit, industry, and great cheerfulness of the men,—

all of them inconsistent with general sickliness. (2) In fact there were not as many sick as Arnold counted on, for he wrote Enos, October 15th: "I expected to have found some subaltern unwell, who might have been detained," etc. (3) Senter, it must be noted, speaks of the sick on the 16th as having "increased to a very formidable number"; but this was four days later than the time referred to by Mr. Codman, and in the meanwhile the army had been getting the consequences of drinking the unwholesome water of the second pond. It was to the bad pond water, which the use of salt meat compelled the men to drink in large quantities, that Senter attributed what sickness there was; and, as the cause would soon cease to act, since the army was moving on, it was not a serious matter. (Senter was, however, mistaken in speaking of the water of the first pond as bad, for that is fed entirely by springs. His remarks apply to the second pond.) (4) Senter mentions by name only two persons as ill here (both of them, he adds, had been ill at the

made for the feeble (not sick, but not rugged), for men working in the rear with the commissary and on other details, for the "straggling," *i. e.*, deserting, that began as soon as Fort Western was left, for the persons getting lame, and for those injured more or less by accidents of various kinds, the number to be set down as sick does not seem excessive. (9) According to Stocking the hospital was "designed for our sick in case they should return this way"; evidently he did not think a great part of the army were on the verge of invalidism. (10) None of the journalists, except the surgeon, shows any feeling that there was much sickness, or mentions being ill up to this time. (11) The condition of the army was not such as to require any change of plans. (12) The men did, as a matter of fact, go right on through greater and greater hardships. Our conclusion must be, I think, that while a good many persons were somewhat afflicted with such ailments as rheumatism, vomiting, and diarrhœa, and some with dysentery, so that the aggregate looked formidable to a young surgeon just out of the apothecary's shop, the efficiency of the army as a whole was not by any means endangered by sickness at this time.

23. So Senter states. This perhaps explains how Dearborn came to think that the log-hospital was erected by the first division.

24. Mr. Codman (p. 59) applies one of these names to the log-hospital, and the other to the log-house mentioned in the next paragraph. But Senter says that the house for the sick was "christened by the name of Arnold's Hospital," and Stocking's words are: "Between these ponds we built a blockhouse and gave it the name of Fort Meggs, designed for our sick," etc. The only building erected beyond the first pond was the hospital.

As no other journalist mentions either name, we must conclude that some soldiers gave one name to the hospital and some gave the other, which is not at all surprising.

25. Serving as ensign in Morgan's company. Senter (MS.) also spells the name "Irvine," while Morison wrote "Irwin."

26. Dearborn records the building of the house by the Kennebec under date of the 11th, and Mr. Codman says (p. 59) that when the hospital was erected a house "had been already erected on the Kennebec side of the first portage." But (1) the house on the Kennebec was not erected until the 12th, for Arnold, Oswald, and Meigs (who says he received the orders from Arnold and had them executed) agree that the orders for it were issued on that day, and nobody but Dearborn says anything else; and (2) the hospital was put up the same day, for Arnold, Oswald, Melvin, and Haskell testify to this and nobody differs except that Stocking throws

way home, and evidently did not do so at the Great Carrying-place.

28. Church had been waiting for him since the 8th (Humphrey).

29. What river was this? William Allen evidently thought it was Spider River (No. 106, i., p. 395). But I can see no good reason to doubt that it was Arnold River, since in all probability Steele followed the trail which the army took afterward. In fact his mission was to find and reconnoitre this trail. As we shall see, it led to Arnold River. But Henry's account is vague, and probably some or many of his statements are more or less erroneous. For this reason we cannot be sure.

30. Arnold's words are: "the Dead River from the last carrying-place he judges to be 80 miles." This figure included the Chain of Ponds, for Arnold adds: "the carrying-place from the Dead River to the Shordair pond about 4 miles," *i. e.*, Dead River was regarded as running through the ponds, as it still is, and as we find the journalists expressly saying later. Mr. Codman makes a threefold error, then, in his table of distances (on the map opposite p. 58): (1) he accepts this hasty and excessive estimate of Steele's; (2) he adds six miles to it; and (3) he understands Steele as excluding the ponds (see his p. 60).

Though Steele's canoes broke (p. 114 of text), they were repaired enough to be serviceable.

31. Mr. Codman (p. 60) represents Steele and his two companions as staggering into camp, "emaciated and exhausted," and adds (p. 61) that "as soon as Lieut. Steele was able to undertake the duty," he was sent on again. But (1) Arnold records unconcernedly that he ordered Steele off again the very day of his return. This does not look as if he was not able to walk. And

(2) Henry's account, vague as it is, shows plainly that all of Steele's party suffered hunger for a while, that a plenty of moose-meat then came their way, and that at first this meat was very good food. After a time, when all the fat of it had been used up, *those who were left behind* suffered from innutrition and diarrhœa. Steele, however, had gone on. So we may believe that he reached the camp in fair condition.

32. "Chaudiere Pond." According to Mr. Codman (p. 61) Church was to go down the Chaudière River, but Arnold implies clearly that this was not intended: "Lieut. Steel[e] to go down the Chaudair," etc. (October 12th).

33. St. François (St. Francis) on the St. Lawrence River (Lake St. Peter).

34. The letter was directed to "John Mercier, Esq. [the American copy as printed in No. 54 and No. 106 says Manir, but the English copy, sent to London on November 9th by Cramahé, gives the name as Mercier]

(5) Washington's instructions contain no hint of raising French troops, and gave him no authority to do so. The statement was, of course, knowingly false, and was doubtlessly intended—a trick of war—to give confidence to his Quebec friends.

Mr. Codman speaks of Arnold's sending an express to Washington (p. 62); but, in fact, his letter was taken by "a person going down the river."

35. Who was this Eneas? The question is important, because the answer may enable us to say whether Arnold was prudent or foolhardy in trusting him. Mr. Codman holds (p. 64) that Eneas was a brother of Natanis, and that he met Arnold later at Sertigan. But I have not been able to find the least evidence for either of these statements, and infer that Mr. Codman must have been thinking of Sabatis, to whom — according to Henry — they would both apply. Arnold would be very likely to make inquiries about the Indian whom he thought of sending (his letter of November 8th to Montgomery suggests that he did so), and he would hardly have entrusted such letters to the brother of a person (Natanis) whom he had ordered Steele to kill or capture as a British spy and a villain. Senter declares that Eneas was a Penobscot Indian, but Senter's account of the matter has been proved suspicious and inaccurate (Chapter VII., note 10). The name Eneas has been called a mistake for Natanis; but this is an error, for Natanis did not appear until considerably later.

It seems fairly clear that Eneas belonged to the St. François tribe. Some reasons for thinking so are: 1. Washington expressed the opinion that Arnold could communicate with Schuyler by the aid of the St. François Indians (see his instructions to Arnold, 8). 2. This could only be through Indians of this tribe *in Arnold's*

army, for their home was far away, and they were not at all likely to be met with by accident. 3. We infer from Arnold's letter to Washington of September 25th (No. 54, 4, iii., 960) that a party of Indians set out from Newburyport by land to join him, and he says he shall send one of these Indians to Schuyler "as soon as they arrive." 4. St. François Indians visited the camp at Cambridge not long before Arnold set out, and several of them were detained there for some reason after the chief left (No. 54, 4, iii., 339). William Allen, in No. 106, states without qualification that Eneas was a St. François Indian. He does not give his authority, but the early time at which he wrote, as well as his carefulness and his personal acquaintance with Dearborn, gives weight to his opinion in spite of his numerous errors. As there is nothing, so far as I am aware, against this theory, I am inclined to believe that since Eneas was the sort of Indian recommended by Washington, Arnold cannot be blamed for trusting him.

106, i., 394, note). A further argument against this relationship is the fact that—as pointed out above—Arnold would not have trusted the brother of Natanis with such a mission. Allen believed that Sabatis went with Eneas, and there is no evidence against that opinion, I think, after his relationship to Natanis is disproved, except the italicised words in the remark quoted above from Henry. But it is not surprising that Henry had not seen or did not remember having seen Sabatis prior to November 4th, even if Sabatis had been with the army.

Besides the Indians there was one, and, so far as we know, only one white man in this party. Arnold, Oswald, and Senter agree about that. Who was he? Senter says it was "Jackquith," and Mr. Codman follows him (p. 64). Allen says the name was Jakins. There is no doubt that this man—his name was really Jaquin, in all probability—was at some time sent to the French settlements (Arnold's journal, October 27th); but that does not prove at all that he went at this date, for Arnold wrote, November 1st, to his friend in Quebec: "I have several times on my march wrote you by the Indians," and if he thought it wise to send a white man with his Indians once, he may have thought so again. This receives some confirmation from two facts: Senter (October 28th) calls "Jackquith" "one of his [*i. e.*, Arnold's] expresses," and Arnold's way of alluding to him in his journal (October 27th: "one Jakins, whom I had some time since sent down to the French inhabitants") implies that nothing had previously been said of despatching him.

On the other hand there is clear evidence that Jaquin was not the man sent by Arnold at this time. We have a letter of this date from Arnold to Lieutenant Steele: "I have sent the bearer and another Indian to Quebec with letters, and must have John Hall, as he speaks

French, to go to Sartigan with them." (Hall was a deserter from the British forces at Boston.) This was a positive order from the supreme authority of the army, and we cannot doubt that it was obeyed. Hall was there, for we find him later at Quebec. We have other evidence. Arnold expected to reach Lake Megantic about October 20th or 21st, and the white man sent off on October 13th was to meet him there (see Oswald, October 13th), but Jaquin did not reach the lake on his return until October 26th or 27th. The inference is that he was sent later than October 13th. There is, indeed, another possibility. Steele was given permission to send a second white man with Hall in case Hall should not be willing to go alone; Jaquin may have been selected and may have been delayed on his return. This, however, is guesswork, and is opposed by the statement that one white went with the Indians, as we learn not only from Arnold and Oswald, but from Humphrey and Thayer, who appear to have seen the messengers on their way.

would indicate that but little had been lost, for we have no evidence of any transfer of supplies from the fourth division. Yet he himself (October 3d) speaks in his journal of a "great part" of the bread of Thayer's and Hubbard's companies as damaged, and the same causes were likely to have the same effects in other cases, as we know from the journals. This and later developments appear to show that Arnold did not keep himself as well posted about the state of the provisions as he should have done.

38. Enos was also to send on a yoke of oxen belonging to the army, to be slaughtered. (Meigs noted on the 13th that up to that time four moose had been killed by "our men.") Arnold wrote Enos about his "proposal in regard to Mr. North": "When we arrive at the Dead River, will determine that matter, where you will hurry as fast as possible. There I design holding a council of war and expect particular advice from Canada." What was to be the source of this "particular advice"? Not Hall or Eneas, for Hall was to meet the army at Lake Megantic, and the Indians, who were to go farther than he, would be still longer away. In fact Arnold had written Washington two days before this: "I have had no intelligence from Gen. Schuyler or Canada, and expect none until I reach Chaudiere pond." It would appear, then, as if he wrote thus to Enos merely to stimulate him. The next inference would be that he suspected Enos of lukewarmness. If this was the case, we can understand why he expressed so little surprise on hearing than his division had returned.

39. He also ordered forty men of Meigs's division "to work on the roads that the rear might pass with less difficulty." Arnold seems to have camped, October 11th, on the west side of the first pond, for Senter found

him in camp there on the 12th, and to have remained there until 4 P.M. on the 14th.

40. Our only authority for this is Henry (No. 72), one of the scouting party. He says it took place on October 17th. Of course the date is wrong, but that does not authorise us to reject an incident which could not fail to fix itself in his mind. See note 31.

With reference to this incident, Mr. Codman (p. 60) says of Steele and his two companions that "having wrecked both canoes . . . they had left *two* of their party several miles up the Dead River too weak from lack of food to retreat further towards succor." But (1) Henry, our only informant, indicates that at least four were left behind (p. 46); (2) they were left, not several miles up Dead River, but about opposite the mouth of Bog Brook (pp. 24, 43, 45); (3) they remained, from choice, to complete the process of "jerking" the moose meat, which would require six days (p. 45), and, after losing

have expected to see anything of Quebec from this point. Lieutenant Steele had reported that Dead River was eighty miles long; beyond that were Lake Megantic and the Chaudière River; Bigelow must have had some knowledge of Steele's report; or, at the very least, he knew that when baggage was a deadly burden, it was Arnold's will that his men should be loaded down with provisions for about three weeks. He must have known also that the "height of land" lay between Dead River and Quebec. Mr. Codman (No. 28, p. 66) gives the height of Mount Bigelow as thirty-eight hundred feet, but the United States Geological Survey makes it thirty-six hundred feet.

2. I went the entire distance up Dead River and the ponds by canoe, so as to study carefully all the landmarks. A part of the river I have travelled over several times, and most of the way I have gone by land, also. Besides my personal observations, I have employed several of the most competent guides to make investigations, and have obtained data from a considerable number of the best-informed residents. To make the journey by water is particularly necessary, since the journals describe the march in terms of the river, which was, of course, essentially the highway of the expedition.

Possibly it needs to be added that all figures for distances on Dead River are estimates. Careful and experienced boatmen can reckon distances pretty closely by repeatedly timing themselves. When a number of such estimates are compared and corrected by one another, and further rectified (as they are) by comparison with known surveys of the land, a fairly close approximation can be made. It is not a measurement, but is certainly worth far more than the hasty guess of Steele, who went over the route only once and back, and, so far

expedient.

3. This is not positively certain, but seer probable. Now it was (October 18th) that ordered the last yoke of oxen killed for Mr. Codman is in error in saying that th oxen were slaughtered "before the Dea reached" (p. 47).

Mr. Codman observes that (the mouth of "formed a convenient harbor and landin the first camp of the army on the Dead Ri But the camp one mile up Dead River (*i. e.*, the mouth of Bog Brook) was the "first c river for Meigs, Dearborn, "Provincial," M kell, Stocking, and Tolman. All the rest stopping-place is indicated went farther.

4. The name Dead River is due to the low water there is no perceptible current a good many miles above, probably because below act as a dam, and convert the strean pond. At high water the current runs four an hour, but on account of the stillness of th to its depth, might easily be thought mu this fact we may partly attribute the l timates of distance on Dead River, I dar water was now of medium height probabl had been heavy rains, and Humphrey says part of the river the current was so strong

the river seems low even when it is pretty full, because the banks are high. One may assume, therefore, that even in this part of its course the river probably flowed at least one and one-half or two miles an hour.

It is interesting to find evidence here how closely Arnold kept his eye on Montresor's journal. He wrote under date of October 16th: "We were now near the large mountain mentioned the preceding day. Here the river by its extraordinary windings seemed unwilling to leave it—two hours had passed away and we had gained nothing in our course, but at last by slow degrees it became more regular and returned to its proper course." In Montresor's narrative for July 16th we find: "We had now passed the mountain, but the river, by its extraordinary windings, seemed unwilling to leave it. Two hours passed away and we had gained nothing in our course, but at last by slow degrees it became more regular and returned to its proper course" (No. 106, i., p. 355).

5. Humphrey and Thayer mention this, giving as the reason the strength of the current. But had there been a plenty of oars and paddles, the boats could probably have been propelled.

6. Unlike the courses on the river, the portages had been surveyed, and Arnold was probably in possession of the results. To be sure, he had not yet overtaken Church and the surveyor; but, as the surveys were made for the sake of having the information to use, we must assume that in one way or another the figures were communicated to the commander. At all events he would receive them later if not sooner, and whenever they came to hand, they would be used in his journal. This view seems confirmed by the fact that his figures for the portages are evidently not estimates. We seldom meet

neglect the others.

Mr. Codman expresses the opinion that ' whole third division" camped at Hurric the 16th" (p. 68); but Meigs and Hanch Meigs says, "one mile up the river"; Ward' Haskell shows) had not reached Dead R know by comparing Meigs and Dearborn th company was a long way behind Dearb morning of the 16th.

7. Mr. Codman (p. 67) seems to call the Bog Brook to Flagstaff Point "about 21 really about ten or ten and one-half by the tween twelve and one-half and fourteen Arnold reckoned it fifteen.

8. This is not absolutely certain, but the the description of the spot seem to point to this conclusion. At Flagstaff one meets ber of stories about this expedition. It is Arnold camped for at least two weeks (some assert all winter) and that the name is derived from a flag-pole that he set up the it is said that Arnold himself climbed the p ened the flag at the top. As to the pole, Flagstaff and neighbouring places three ci descriptions and histories of it derived from ants,—stories not capable of being harmonis

he did not), and the soldiers were not ready yet (however they may have felt later) to bury their guns.

I have spoken of these tales as "stories," not "traditions," because, when Arnold went up Dead River, there were no inhabitants to pass traditions down, and he left nobody behind him there. The belief that he camped at Flagstaff can readily be explained, it seems to me. When the first settlers arrived, it was easy to see (if we are correct in believing that the house of Natanis was there) that a clearing had been made by some one. Every sign of human work dating apparently from somewhere near the period of Arnold's expedition was naturally attributed to his army, as is often done still; and so it was inferred that the Indian clearing had been his camp.

9. Mr. Codman (p. 67) represents most of the men who went by water as crossing "on foot the points of land between the serpentine windings of the river"; but (1) the journals do not mention this; (2) nothing would have been gained, for, after crossing the point, they would have had to wait for the bateaux; (3) much would have been lost, for the steep, high, and crumbling banks would have been hard to ascend and descend, if the river was at all what it now is (Thayer says the shores were "bold"); good landings are not easily found on this part of Dead River; and (4) most of the bateaux must still have been laden, as Henry states, for boats seem to have been smashed about as fast as their contents were used up, and some went adrift down the Kennebec; and a laden bateau, we are particularly told, carried only men enough to navigate it. If, then, the crew had got out to walk, what would have become of the boat? Boats not otherwise loaded probably carried the infirm or ill.

for half-rations, *i. e.*, six ounces per man,
mean, as there were now, according to
men in the company, twenty-two and on
(Humphrey says fifty men); also becaus
remarks, "in the morning *here*," etc., and
Camp Greene on the morning of the 16th
his letter of the 17th to Enos, stated that
sion had four barrels of flour and ten ba
This would have given the men full rations
nearly six days, and of pork for nearly fifte
might infer from this that Hubbard's co
have been better supplied than Thayer's an
but we find Arnold providing for an equa
among the three of whatever Enos should s

What shall we do, now, about these v
reports on the provisions of the second di
cording to Humphrey and Thayer there wa
flour for breakfast on the 17th; according
letter, probably written just after breakfas
four barrels.

The impulse would be to say that two
stronger than one. But (1) if the statemen
and Humphrey were strictly correct, what
live on until Bigelow brought some flour fou
Salt pork would hardly have answered as
diet. Had the men been reduced to th

qualified only by the chance of a misprint; but we do not know just when the two journals were written as we have them, nor just how independent of each other they were on this point. Had Arnold intended to misrepresent, he would have made the supplies appear smaller, not larger, than they were. (4) Topham's account, while it does not agree exactly with Arnold's, differs very significantly from Humphrey's and Thayer's. Humphrey says: "in the morning here our company Had not five or 6 lbs of flower to 50 men." Thayer, by changing "not" to "but" and "50" to "60," appears to make the rest his own. But Topham, though following Humphrey in general, says, "not more than 5 or 6 lbs per man." Arnold's figure would allow a trifle more than four and one-third pounds per man, but Topham's statement was evidently not intended to be exact. On the whole, then, it seems fairly clear that Arnold's account is the one to be accepted, though it is very possible that he ignored a partly used barrel, which did actually bring the amount of flour up to five pounds per man.

Arnold's journal might seem to imply that Greene's division, though short of flour, had bread; for he says, "great part of their bread being damaged." But the fact that the men were on short rations before it was found that fresh supplies could not be obtained, indicates that there was not enough bread to signify; nobody else gives a hint of bread; and it is very possible that "bread" was used as a synonym for "flour." This seems, in fact, probable, in view of Humphrey's words: "Arnold . . . hearing of our wants of *bread*," etc., for Arnold speaks of their wanting *flour*.

It should be added that Senter corroborates the journalists of Greene's division. He reached their camp on the evening of October 21st, and under date of October

been for several days."

Mr. Codman, doubtless reflecting Sente statements (note 25, Chapter V.) remarks (inequality in the distribution of the prov the different companies . . . had n ously appeared." But Arnold has recently first three divisions (*i. e.*, each of them) ha twenty-five days, and we have just seen t panies of the second division appear t equally in want. So far as one can disco inequality of distribution was the intention of an extra supply to the last division as a

11. Mr. Codman says (p. 68) that he o'clock in the morning; but (1) Thayer evening," (2) Topham adds "8 o'clock in (3) Humphrey says, "about 8 O Clock," an writes in his letter of the 17th, "last night would seem quite true of boating on the riv o'clock, when it was almost dark at half-pa

12. In his journal, Arnold says that Bige back to "assist the rear in bringing up thei but this meant, as the letter to Enos said, tl "bring up as much provisions as you can s here we find a suspicious spot in Humphi October 16th he says he was "sent back" v yet October 17th to 20th he records what w

tremely reluctant to go, we may infer that he obtained an excuse from the trip; (2) his journal for October 17th to 20th could not he made from Topham's and Thayer's; and (3) October 21st he alludes to Bigelow's return in terms which seem to indicate that he did not go: "Major Bigelow who had been down With our boats return'd," etc.

13. Topham says *one* barrel, Thayer and Humphrey say *two*.

14. Dearborn mentions arriving on the 17th. According to Arnold, however, Dearborn's and Goodrich's companies arrived at 10 A.M. on the 18th. This perhaps means that the greater part or the last of them came at that time. They were set at making cartridges. Melvin records at this point: "Had orders to put ourselves in a defensive condition," and Dearborn mentions that the powder-horns were filled. This implies that until now the usual military observances and precautions had been neglected. Indeed, why should they not have been? This was a rough-and-ready army, out for work, not for pomp, and until now there had been no danger to fear. If Carleton were going to attack the army, he would certainly not weaken and endanger his forces by coming down to the Great Carrying-place. He would wait until fatigue and hardship had reduced the strength of the Americans, and they had become involved in the more difficult region above. Then, nearer his base, he could attack with far greater certainty of success. For these reasons it does not seem at all probable that sentries were kept on guard at the Great Carrying-place, as Mr. Codman supposes (p. 58).

15. They worked at this under a Mr. Ayres. By Chaudière River is here meant Arnold River, no doubt. This is from Meigs.

red men, two-thirds of the whole detachr
appeared in this Melchizedek style.
statement is to be disregarded as someh
take. This is the more evident because
what appears to be the same incident
looks perfectly sensible: "Col. Enoe ca
about 11 o'clock in expectations of findin
but on his disappointment return'd and
urged on (?)] his rear." Humphrey s
Williams's company arrived in the af
command of a sergeant.

The fact that Williams seems to have r
rear of the fourth division, and that he ar
Greene just after Enos went back to "
rear, suggests that Scott and McCobb h
But Williams appears to have been in t
division now. Scott was behind him, and
same can be said of McCobb.

17. Mr. Codman (p. 69) says "ceased,"
word is "abated," and also, "small rain
this day." The 18th was very rainy, acco
born, and Morison's journal might be con
with that; but no other journalist gives th
and Humphrey, Thayer, and Haskell refer
as pleasant.

18. The wind has been described (No

quarter the day before: "wind to the So. wd." It was a steady, heavy storm.

19. Mr. Codman states (p. 71) that all the divisions except the first were in motion October 21st; but Humphrey, Topham, and Thayer agree that the second division did not budge till the 22d, and Senter corroborates this. It was not until the 21st that Bigelow returned with the boats, and after that the sick had to be sent back, and the preparations made for breaking camp.

20. Arnold's estimate. The forward portions of the army received the brunt of the flood, because they found themselves in the foot-hills, where the stream was more rapid and the valley narrower than below.

21 Mr. Codman states that Arnold "saved himself only by sacrificing his baggage" (p. 73), but Arnold says the baggage was conveyed to a small hill, and the next day was dried.

22. Henry says this took place during the night of the 22d, but as in so many other cases his date is wrong.

23. Squier estimates the rise of the river at twelve feet, Senter at ten (October 22d), Arnold at eight, Dearborn at eight or nine. Mr. Codman assumes (p. 71) that fires could not be kept going on the night of the 21st; but Arnold, Senter, and Squier indicate the opposite.

24. What had become of their tents does not appear. Washington stated at Cambridge that tents were provided for all. Some may have been lost, but it would not be easy to lose tents. The men may have wearied of carrying them. Perhaps so many bateaux had smashed that there was no way to transport all the tents. Possibly the supply was not what Washington supposed it to be. Or perhaps, on account of the gale, it had not been feasible to set up the tents.

less. But (1) there is no evidence t
were confused, for the guides were ap
head of the army, and that portion did
(2) why should Montresor's map beco
useless *because* the guides were confuse
not go by a map; if they did they would
When guides fail, maps become pecul
And (3) as no detailed information abo
could possibly be derived from Montresor
map, how could it become *worse* than
situation was bad, but it is possible to
freshet and its evil consequences.

26. During the time of the great storm
tober 19th to 22d) the riflemen advanced
miles. One reason for the delay, accordin
man (p. 70), was that they "were counting
divisions to bring them supplies"; but, if
case, why did they move on before the
i. e., Greene's and Enos's, came up?

X: Pages 147–163.

1. The South Branch rises not far fr
Lake.

2. Arnold's words are: "Oct. 21. . .
embarked and proceeded up the river 3 l
we came to a small fall of water, th

W. N. W.—about 90 rods higher up met with a fourth fall very considerable and long—Portage over W. N. W. Distance 73 rods—here we overtook Capt Morgan and his division, but as his encampment was bad proceeded about one mile higher up. . . . It was now quite dark so that we had little time to encamp." Where the Eustis dam now stands there was formerly a wall of rock which compelled the river to make a sharp turn, and run where the mill has been built. There is one difficulty here. Arnold says the portage was W. N. W., and I do not see how the carry at Eustis dam can have run in that direction; but (1) it is impossible to tell just how the river went, or just where the portage was in 1775, (2) we do not know how to interpret such bearings,—a portage is not often straight, and (3) apparently Arnold was not very careful here, for he gives W. N. W. as the direction of four successive portages,—exceedingly improbable on a stream like Dead River. Perhaps, on account of the rain, he was not using a compass, as he may have done elsewhere. In that case, as the sun was hidden, he would be likely to err.

3. By the road eighty-two rods, but "across lots," in a pretty direct line, only four hundred and forty-three short paces,—say about seventy rods. The reader may wonder why I did not have the distances on Dead River measured. On account of the windings and swellings of the stream, it would have been necessary to measure the middle of the channel, and this would have been quite difficult. The results, even if correct, would probably have been of little help, since Arnold's figures for distances by water were only estimates, no doubt. Careful, averaged estimates appear to be as good as anything for our purpose.

4. A little way above Upper Ledge Falls a back

[illegible] that this channel was never flood times, and that the river now runs 1775. The Indian carry is said to have l island formed by the two channels. Th Falls dam has gates to regulate the flow sluice for the logs to pass through. The the dam at the foot of the first pond.

5. Arnold's words. He describes no the river in such emphatic terms; they fi Falls exactly, and there are no other falls "very considerable and long."

6. The river makes a turn of sixty deg Lower Ledge Falls.

7. If the portage of twenty-six rods wa side of Black Cat Rapids (on account of some other difficulty), and the portage c rods began fifty rods below Lower Ledge with Arnold's half-mile, near three-fourt Possibly the river has lengthened its cours

8. An error. Hendricks is meant.

9. We may assume that Meigs, after re Flood on the 22d with "part of his divisio and brought up the rest the next morning.

10. *I. e.*, "distance."

11. Allowing for the difference in the the compass.

12. The reader will recall several ca

which the men went up by mistake; but, as he places Camp Disaster at Ledge Falls, his theory requires us to believe that it was (1) some temporary stream produced by the rains, (2) the South Branch of Dead River, or (3) Tim Brook. I have searched in vain for some stream besides these and Alder Stream that could have made the "crotch."

(1) Nobody can go up and down that region as I have done, besides employing guides to do the same, without feeling satisfied that a temporary stream, navigable for four miles the second day after the freshet, is inconceivable.

(2) As already suggested, it seems tolerably clear that, according to Henry, some of the riflemen took the South Branch for Dead River. Henry (No. 72, p. 33) says that, on the afternoon of the day he passed the cabin of Natanis on the scouting expedition, he came to a stream entering Dead River "from the west or rather the northwest," which the party were inclined to take; and that later he was told by a boat crew of Morgan's men that they did follow this westerly stream and went seven miles up it. The only navigable affluent from the west that Henry can have seen on the day he passed Flagstaff Point is the South Branch, which empties eight or nine miles above, and this is the only affluent of Dead River that is navigable for seven miles. But Mr. Codman is wrong in representing "the riflemen" (p. 73) in a body as making this mistake, and also in representing any riflemen at all as going up this branch on the 22d, for Arnold's journal renders it practically certain that they passed its mouth late on the 17th, or early on the 18th, and quite certain that they had got a long way above it by the evening of the 21st. Mr. Codman says that when the riflemen discovered their mistake they "made a bee

crew would thus abandon their bateau a
cially as it would have been vastly easier

Now Mr. Codman (p. 74) sends the
the third division up the same stream, an
the same day, October 22d. But Arnol
born, and in fact all who allude to this ac
on the 23d, and the musketmen who blu
that time far beyond the mouth of the So
Arnold's journal shows that Meigs's divis
a quarter of a mile of this point at noo
and still advancing; Meigs and Dearborn
division advanced six or seven miles on
days; and Arnold proves that at 7 A.M.
was nearly four leagues above. Furthe
their "cutting across" from four miles up
to Dead River and reaching Upper Ledg
Mr. Codman represents them as arriving)
is practically impossible. We conclude,
"crotch" was not at the mouth of the Sou

(3) As what has been said implies, if (
is placed where Mr. Codman places it, at
the only plausible theory about the "crot
was the junction of Tim Brook with Deac
eight rods above Black Cat Rapids. This
people in the locality. But the difficulti
this theory are insuperable. (*a*) Dearborn
bateau went four miles up the affluent, but

than ten miles above Arnold Falls, but Arnold called the distance between Arnold Falls and the "crotch" fifteen miles; (*c*) Tim Brook is about fourteen miles below the first pond, but Arnold called it less than fourteen and a half miles from the "crotch" to the first pond, and this was where he was quite sure to exaggerate distances; (*d*) Tim Brook, much smaller than Dead River, does not make with it what any one would call a "crotch"; (*e*) for three miles below the "crotch" Arnold did not have to carry, but within less than a mile below Tim Brook two carries would have been necessary; (*f*) the portages of seventy-five and seventy-three rods were about four miles below the "crotch," but, on the Tim Brook theory, falls requiring such carries cannot be found; (*g*) the country is so desperately bad that had the men found themselves up Tim Brook they would soon have given over trying to "cut across," and would have followed that stream down to Dead River. Other arguments could be presented, but these appear quite sufficient.

The fact that the men went up a stream coming from the westward shows on which side of Dead River they marched; and Henry (p. 52) states that they went on the south (*i. e.*, the south-west) side.

13. "Lower Shadagee Falls" is a somewhat indefinite name. It may be said to cover about half a mile of shallow swift water and "ripples" below Upper Shadagee.

14. This has been considerably reduced in height by blasting.

15. Mr. Codman (p. 74) places Camp Disaster at Ledge Falls, and, though he does not expressly say so, it seems evident from his description (p. 75) that he means Upper Ledge Falls. There is, no doubt, a local

upon the fact that several quarts of bul
near the site of the upper dam. But bu
found elsewhere. Boats were capsized
than one; and it was very easy, in loadir
at a carry, to let a bag of them slip into t
objections to the Upper Ledge Falls th
cisive: (1) the "crotch," we have satis
was at Alder Stream, and Camp Disaster
point; (2) if we place Camp Disaster at L
distances come right neither above nor bel
Disaster was at a portage of seven rods,
have to carry many times that distance
Upper Ledge Falls; (4) the theory would
suppose that Arnold failed to mention
Falls, for below the portage of seven rod
other for about seven miles; (5) on this t
not place the portages of seventy-five and
rods, and the "very considerable and long
Lower Ledge Falls suggested as the point
Disaster was pitched, the difficulties wou
stantially the same.

16. It will be remembered that most
riflemen were marching at this time with
sion (the 3d).

17. October 22d, Morgan passed Arn
Camp Disaster Arnold pressed forward i

18. This is Arnold's and Dearborn's figure. Others add slightly to it. Of course the lack of food increased the number of invalids, but the cases of disease do not seem to have been many. October 23d, Senter writes: "Several of our men were excessively exhausted with the diarrhea, with [a] few rheumatic cases" (MS.). The sick were furnished with three days' provisions, and Enos was ordered by letter to give them supplies enough to carry them on to the commissary (at the log house on the Kennebec?) or to Norridgewock. The mention of Norridgewock in Arnold's order does not prove that any dépôt of supplies existed there, especially as it is shown that the commissary was elsewhere. (Arnold's letter is incorrectly printed—p. 84—by Mr. Codman; "in" Norridgewock should be "or" Norridgewock.) The people at Norridgewock were few, but they had now laid in their winter's supplies, and could give a simple meal or two to a good many men. Squier's account of his return trip makes no mention of a dépôt at Norridgewock. At Ft. Halifax, not at Norridgewock, he "drawed provision." And our inference is confirmed by Arnold's letter of October 24th to the commissary: "I wrote you the 14th instant to send forward to the Great Carrying-place all the provisions you had. This I make no doubt you have done"; *i. e.*, there was no thought of establishing a dépôt at Norridgewock.

19. That it was a picked company is clear, for we know that one of his men, Stocking, did not go with him, while men not of his company did go. Haskell informs us that a sergeant and seven men were taken from Ward's company. See also Chapter XIII., note 19. Each man was allowed ten pounds of flour and five pounds of pork, equivalent to the full rations for ten days. According to Mr. Codman (p. 76), this company consisted

tober 24th, that "we" had on that date tw
days' provisions. Eight days before this,
sion was put on reduced rations, and hac
get only a barrel or two of flour. Appa
did not keep well posted as to the state of
him. In accordance with his order, forty-e
sent back from the second division.

21. A difficulty confronts us here, how
ing his letters written at Camp Disaster A1
being thirty miles from Chaudière Pond;
he is "about 20." This would seem to
terval at least nine miles, whereas the dista
dagee Falls to Sarampus Falls is probably
and a half or five miles. But the figures fc
in his journal amount to only seven miles
rods plus one hundred yards, which can l
to the actual distance with a fairly good co
he may have received information in the n
changed his opinion.

22. Senter, who camped a few miles
Greene's division, speaks of "nigh six inch

23. There is a buckboard road from Eu
an abandoned (1902) farmhouse on the firs
opposite which the outlet must have been i
treasurer of a lumber company writes m
years since he had the road chained fro



The length of the road has no close bearing, however, on our opinion of the distance by water.

24. After Arnold, Dearborn gives the best account, though his estimates of distance are much too large. Up to Arnold Falls we can follow him perfectly; but after that, in consequence of the incompleteness of his record, we cannot be sure. His account falls into the scheme of the text except that Arnold's carries at Eustis Falls and Black Cat Rapids appear two miles apart in Dearborn, and are longer than Arnold's (perhaps because the river had risen). Dearborn gives a group of three portages of 74 rods (evidently a slip for two), and he gives only three more carries, without specifying their order: 4, 4, and 90 rods, against Arnold's 12, 6, 40, and 100. (Possibly, if Arnold's boats were light, he made a carry that the others did not make.) Meigs agrees with Dearborn, except that he mentions only two portages of 74 rods. He calls the portage at Camp Disaster 15 rods long. These two journals show distinct signs here of mutual dependence yet of independence. It is particularly to be noted that both journals place Camp Disaster at the first portage above the 74-rod carries, which were almost certainly Ledge Falls. In the list of Dearborn's portages (p. 148 of the text) the one following the 74-rod carries is omitted because he gives no figures for it.

No help can be obtained from Melvin, Tolman, Henry, Fobes, or Stocking. Morison and "Provincial" throw scarcely any light. Haskell travelled by land, and his estimates of his marches do not aid us, for the flood compelled him to follow a circuitous route. His portages above Arnold Falls are 20, 30, 50, 70, 15, 4, 5, 160 rods. He mentions going four miles up the wrong stream on October 23d, but he "had to go back again" instead

having to make roads at two carrying place
Eustis Falls and Black Cat Rapids), whic
the portages used by the first and third
been submerged, and so may help us un
agreements about the portages. His re
Ledge Falls represents falls half a mile lc
by "not more" than that distance fron
same length,—certainly far from a correct
suggests the falls at Camp Disaster (Shad
mentioning the wrecks of bateaux. Be
speaks of passing one waterfall and three ca
Squier (his journal is not accurately print
ently boated over the carrying-place at
how far beyond that he went on the 22d, c
The next day, after advancing eight miles,
rods (Eustis Falls?) and camped half a
On the 24th, after going a mile, he ca
(Black Cat Rapids?), boated two miles, c
mile (Lower Ledge Falls?), boated 40
half a mile (Upper Ledge Falls?), and cam
above. The next day he marched until
(though not all the time), and seems to ha
not quite reached Shadagee Falls. The
division retreated.

Dearborn and Meigs called it ten miles, p
more, from Camp Disaster to the first p
"something more," made on the morning

the pond. The figures of "Provincial" and Morison are extravagant. According to Dearborn it was about forty-one miles from Flagstaff to Camp Disaster. Even liberal discounting cannot bring this down to the distance between Flagstaff and Ledge Falls, about twenty miles.

25. Mr. Codman states (p. 74) that among the losses at Camp Disaster was a considerable "sum of money destined to pay off the men"; but Morison, whose words these are, puts the event on the next day. This is confirmed by his remark that it was after the Colonel took his departure. Arnold did not push on ahead of the main body on the 23d, for he speaks of despatching the troops on the 24th; but on the 24th he did so. We have other testimony to the upsetting of boats on the 24th (Tolman, Haskell, "Provincial," and Stocking).

26. Melvin's journal intimates that he did no more on the 26th than reach the first pond.

27. According to Montresor there was a large beaver dam at the foot of the first pond.

28. Mr. Codman (p. 75) remarks: "The valley narrows as it reaches these lakes, and the intervale is cut up by steep hills and deep ravines. The circuits the army was obliged to make in order to avoid the overflowing of the river became wider," etc. But of course the circuits did not become "wider" where the valley narrowed.

29. For Humphrey, Thayer, and Topham say that Greene, Thayer, and Topham *stayed* by desire of Col. Enos to hold a council on the 25th. Williams's company reached Camp Greene, where the second division still lay, on the 21st, and Scott's cannot have been far behind, for they called themselves twenty-one miles from Bog Brook that night. McCobb's had at other times led the division. Senter speaks as if the fourth division

about what this theory would require
heard on the 24th that the carrying-plac
of land was twenty-five miles distant.
nold the foot of the first pond was abou
from that carrying-place. On this bas
sion had then arrived within seven miles
almost exactly where we have placed Ca

Humphrey, Thayer, Topham, and
agree in representing the camp as far
Ledge Falls. It cannot have been at
for Arnold was near there on the night

The journals coming from men of the
do not represent it as moving on the 24t
overtook it at evening on that day, state
these troops "waiting for the remainder
come up, that they might get some pro
advanced any further. Upon enquiry
almost destitute of any eatable whate
does not assert that they had been
Apparently they had not been, though
silent. Senter advanced, yet did not pa

31. Topham said on October 25th: "
lute danger of starving," and Humphre
same. Thayer wrote on the 24th that
of flour per man was left, and Senter, th
there was almost nothing eatable in the d

o'clock the council had been held and orders given for the retreat of the fourth division.

33. It should be added that all this is not positively certain. The principal data are: 1. Thayer: "Oct. 25. We stay'd for Colonel Green to consult [with Arnold] about our situation . . . in the afternoon [the men] went about three miles and encamp'd waiting for our boats [that went down the river to get provisions]. Here [*i. e.*, at the camp] col. green capt. Topham and myself stay'd by desire of col Enoe to hold a counsel of war. . . . Mr. Ogden . . . and myself took the Boat in which we ran rapidly down with the current where we expected to receive from the returning party 4 Barrels of flour and 2 of Pork . . . working . . . up against a most rapid stream for a mile and half . . . I reach'd and met some of our boats coming to me [sent from the camp three miles above] . . . Mr. Ogden and myself . . . lied that [night] disagreeably in the snow . . . about 9 o'clock [the next morning] we overtook our troops who were just ready to march." The fact that Thayer met boats of his division so long after setting out in a boat (provided, it will be noted, by Colburn) is explained by the hypothesis adoped in the text, viz., that during the council the men advanced three miles, so that time was necessary to send them orders, unload the boats, and bring them down. As it was already afternoon, the men camped, awaiting the return of these boats. 2. Topham: "Oct. 25. We stayed for Col. Green who is gone forward to hear what we must do for provisions . . . [The men] Proceeded on our way about 3 miles and encamped for our boats to come up, which could not be done very quick on account of the rapidity of the river. Col. Green, Capt. Topham and Thayer stay [behind] by desire of Col. Enos in order to hold a

went about 3 miles and encamp'd and
boats; here Col. Green Capt. Topham
by desire of Col. Enoe," etc. One's r
again would be that the officers stay
pitched in the afternoon; but the w
mained there, while the tarrying of the
sented as done specially at the request o
the meaning might be drawn that th
advanced three miles; then Greene
stopped the march and stayed for a
division encamped to wait for them.
ing seems to be represented as done '
boats," and the boats did not go down th
the conference, hence the army did not
the sake of the conference. 4. Sente
25. . . . We now waited in anx
for Col. Enos' division to come up, i
might have a recruit of provisions ere
the ground. An express was ordered b
the river, the one up the river in ques
[but Humphrey, Thayer, and Topham
himself went.] . . . The other ex
the river to desire Col. Enos and offi
consultation [but it was for the interes
officers to hold a council, and Humph
Topham state that he asked it]. They
up before noon. . . . After debati

or to show their disapprobation of proceeding any further. . . . Received it [*i. e.*, the provisions from the fourth division], put it on board our boats, . . . bid them adieu, and away — passed the river, passed one W. falls and encamped [but it was Thayer who went for the supplies, and his account is different]." Senter also says: "To compel them to a just division, we were not in a situation, as being the weakest party"; but if the conference took place at the camp of the second division, Greene had the officers of the fourth division entirely in his power. 5. Squier: "Oct. 25. This morning by a little after Break of day went up to the rest of our company [1½ miles ahead] there stopt till Capt. Scott and Lieut. Sprague went up to the Lieut.-Colonel Eanos a mile forward and we marched on I went by land We marched till 2 o'clock in the afternoon then was ordered to march back to our camp."

Mr. Codman (p. 83) calls this council or conference "a general council of war," which, of course, it was not, for it was not summoned by the commander.

What, now, was the duty of Greene and Enos? On the day before, Arnold had written them both. Enos was directed to "proceed with as many of the best men of your division as you can furnish with 15 days' provision." Greene was directed to "proceed on with the best men and 15 days' provisions for each [man]." The two orders were evidently intended to mean the same, and that meaning is most clearly stated in the first. Obviously, Arnold supposed both divisions better provided with supplies than they seem to have been, and supposed that the log house on the Great Carrying-place contained a plenty of provisions. His plan was that Enos and Greene should press on with as many men as could be furnished with provisions for fifteen days, after

If Greene had 180 men (as Thayer
ways), and had four barrels of flour
Chapter IX., note 10) after breakfast
Arnold's letter was probably written) o
and he continued to give half-rations of
breakfast on the 22d (very possibly full
sumed when Bigelow brought more flo
then, after providing dinner and supper
his division on October 24th, and thre
same short allowance, October 25th,
pounds.

This does not seem at first to agree w
the journalists. Humphrey, under da
writes: "We are almost destitute Of
brought to half pint of flower Pr man
more to deliver out, it Being the last we
this is only a repetition of the difficulty
October 17th (see Chapter IX., note 1
hardly possible to take Humphrey litera
compel us to suppose that for about tw
the division had no bread at all, while
the 25th: "We are absolutely in a dang
He even expects to be able to live until
the french side" can be obtained. If
that source, "we shall be poorly Off," he
"had" (cf. "are" above) suggests that

that one half-pint apiece, given out on the 24th, exhausted the stock.

In short, while the matter is far from clear, it looks as if the supply of flour—very small indeed it must have seemed under the circumstances—was actually inadequate, and it is possible that exaggerated reports of the situation found their way into the journals. Senter's statement that Greene's division had nothing eatable but some candles on the 24th appears clearly extravagant, for the division, if it had no other flour, would not have used up in three days the two barrels brought by Bigelow; and the other three witnesses are not independent.

But Greene's supply of pork needs to be considered. Accepting Arnold's account of the situation on October 17th, calling a barrel of pork 200 pounds, and assuming that one pound a day was given out (to make up for the shortage of bread), we find that, after furnishing his division with supper on October 25th, Greene had 440 pounds of pork. His supplies were equivalent then to 608 rations of bread and 586⅔ rations of meat, *i. e.*, food enough for one man for 597⅓ days. Four days' rations for the division would more than have exhausted the supply. In short, Greene could not have equipped any men for the advance according to Arnold's orders,—that is to say, after providing for those returning.

The state of Enos's supplies came out at his trial by court-martial (see note 39). The upshot of the testimony (No. 54, 4, iii., 1710) was that after supplying Greene with certain provisions on October 25th, the fourth division had left only enough for three days. Enos himself in his report to Washington (November 9th) stated that, after sharing with Greene, the fourth division found itself with only food enough for three days (No. 54, 4, iii., 1610).

colour of misrepresent facts. Squier finc
the 28th all "took 2 days' provisions f
This proves that on the 25th, Scott's cor
had enough for five days (and Squier r
of a part of a barrel on the 26th). It toc
afternoon on the 30th to reach the "i
Norridgewock. He went by water, and
idly, but he says that some "could not
these must have had still ampler supplie
Scott's company, and (we may assume)
from each of the other companies, wen
Brook on the 29th to get flour from Dea
the Great Carrying-place. The transpo
flour would have been a slow affair, so that
have needed provisions for, say, eight d
must have been at that time a large undi
of flour, else such a detail would not have b
It looks, therefore, as if the fourth divisi
retreat with provisions for, at the very lea
far as flour was concerned.

As to their pork, we have no such data
assume that the stock was at least as gooc
the ration was fixed, equal quantities of
pork were allowed, which implies that ec
were in stock, (2) pork was less likely to b
(3) Enos had given some flour, but no po
division previously.

It may be asked, if Enos had an ample supply of pork, why did he not give Greene some on the 25th? The reply is easy: it was hard for Greene to get the flour which he urgently needed, and of pork he still had a considerable supply. Another question is this: if the second division now had supplies for seven days, why did they complain so bitterly of Enos? Again the reply is obvious: they did not know how soon they would reach the "inhabitants," and, allowing for accidents, their stock seemed dangerously small. Arnold's orders implied that provisions for fifteen days were needful.

Enos had, after the conference, perhaps 250 men of his own (including Colburn's), and was said at the trial to have had 150 from the other divisions. A simple computation will show that provisions for one man for 3275 days were on hand in the two divisions. These would supply 107 men for fifteen days, and 418 men for four days.

In all this figuring, we have adopted underestimates, but—to be perfectly safe—let us now throw off the seven men at a venture, and say that at least one hundred men could have gone forward as Arnold ordered. If there was a broken barrel on the 17th besides those mentioned by Arnold (Chap. IX., note 10), if Greene's division did not resume full rations on the 21st or 22d, if he did not have 180 men, and if the fourth division had more than the above minimum estimate of their supplies, then this number would have been more than 107. Mr. Codman would therefore seem to be in error in saying (p. 87) that the precise execution of Arnold's order was "an impossibility," and that if Enos had undertaken to obey it some of the men who advanced would "undoubtedly have perished" by starvation.

Some may feel that the testimony at Enos's trial has

from another point. Let us assume tl
returned on October 21st he found (
absolutely destitute of food. Captain
that he gave Bigelow eight barrels of pr
were enough to make full rations for
Yet Enos wrote Washington that he "
Greene with his division, entirely out of
this occurred in the forenoon of the
party, to be sure, lived a day or two, perl
he received; but this does not invalidat
—especially as we may be sure that unc
stances Greene would not have dealt
Further, Greene must have had some su

34. Mr. Codman (p. 75) represents
second division as discouraged by the l
valids sent back from the first and thirc
" assured them of the hopelessness of a
gress . . . and exhorted them to tu
no journalist except Senter mentions suc
he names but one. It should be rememl
returning soldiers were not stragglers.
did not make them poltroons. They wer
order. Morison tells us how the rifleme
ceal their condition as they grew feeble,
to about returning, declared " that they
well enough." When ordered to the

35. Mr. Codman (p. 81) quotes Senter, without question, to the effect that the men on this side were Enos, Greene, Bigelow, Topham, Thayer, and *Ward.* But I cannot believe that Ward attended the council, and think his name was an error for *Hubbard;* for (1) Hubbard, one of Greene's captains, would hardly have been absent; (2) Ward belonged to another division, now more than a day in advance, and so would not be likely to be there; (3) Haskell, of Ward's company, says that they went forward (from Camp Disaster) on the 24th, and continued their advance on the 25th. Senter, the doctor, might easily be misinformed about this matter, as about so many others. The probability that Senter was ill-informed on this point is shown by Thayer's statement that six voted in the negative and seven in the affirmative on the question of advancing, whereas according to Senter the numbers were five and six. Further, Lieutenant Hyde testified at the trial of Enos that he was present at the council, and "we found" certain things, and Lieutenant Buckmaster in his testimony "confirms what Lieut. Hyde deposes." How could Buckmaster do so if he was not at the council? Yet Senter does not mention him. Still, in default of better evidence, the text follows Senter as to the persons present at the conference (except in the case of Ward) and other points. Certainty is unattainable here.

36. What made this defection seem peculiarly exasperating to the rest was the fact that the fourth division had a comparatively easy time of it. Being in the rear they found roads, and often huts, all ready for them. As Colburn does not appear again it is probable that he and his company of "artificers" retreated with Enos.


37. So Thayer, our best authority at this point, says. Senter calls it two and a half barrels. Four barrels of

say who did this, and it is of course po
party of troops were actually reduced t
this time. It seems equally possible
Thayer, relying on his memory, carri
date something which occurred later.
not appear in Humphrey's account.

Mr. Codman intimates (p. 79) that A
"peremptory orders" to the fourth d
flood to divide their provisions with Gre
find any evidence of this. Arnold mus
Greene had received supplies, since
ordered him to go on with as many of hi
could furnish with rations for fifteen da

One is a little surprised to hear
"game" reported plentiful by Steele's
Very likely the leading companies w
some (though we do not hear of it), bu
such a body of men must have frighten
moose away. The fish, however, wer
scared to bite. Senter and Arnold had
catching a plenty of large trout in D
many of the army had passed. This
plain how the men were able to live wh
so scant; but they seem, as a rule, to ha
for fishing.

38. This is from Senter. As there i



39. Mr. Codman (p. 83) represents the failure of the expedition as due to Enos's defection, and the defection as due to the failure of "an express, despatched by Greene," to reach Arnold and apprise him of the situation. His words are:

"From the failure of this courier to reach Arnold may be traced Enos's defection and return, the failure of the Expedition . . . and the loss of British America to the American Union."

But Senter is the only one who states that an express was sent in search of Arnold, and he adds that the express was sent that Arnold "might be inform'd of the state of the army, many of whom were now entirely destitute of any sustenance." This means that he (if there was an express) went to see about supplies, not to say anything about Enos. In fact Senter indicates that he went before the council was held. But Humphrey, Topham, and, by implication, Thayer, say that Greene himself went forward to see Arnold. Evidently then, he did not send an express, and Senter misunderstood the matter. But Greene certainly went *before* the council, and for the purpose of securing provisions; and his failure to reach Arnold can have had no bearing in any way on Enos's defection, because when he went he did not know that Enos was intending to abandon the enterprise.

But let us concede to Mr. Codman (what is impossible, for Greene then knew that Arnold was out of reach) that an express was despatched *after* the council to notify Arnold of the threatened defection; would his overtaking Arnold have changed the result, as Mr. Codman holds? Arnold had a start of more than a day, and was pushing on with all possible speed. Consequently it would have taken a person under the most favourable

of fully four days. Six days at least
required to overtake it. By that tin
being below Fort Halifax (November 4
tainly would not have quitted the rest
on such a quest, and, if he had, could
the men to return then. An order fro
that point, would have had no effect;
reasoned that he did not understand th
was now quite impossible to march for
would Arnold have sent them a perem
vance, unless he had made sure there
to keep them alive,—this we know fro
he did give. In short, this lack of cor
Arnold, to which Mr. Codman attribu
of Enos, had really no bearing upon
defection of Enos caused the failure of
does not lie within the scope of the
inquire.

The fortunes of the returning party
terest for us. It is enough to say t
Cambridge. Enos was placed under
a court-martial, and honourably acquit
those whom he abandoned was present
commission was about to expire when
bridge, and it appeared necessary to
He was acquitted, therefore, on the tes

should not have retired. That feeling was very strong at the time. It is not within the province of this book to inquire how just it was.

Some of the testimony given at the trial must, however, be considered a little more in detail than in a previous note. Captain Williams testified that he let Bigelow have eight barrels of provisions (whereas Topham stated that Bigelow obtained one barrel, and Humphrey and Thayer that he obtained two), that he was *informed by Bigelow* (which implies that Williams was not present at the conference) that the "council of war" decided that Enos's whole force should return (whereas Humphrey, Thayer, Topham, and Senter state the contrary), and that the fourth division had but three days' provisions when they turned back (disproved by Squier's journal). Captain McCobb testified that it was "agreed" at the council "that the whole division under Col. Enos should return," and that "we left" Greene's division "with about five days' provision." Captain Scott confirmed McCobb. Lieutenant Hyde ("Hide") testified that "it was adjudged that there was about four days' provision for those who went forward, and we returned with 3." Lieutenant Buckmaster supported Hyde, and said that there were 150 men (Mr. Codman, p. 84, erroneously quotes him as saying "invalids") from other divisions with the fourth.

A few things may be said: 1. While these witnesses had a strong motive for colouring, if not misrepresenting, the facts, the journalists had little or none. 2. We cannot accept Williams's testimony as to the amount that he delivered to Bigelow; it is contradicted both by Humphrey, Topham, and Thayer, and by the fact that Greene was again in need on the 24th. 3. If, as the witnesses represent, it was agreed that the fourth division

should go back, why did the journalists represent it otherwise, and why were the army in general so bitter against Enos and his men? 4. Hyde disputes McCobb.

How did it happen that Enos, who possessed a disproportionate share of the provisions to start with, could not afford to be more liberal with Greene, even after keeping back an ample reserve for himself? Of course he had the sick and the stragglers to feed, and Lieutenant Hyde said there were 150 of them; but it was only on the 24th that invalids began to be sent back in large numbers. It would seem, then, as if he must have lost a good deal of provisions. But the rear division ought to have profited by the experience of those before it; and, according to Senter, it had a disproportionately large share of flour, which suffered less than bread (biscuit) because in better barrels. (Thayer tells us that on the 25th the fourth division was "overflowing in abundance of all sorts"; this must be taken with some allowance, but Squier noted on October 23d, "fare

He wrote me word that there were 25 days' provisions for all the divisions ahead." This seems trustworthy for we have Arnold's reply (October 15th) to a letter of Enos's written the day before. It is therefore clear that Arnold received a warning or at least a hint of danger at this time. There was little that he could do. He had (October 14th) ordered the surplus provisions sent up from below, but to wait for them might ruin the enterprise. So he evidently concluded to push on and take the chances, hoping that after all there would prove to be food enough on hand.

But what of the one hundred barrels or so of provisions that Arnold ordered sent on from Fort Halifax to the Great Carrying-place? They do not seem to have been sent. Squier records drawing four days' provisions at Fort Halifax, but gives no hint of getting supplies at the log house. So, if Arnold had retreated from Lake Megantic or the ponds, counting on obedience to his order, the results would have been disastrous.

Arnold himself did not hear of the defection of Enos for some time. Mr. Codman, to be sure, says (p. 85) that Stocking was with Arnold and Hanchet, and Stocking's journal indicates that he heard of the retreat on October 25th. But Mr. Codman is mistaken. October 28th Arnold supposed that Enos was advancing, for he recorded in his journal that he "Dispatched one Hull to Col Enos & the rear Division to Pilot them up." Mr. Codman was no doubt misled by assuming that Stocking was with Hanchet's advance party. He was not; as is clearly shown, for instance, by the fact that on October 28th Hanchet's party was on Lake Megantic at 6 A.M. (as we know from Arnold, who saw them there), while Stocking records that he was crossing the height of land that day.

XI: Pages 164–181.

1. Senter says that he went on in a birch canoe; but (1) Senter was not near him and did not overtake him for a long time; (2) Arnold abandoned his original birch canoe at Vassalborough for a pirogue, and we have no hint of his obtaining another; (3) under date of October 25th he wrote: "we were obliged to go on shore several times to Bail our Battoes," which certainly implies that he was not in a canoe, since a canoe would have required bailing quite as much; and (4) he wrote also that it was very difficult to keep the bateaux above water in the storm. How then could a canoe have lived? I feel sure from my own experience there that in such a storm as met him he could not have gone up the ponds in a birch canoe.

2. The purpose of building this dam was to facilitate logging operations. When a "drive" of logs is to be sent down Dead River, the gates of the dam are opened,



4. At this point is now situated a camp of the Megantic Fish and Game Corporation, which very courteously admitted me to its privileges.

5. This name does not come from our friend of Arnold's time, but from an Indian woman who lived and died (or was killed) on the tongue of land that separates Natanis and Round Ponds.

6. Arnold states that Long Pond lay north and south, but its direction is nearer to north-west and south-east — another instance of his fallibility in the matter of bearings. A strong wind down this lake produces a considerable "sea."

7. This is worthy, perhaps, of explanation. None of the maps that I was able to obtain showed such a pond as this, though Arnold's journal seemed to require it. The first time I visited the ground I had my guide follow the Stream, while I went by land at a varying distance. We both arrived at Horse Shoe Pond (out of which the Stream issues) without finding any pond, and my guide was sure there was none, else he would have known of it. I concluded that Arnold had underestimated the distance he went on the Stream, that the portage of twelve rods was required to get around some obstruction, that his next pond was Horse Shoe Pond, and that as I went on I should discover some explanation of his enumerating one more pond than Nature seemed able to afford. This explanation, however, I did not find; when I had examined the whole ground I had to admit that either the journal was incorrect, or I had failed to discover a sheet of water that Arnold crossed. In favour of the first alternative was the fact that Meigs mentioned one pond less than Arnold; but it is far easier to omit an item than to insert one that does not exist, and Arnold's journal bore many marks of carefulness.

It was not convenient for me to retrace my steps at that time, but I sent my guide back to reinspect the locality. He found nothing, and the guides and sportsmen with whom I talked and corresponded knew nothing of the missing pond, though some among them had been tramping over the region for many years. Finally I determined to make a fuller investigation myself, and at length I found the object of my search. Then I understood why it was unknown. It lies parallel and very close to the Stream, separated from it only by a steep ridge from fifteen to forty feet high, which sinks into a piece of wet ground perhaps ten rods wide near the lower end. Here is the outlet of the pond into the Stream; but, as the pond drains only a basin a little larger than itself, there is no overflow except in the spring or after rains. No outlet-channel exists, and, as the low ground is covered thickly with alders, there is no reason why a passer-by on the Stream should suspect the existence of a pond at that point.



8. My description is of course based entirely on present conditions. The pond is probably about thirty rods wide in the middle, as Arnold said.

9. Montresor evidently considered this outlet the main stream, for he wrote: "Here [at the short portage] the river turns off to the [gap in MS.] although a rivulet [*i.e.*, Horse Shoe Stream] which falls into it here springs from lakes I have yet to mention [*i. e.*, Horse Shoe, Mud, and Arnold Ponds]." This passage was inexplicable to me for a long time, but the explanation is simple. Hathan Stream expands itself into a sort of lagoon just before it empties into Horse Shoe Stream, and so appears to be the main channel.

10. Arnold called the direction of this portage W. 35° N. The ridge, if one may judge from present indications, was almost a natural highway. It is quite sharp and dry, and the trees probably did not stand near together. It is evidently a thoroughfare for the deer at present, and one finds there a well-marked path made by them.

11. Montresor called Horse Shoe Pond "about 700 yards long and 270 in breadth." He mentions "leaving the brook, which has a cascade, on our right hand," as he set out for the next pond; and this fits Horse Shoe Pond exactly.

12. The present trail from Horse Shoe Pond to Mud Pond runs in about the same direction as the trail of 1775. The distance was called five hundred yards by Montresor, seventy-four rods (that is, 407 yards) by Arnold, and about five hundred yards by myself and guide.

13. Of Mud Pond Montresor says: "This is much smaller [than Horse Shoe Pond], its form very regular, the shore rocky." This is unmistakable. Big boulders

are thickly set along parts of the shore. In a single group one may count thirty. This is true of no other pond in the region.

14. According to Arnold this portage was only forty-four rods (that is, 242 yards) in length. The present path is about 550 yards long. Evidently Arnold went by another trail. As nearly as one can judge, he probably followed the brook which connects the two ponds. The ponds appear to be nearest each other there, and the distance that Arnold gives (forty-four rods) may well have been correct for that route, it seems to me. Montresor seems to confirm this surmise, for he says that he entered Arnold Pond "nigh the source of the brook [connecting it with Mud Pond]." He also calls it "a short portage" which implies that it was short in comparison with the previous one of five hundred yards.

An expert in such matters called my attention to what seemed a line of lighter foliage running from Arnold

ing to the Coast and Geodetic Survey, I was favoured with the following letter:

"We have no data for the precise locality 'Dead River'; however, according to the information we have on file for various places in the vicinity of Portland, we find that the needle pointed on the average in October, 1775, $8\frac{1}{10}°$ West of North, and that at the present time it would point on an average $14\frac{5}{10}°$ West of North." (August, 1901.)

It will be noted that I have here accepted Arnold's bearings, which have proved erroneous in certain other places; but I accepted them only as hypothetical, until they seemed to be proved correct. Further, since this was a well-known portage, it is easy to believe that the bearings had been carefully determined, and that Arnold was not dependent for them on his own compass or his own guess.

17. Morison: "Attempts were made to trail them over" (Oct. 27th). What he meant by "trail" may be seen from another passage (October 25th): "It was a magnificent spectacle to behold a long line of boats trailed up an almost impassible river by their mooring ropes, by men," etc. A sufficient reason why we find no other mention of such an attempt may be that the attempt failed; or, even if the boats went by water a little way, this was as nothing compared with the terrible portage that remained, and so did not seem worthy of mention.

18. There are some additional arguments of uncertain value. The fact that the pond, the river, and a mountain overlooking the pond all bear the name Arnold might appear significant; but we do not know when or by whom the names were given, and there can have been no real tradition about it, since there were no inhabitants hereabouts. Still, President Allen (No. 106, i., p. 395, note)

knew in 1831 of the name Arnold River (in 1775 it was called the Seven Mile Stream.) Stories are told of the finding of boats and the discovery of a great quantity of rotting oars leaning against a tree; but the finders of such things are mostly not within the reach of questions now. Somewhat more valuable is the statement of a man over eighty-five years old, reported to me by one of my guides, that he came upon the irons of a lot of bateau poles on the shore of Mud Pond near the outlet, and that when he was first there, as a boy, it could be seen that men had camped on the spot many years before.

A Boston gentleman has told me of finding a bayonet in a spring north-west of Arnold Pond.

19. See No. 106, i., p. 395, note. President Allen was of the opinion, as already mentioned, that what Steele's party took for the Chaudière (*i. e.*, Arnold River) was Spider River.

20. Mr. Codman does not undertake to throw any

tific after all. There was another objection: the data given us by Arnold are not scientific. The directions of his portages can only have been approximations, for a trail is never straight for long. The distances by pond and stream were only estimates. Besides, assuming that his estimates were exactly correct, we should not be greatly helped, for we have often no means of knowing precisely where he went between two points. It seemed to me, as already suggested, that perhaps after all the best results might come from pursuing his method,—*i.e.*, making as careful estimates as possible. Of course when the region is cleared, if that day ever comes, it may be possible to do better than can be done at present.

23. One of Getchell and Berry's reconnoitring party.

24. We do not know at precisely what time these events occurred, but apparently it was at the close of the day. It may be supposed that Steele's and Church's men were helping clear the path over the Boundary Portage.

25. Arnold wrote: "The Carrying-places from lake to lake are so many and difficult, that I think the whole will get forward much sooner by leaving all the batteaux. If there are any people sick you will perhaps be under a necessity of bring on some batteaux." This was addressed to "Col's. Green, Enos and the Captains in the rear [portion] of the detachment."

Arnold's ground for issuing the order was a report from Hanchet (see Arnold's letter of October 27th just mentioned) that the "roads" through the woods (around the lakes) were well spotted and preferable to the water. This shows that Steele and Church's party had done a great deal of work. Evidently Hanchet had either

gone by land all the way, or had obtained his information from this party. (By "spotted" Arnold meant "blazed.")

XII: Pages 182–195.

1. Mr. Codman states (No. 28, p. 88) that at this time Arnold had crossed the height of land, and "was paddling rapidly down the Chaudière Lake"; but Arnold says, under the date of October 27th: "At 4 P.M. we entered the Chaudeire Pond."

2. Arnold met the two lieutenants on Arnold River about noon on the 27th, after overtaking their men the previous day, apparently at evening. In his letter written on the morning of the 27th Arnold said: "Lieut. Steele has gone over the pond. His party are here." This evidently means that Steele's men so reported.

3. Mr. Codman states (p. 88) that at this time Captain Hanchet was "marching around the lake [Lake Megantic] on its eastern shore"; but Arnold says: (1) that

should now be separated by about the whole length of the Chain of Ponds.

5. Mr. Codman states (p. 88) that at this time Enos "was beginning his retreat"; but according to Squier, the only journalist in that division, the retrograde movement began the previous day (October 25th) at 2 P.M.

6. The number of men lost between this point and Quebec seems to have been quite small.

7. On reaching Quebec Arnold had about six hundred and seventy-five men (Arnold's letter to Washington, December 5th); deducting the advance parties and allowing for a few deaths, we have about six hundred.

8. The reader is referred to the map on page 171. This is based largely on my own observations, but, though not scientifically accurate, is probably correct enough for the present purpose. The bearings were taken with a good pocket compass. Distances I measured only by traversing them and counting paces, or noting the time, or both. Experience gives one a fair judgment as to the rate of a walk. My guides rendered material assistance in this work, for they are accustomed to such reckoning. I also got the best information I could from other reliable guides. But in this direction one has to be extremely cautious. An intelligent and experienced guide, while often surprisingly accurate about the things he is familiar with, may not draw the line between them and what he does not know. Guides are liable to accept and represent as knowledge what they have only heard from others of their guild, and it is not at all easy for them to confess, particularly to an employer, that they are in ignorance about any such matter. I tried in every suggested quarter to find exact data, but obtained little. A prime difficulty lies in the fact that the country is all wooded. One cannot see far

along a trail for instance; and in the course of a mile one has to take the bearings forty times, perhaps, and strike an average. The various parts of my map, based on many independent data, came together with a consistency that rather surprised me.

9. Arnold's journal is always excepted in this chapter, of course.

10. It may appear singular, but it is a fact that no guide with whom I talked knew where the outlet of Lower Hathan Bog ran. I had to follow the outlet all the way down through about a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters of alder swamp to find its connection.

11. The question of the outlet of Crosby Pond is an interesting one; but, as it did not directly concern me, I did not follow it to a conclusion. I found no evidence of outlet except what is suggested in the text. Of course the overflow is little or nothing, except in spring or after a heavy rain, for the pond has but a very small drainage

born's errors are reproduced and several errors are added. The first are the mistakes as to the sizes of the ponds, statements that there was a strait half a mile long between Long Pond and Round Pond (not supported by Arnold, Meigs, or the fact), that the pond next after Round Pond was half a mile over (not supported by Arnold, Meigs, or the fact), and that there were only three ponds beyond Round Pond, whereas Arnold and the facts prove that there were four. The errors that he adds are the statement that the passage between Lower Pond and Bag Pond was two rods long (both Dearborn and Meigs, our only authorities, say four rods), the omission of one pond of the "chain," so that two straits join (his words are: "They passed . . . to a narrow gut two rods over, then poled up a narrow strait," etc.; both Meigs and Dearborn, as well as Arnold, mention the pond omitted by Mr. Codman), the statement that the "narrow tortuous gut" (Horse Shoe Stream) was "3 or 4 miles in length," whereas it is no doubt nearly or quite six, and the statement that "Meigs's men" encamped at the fifteen-rod portage, whereas Meigs, describing "our" movements, indicates that his men crossed Lost Pond and encamped "on the northwest side, upon a high hill, which is a carrying place." Mr. Codman does not attempt to make his account fit the topography of the region, which would evidently have been impossible; neither does he deal with statements differing from Dearborn's. He calls the Boundary Portage four and one-half miles long without comment, whereas, according to the measure, it was not quite four and a quarter.

Both Dearborn and Meigs make the strait between Bag Pond and Long Pond one and one-half miles long. Arnold says "half a mile," which is far more reasonable.

15. It is not certain that the men marched on this

side; but they had been on this side below, and the nature of the ground made it easier to continue there.

16. This carry is to my mind somewhat doubtful. Meigs and Dearborn, the only two (besides Arnold) who give a fairly good account here, do not mention it. Thayer and Humphrey refer to it distinctly; and "Provincial," Haskell, and Tolman seem to allude confusedly to it. Topham's record is somewhat mixed. It may be that some of the boatmen poled up the swift, narrow, crooked stream between Bag Pond and Long Pond, while others preferred to carry. According to Arnold, the stream was half a mile in length, and we can believe him; but the carry may not have been more than half as long, or the stream may have been good a part of the way.

17. See Chapter XI., note 25. But the letter was addressed to the second and fourth divisions.

18. Mr. Codman (p. 77) says he was "unwilling to

and obtained their officers' consent to let them remain there, preferring to march by land and get on without tents. They then returned to them the next morning, took their guns out of the bateaux, and marched. This appears to be the only way to harmonise his statements (October 27th and 28th); but his account does not seem quite correct here (note his distances for October 28–30).

20. Meigs does not mention giving such orders, and the reference may be to Arnold's letter. The men seem to have regarded the orders as the result of a conference of the officers. Stocking says, "It was resolved"; Tolman, "It was agreed." Such a conference may have been held, and Dearborn, being in the rear of the division, may have received its conclusions as "orders."

Mr. Codman says (p. 79): "The bateaux of Meigs's Division were hauled up . . . and all but six for each company abandoned"; but this is evidently based on a misreading of a passage in Stocking's journal: "It was resolved to leave here most of our batteaus, which had already been reduced from 16 to 6 for each company—but 6, I think, were carried from this place." This means that most of the six which each company still had were left behind. But, as pointed out (Chapter V., note 26), this passage is not trustworthy.

The story of the damaged powder also is from Stocking. In itself it is perfectly credible, but we cannot positively say to how large a part or to what part of the detachment it applies.

21. Ward seems to have camped at the beginning of the portage. Dearborn mentions at this point "one Mr. Ayres, the Capt. of our Pioneers," who agreed to become his travelling companion. It may safely be assumed, I think, that Mr. Ayres was a captain only in the sense of being at the head of this gang. The pioneers

belonged to Meigs's division (see his journal, October 19th), but a civilian, if a good woodsman, was the proper kind of a person to direct them.

22. The position of this division seems to be fixed by the mention in Topham's, Humphrey's, and Thayer's journals of a pond beyond a carry three-quarters of a mile long. This would seem clearly to be Horse Shoe Pond, especially as Topham adds that the river ran through it,—a fact that distinguished it sharply from Lost Pond, which they had just left. Something is wrong, however, with these journals here. They mention on the 28th three portages and three ponds before the Boundary Carrying-place was reached, which is inconsistent with the record of the previous day.

Here must be considered the surprising fact that "Provincial" and Tolman give the length of the carry just before the last pond as fifteen rods, and Morison as sixteen. It appears beyond doubt that this is erroneous. Possibly it is a confused recollection of the distance

met Lt's. Steel and Church." And in his journal he wrote: "On this stream we met Lieut[t] Steel and Church with one Jakins, whom I had sometime since sent down to the French inhabitants." It would appear that the meeting took place just after Arnold "entered" the river. How did Steele and Church happen to be there? Steele had been ordered to go down the Chaudière River "near the Inhabitants, & examine the falls, portages, &c., & return to the [Chaudière] Pond as soon as Possible." He would not be at all likely to go alone on such a mission, for the danger of accidents was great; and we may infer that he took Church with him. Jakins, called also Jackquith, was probably a member of the Huguenot family Jaquin (Anglicised as Jaqueen and Jakin) that settled in Pownalborough (see Chap. VIII., note 35).

2. This letter, dated "Chaudiere River, 27th Oct. 1775," must have been carried along by Arnold and sent back the next morning, for (1) a postscript adds information about the land where the river empties into the lake; (2) the letter was sent by Hull, who, according to Arnold's journal, was sent on the 28th; and (3) Hull carried also a letter for Washington written after Arnold's arrival at the lake.

3. This letter illustrates Arnold's indifference about rigid accuracy. It was dated "Chaudiere Pond, 27th Oct. 1775," but according to the journal was written (was it ante-dated to give Washington a false impression?) on the 28th. It said: "I have this minute arrived here with 70 men [counting Hanchet's evidently], and met a person on his return, whom I sent down . . . to the French inhabitants." But this "person" appears to have been met near the meadows on Arnold River.

of Steele's party were " going forward.'

6. Mr. Codman's account of Hanche 27th (p. 92) was sure to be erroneous sumed that Stocking was with him (p fore followed Stocking's journal. H had a picked company (Chap. X., note journal represents him as not crossing t until the 28th.

7. Arnold's estimate. These facts there must have been deep water to t chet's men, else they could have follo the lake around; (2) that men could edge of the lake, for Arnold, two mil not have seen Hanchet's party had it b from the shore, and Arnold says the covered " on a *Point* of low Land "; (3) tered the lake a considerable distance v where Hanchet was, for it was two mil wam to this place (which was on the *ea* lake), while it was three miles to the poi entered the lake; and (4) that if Hanch over the height of land it was not now i With reference to (3) it must be concl miscalculated a little, as was very nat miles may have been two and one-half.

How could Arnold " discover " Han

the water's edge would have been visible, if something drew attention to the spot where they were.

8. Isaac Hull, one of Getchell and Berry's scouting party.

9. Arnold seems to have laid emphasis on the size of his party, for he mentions the number of his men and boats in his journal, in the letter to his officers, and in his letter to Washington. Where did he get his men and boats? According to Mr. Codman (p. 88) Arnold had them on the eastern side of the mountains; but (1) why, then, does he suddenly begin on the 27th and 28th to talk about his determination to proceed "with 4 batteaux and 15 men"? This emphasis suggests change; there is no reason to suppose that he *reduced* the size of his company; hence the suggestion is that he added to it. (2) We know that he here took on two or three men, viz., Steele and Church, and probably Jaquin. And (3) apparently he took others from Hanchet on the morning of the 28th, for Hanchet (see Arnold's journal) had sixty men on the 27th (Mr. Codman, on p. 92, says fifty-five, but Arnold's figures are sixty), and on the 28th proceeded with only fifty-five. One was left behind because out of provisions, and Hull was sent back as messenger and guide, so that Arnold seems to have taken three. In all, then, he added five or probably six to his party here. And as he then had only fifteen, his original company was probably nine, besides himself and Oswald. If this conclusion is correct, he had with him at the bark house Hanchet's sixty men, his own original nine, Steele, Church, and Jaquin—total, seventy-two, in round numbers seventy, as he wrote Washington. This tallies with another way of figuring: Hanchet left the bark house with fifty-five and he with fifteen; Hull went back, and one man remained at the wigwam—total, seventy-two.

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to give him a place of honour as well as the best chance of safety. But if the Colonel, after doing so, took away his boat and some of his best men in order to deprive him of the glory of being first at the settlements and of sending back provisions to save the army,—that would have been a natural cause of complaint.

This would explain why Arnold wrote that he was "determined" to proceed with four bateaux and fifteen men; an expression that suggests opposition.

Where now did Arnold obtain his canoe? See Chapter XIV., note 1.

10. Senter says that he arrived at the meadows by Arnold River at 4 P.M. on the 27th, and *found* there not only Morgan but "all the advanced party, saving Col. Arnold, &c." But "advanced party" must mean simply "leading troops," for (1) by sunset on that day Hanchet and his men had made the extremely tedious and slow march of six miles to Lake Megantic; (2) two companies of musketmen went on from the meadows before four o'clock, as Humphrey, Thayer, and Topham show ("at 4 o'clock an express came from Col. Arnold . . . two companies of musquetry are gone forward."—Thayer); and, in fact (3), as we shall find, not only two but four companies had gone on.

11. Arnold himself did not receive news that Enos had returned until after the evening of the 27th, for at that time, as we have found, he wrote Enos that he hoped to see him soon in Quebec. Mr. Codman is therefore in error when he implies that Arnold knew of it on the 25th by quoting (p. 85) Stocking's record of the news under that date, and stating that he was with Arnold at the time.

12. We are told that the officers resigned to the men their share of the pork, but this was not true in every

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companies. It is rather surprisin
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their accounts discover that all did
statements are: Henry, 5 pints; "P
son, 4 pints; Humphrey, 5 pints flou
Thayer, 7 pints; Topham, 1 pint flou
(doubtless a slip); Stocking, 4 pound
pork (evidently a slip); Senter, 5
perly divisible as it would not have
per man); Goodrich's men (accord
4½ pints flour and 12 ounces pork;
and 4 ounces pork. These inequali
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the boats) in different ways: a sort

a route that Arnold strongly condemned; but they would not have moved without drawing rations.

14. Did Smith's company go down the river? According to Henry's account, it seems quite clearly to have done so; and here the evidence is not a detail, about which he would very likely err, but certain large features of his experience, which he could not have invented unconsciously. Besides, it is impossible to see how Smith came to occupy the advanced position that we find him in later, if he did not follow this route. In the negative appears this remark from Humphrey, repeated by Thayer: "two companies of The muskettry are gone forward but the 3 rifle Companies staid with us." These words come after the mention of Arnold's letter. But (1), as Morgan and Hendricks are admitted to have passed the night on or near the meadows, Humphrey may simply have taken it for granted that Smith did the same, and (2) Smith's company was an unruly one, and may have been determined to go down the apparently easy route by the river in spite of Arnold's warning. It is noticeable that Topham omitted the words quoted above from Humphrey.

What shall we say of Ward? At first sight his company would not seem to have set out at this time. Tolman appears to indicate that the march began the next day, and Haskell speaks of going six miles that next day; but (1) Tolman's account is completely muddled here, and (2) Haskell's account of the 28th indicates that he went beyond the meadows, and, while the direct distance from the meadows to the pond was only six miles, no one following the river could reach the lake without travelling much farther. The evidence that Ward's company marched this way is: (1) the omission of all reference to Arnold's letter and the news from

quarters miles down Arnold River
that day; (3) Haskell's statement tl
Megantic and went the whole lengt
and (4) Tolman's statements that ir
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a boat. See also note 22.

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guides for the army; but only one is
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Jaquin, and made his own inference.

16. Senter states that several c
down by the river, and then passed

(2) such an attempt would have plunged the men into a dreadful swamp at the lower end of Annance River; and (3) the men would have seen that such a course would place a long lake between them and their comrades, besides unknown difficulties that might make reunion impossible. As for (1), Senter says that Greene and "most of his officers" went by the easterly route, and this might seem to exclude the men; but it is very common to mean troops, as well as their commander, when the commander and officers are mentioned. As the companies marched singly in most cases, Hubbard may have been with this part of the army without Senter's knowing it, for Senter was in the fore with Greene. Probably Senter wrote merely from hearsay. There is no likelihood that Hubbard flew off at a tangent alone (see note 25). With reference to Hanchet's company (not his advance party) it should be added that we have no information unless we accept Stocking; but, as Stocking's account seems quite independent here, we may probably infer that it represents his own experiences.

We know that Greene and Bigelow went back to the high ground, for Meigs tells us of paying them money there. For the same reason we know that Getchell and Berry had accompanied the army to this point.

17. The proofs that they came to or near the shore are: (1) Hanchett's men did this (see note 7), Goodrich's men could go as far as Hanchet's, and they were just as anxious to do so; and (2) Dearborn says, "When we *Came to the Pond*, I found Cap^{t} Goodrich's Company, who Could not proceed by reason of finding a River which leads into the Pond"; and also, "going into the Pond and round an Island, where Cap^{t} Goodrich was with Some of his Men who had Waded on, He informed

... the second river they skirt
but (1) Henry's narrative is as u
to details,—*e.g.*, he places this ev
whereas we know from Dearbor
occurred on October 28th, and (
taken to imply only that the rive
distance from the lake; the men
little to make the passage more
the existence of the two rivers, no
cited. Dearborn, Melvin, and He
phatic upon that point. Dearbo
"after we had got them over th
marched above 50 Rod before w
River." Mr. Codman is therefore
(p. 97) that the men were stopped i
map) where Arnold River meets
Lake, for (1) Arnold could not
men there, (2) men in that place
have come "to the Pond," for the
quarters of a mile below, and (3)
necessary to cross only one stream,

18. Melvin's language seems a
His words are: "Being Sunday:
much fatigue and loss of time, in
then waded to another river, about
which we crossed last night." (
stated that Melvin went in a canoe,
that his narrative does two things: it
ences and also those of the compan

Dead, that the men crossed Saturday evening; but it could be considered the same waterway, and by him it naturally would have been.

19. This is another proof that the men with Hanchet were not his own company, as Mr. Codman supposes, but a picked body. Other proofs are: (1) Stocking, a member of Hanchet's company, was not with his advanced party, as already pointed out, and (2) we read that when the general distribution of provisions took place they were divided among ten companies; therefore the organization of Hanchet's company must have been preserved (see note 6 and Chap. X., note 19). The quoted words are from Dearborn.

20. Apparently Morgan's men did not appropriate all of Melvin's supplies, for he speaks of using up the last on November 1st. Mr. Codman (p. 94) represents Morgan as setting out before Smith, but certainly he reached the lake later than Smith's bateau. If he set out first why did he not arrive first? Mr. Codman speaks (p. 94) of Smith's men as tramping "along the east bank of the river" and having to go in single file because "the country was mountainous"; but the land beside the river, like all flood-plains, is very low and very flat. He also (p. 94) says that Smith began his march October 30th; but this is an error due to relying on Henry.

21. According to Henry (p. 65) Smith's men fell into a difficulty not mentioned by the others, a tract of water, covered with ice, three-fourths of a mile across. Here two women who had followed their husbands, Mrs. Sergeant Grier and Mrs. Warner, became conspicuous,—the former for lifting her skirts and wading through the water, the latter for going back to her sick husband and lingering with him to give assistance. I have tried in vain to

only a few rods wide. My conclu
of water is that it was a temporary
higher along the river bank than aw
had overflowed the swamps, no doul
flood; and the overflow could not
ground rapidly.

22. That Ward's company was th
which marched down the river app
that (1) this company is not mentio
Melvin as arriving, though both H
indicate that it went this way; (2)
shows that by the time he came to
ments had been made to transport m
and (3) Tolman indicates the sam
narrative is confused.

Mr. Codman (p. 96) states that "
(*i.e.*, Ward's) went with Meigs. This
it is evident that some troops went w
Codman held erroneously that Hanch
with him. These points have been s
(notes 6, 14, and 19)

23. Mr. Codman evidently beli
division did not join the rest at the
of it (p. 101) as going into camp "or
and waiting "all day" for the rear to c
cannot have waited "all day," for th
Horse Shoe Pond since morning; (2
"came to a small rivulet," evidently
Topham writes "proceeded close to

he was with the rest of the army, so that, as we know that most of the army went to the meadows, we may be sure that he did; and (5) Greene's men, it would seem, must have shared provisions with the rest; for otherwise, having had a good supply of pork on October 25th, they would have had far more than they did on the afternoon of October 28th (see Chap. X., note 33).

As a result of this mistake, Mr. Codman finds it necessary (p. 93) to suppose that Arnold may have written two "similar" letters, one of which went to the meadows and the other to Greene on the high ground; but (1) there is no authority for this; and (2) is it conceivable that Arnold, in his haste, would write a second letter when the first one was directed "To the Field officers & captains in the detachment," and contained these words: "N.B. To be sent on, that the whole may see it"?

24. Mr. Codman (p. 101) confines the distribution to Greene's division and some of Meigs's men: but Thayer's statement quoted above and the statements of nearly all the journalists are against this view, and there is nothing to support it.

25. Topham went back a mile, "turned into the woods and encamped"; Thayer went three miles; Meigs "marched back upon the height & encamped." According to Mr. Codman (p. 94), Hendricks's men went down the river like Smith's; but that seems hardly possible. To be sure "Provincial" and Morison say nothing about retiring to the high ground Saturday evening; but, as one of them speaks of setting out the next morning through woods, and the other tells of going over mountains, it is evident they did not go down beside the river. Neither journal supports the theory that the company marched by the stream; and as both mention Arnold's

Mr. Codman expresses the opinio
tion of the army went around by th
lake. In this he follows Senter, wh
four companies as doing so. Obj
have already been presented (note 1
a position to offer more. What
route? Not Goodrich's, Dearborn'
Morgan's, for we have followed the
they some of the companies that ca
on the high ground? Then they
morning to the low ground which
obedience to Arnold's orders, and
route that he had warned them a
marsh on the lower Annance nobo
struck off alone into wilds they were
with for a destination they had no
able to reach by that route, and alo
of the lake to that which they had
take; and all this in preference to
following a guide that Arnold had se
is not all. The journals of Stock
"Provincial" show that their comp
the western route. Topham's and T
dicate that they themselves did not,
their men imply that their companie
besides which it is inconceivable tha

thrown. Senter was perhaps thinking of the companies that went down the river, whose further course he very likely did not know.

26. Hull, the bearer of Arnold's letter. He was sent to pilot up the rear, and this group of companies constituted the rear.

27. Mr. Codman says (p. 103) of Greene's movement: "The division passed quickly down the Seven Mile stream [*i. e.*, Arnold River]"; but (1) that was just what Arnold had told them not to do; (2) it was just what they had moved back from the river to avoid doing, and (3) it was just what the accounts indicate with perfect clearness that they did not do.

28. They cannot have gone "north and by east," as Arnold suggested. It seems plain that the five companies followed about the same route, for (1) they were all acting in obedience to the same directions of their commander; (2) they all set out to follow the guide sent by him, and had no other; (3) they all had nearly or exactly the same point of departure; (4) they all had the same destination in view; (5) as comrades in a wilderness, they would naturally wish to keep in touch; (6) it was easy to follow the same route, even though not in one body, for the snow indicated where the forward party had gone; (7) a comparison of the accounts shows striking similarities and nothing inconsistent with this view; (8) the nature of the ground, added to the facts that we are sure of, makes it almost certain that they pursued substantially the same route: (*a*) they were sure to strike either Rush Lake swamp or a brook running north-west into it; if they struck the brook they would infer (especially if they had Montresor's map) that it led into Lake Megantic, and would be likely to follow it; in both cases the result would be the same. (*b*) They

of Spider Lake, and the length of tl
ence that they did this. (9) Eacl
features that fit this route peculiarly
small pond, and then a stream leadin
going *south* in order to find a place
(Spider River); Topham: going N.
had been forded; Meigs: marching
night along Nepiss Lake.

Mr. Codman says (p. 101) that G
marched on October 28th over the
(which in fact they left on the 27th),
of land and camped; (2) that they
for stragglers, etc.; (3) that "the nex
vance was promptly begun" (p. 103
daylight of the 29th we [*i. e.*, they] st
11 o'clock sank into the fatal spruce a
tween the Seven Mile Stream [Arnold
Lake" (p. 103). In other words, he
work out of the events of two. I ha
to point out all the errors in this part

29. The brook is not mentioned i
they may have headed so as not to c
they came to Rush Lake; but this dc
able.

30. Mr. Codman says (p. 103) t
Spider Lake was not crossed because



Lake drains but a small area; (*b*) the effects of the storm of October 19–21 had no doubt passed; (*c*) since that storm, snow only had fallen and had not melted, and (*a*) the ground was frozen. The water in the outlet must have been less than normal. Under normal conditions the stream is rather wide for a brook, but very shallow,—a small boy can wade it.

31. Meigs found a place where Indians had camped; no one else alludes to such a spot. Thayer mentions getting a partridge for supper.

32. Mr. Codman says (p. 104) there was "no cooking to do," and represents the men as making all their flour into cakes before starting (p. 102). He may have relied on Henry (p. 62), but on p. 65 Henry mentions cooking later. Thayer says that "daily" the flour was mixed with water and laid "on the coals to heat a little" as follows: a gill for breakfast, two gills for dinner, and a gill for supper; and Morison speaks of making such cakes this particular day. Senter says under date of November 1st that they had water stiffened with flour, which shows that flour was still carried. It must surely have been easier to transport three to five pints of flour than the same stuff in the form of half-baked cakes.

33. The name is not given in the journals, but this must have been the river. It is formed of streams that rise on the slopes of the height of land, flows northwestwardly, and enters the eastern end of Spider Lake.

34. One feels amused at first to find the men thinking of going around Spider River, but probably the sluggish water that they found in it near the lake suggested that it was only a lagoon or "bog." Indeed, Senter intimates as much.

35. We cannot identify this. What is called Moose Hill is probably too far away.

37. It is not certain that all cam

XIV: PAGES 217–

1. We have inquired where Arnc and bateaux. Whence came the c man's narrative (No. 28, p. 92) it s the Boundary Portage. But Arnold until after he reached the bark hou that he "rowed," not *paddled*, to beyond it he "paddled." So it s inference that the canoe was found t XI., note 1. Dearborn's journal shc lay up canoes in that region. He fo

2. According to No. 37, 1092 feet have been unable to find any relia length of the river. The lake is coi teen miles long, but ten would be near thought he paddled thirteen miles o but probably his voyage was less tha the direction as north by east, but north.

3. I was obliged to make the tr from Maine who had never seen the the best canoe to be obtained with took all possible care, yet we had sev

4. Mr. Codman (p. 108) represent

vast tract of overflowed forest"; but (1), as suggested in note 30, on Chapter XIII., the effect of the rains of October 19–21 had no doubt passed; (2) the banks of the river are too steep, much of the way, to allow such a width of water, except during an extraordinary flood; (3) such a flood would have been more white than black; and (4) Arnold's statement that the river was twenty rods wide the next day intimates that it seemed even less on the first day, for it broadens rapidly. Moreover, we find proof in the journals that the Chaudière was not in a state of flood at this time, for we read in Henry's account how men dug roots out of a sand beach exposed by the lowness of the stream, and his description is so detailed that we can hardly think of rejecting it. Mr. Codman himself accepts it, though it contradicts his theory of a flood. Meigs says the river was "very shallow" in places. Dearborn found it "Shole."

The question of the state of the river is decidedly important, for the water, if as high as Mr. Codman represents, would have added immensely to the difficulties of the army by covering lowlands, changing brooks to deep inlets, and sometimes burying the trail. See note 7.

5. It seems quite possible to identify this place by the severity of the rapids, the correspondence of the river above and below with Arnold's description, and its estimated distance from the lake. The point is certainly a dangerous one. My guide was able to avoid the rocks only by sending the canoe into the wildest of the water. Sitting in the stern, he was unable to see the bow for a few seconds,—it was so buried in the waves. I sat as close as possible to the prow, and great quantities of the water were thrown to right and left by my body; but, in spite of this, the canoe was barely able to float by the time we got through. This place is called by some

the Devil's Rapids. It is safe to say that had Arnold's party undertaken to pass it in their bateaux the consequences would have been serious. According to reports, more men than one have been drowned there. Mr. Codman (p. 109) says that Arnold went twenty miles before an accident occurred, but Arnold's journal states that his mishap was "ab^{t} 15 miles" from the lake. Mr. Codman also remarks (p. 109) that the men "used their poles and paddles where they could, but it was seldom"; but I feel very sure that they were using pole or paddle or oar all the time. It was certainly possible to do so, for my canoeman did.

Mr. Codman (opposite p. 110) gives a picture of what are named the Great Falls, to show the place where Arnold met with this mishap, and his text (p. 110) concurs; but Arnold's journal indicates unmistakably that the disaster occurred nearly sixty miles, by the river, above these falls. Besides, it is easy to recognise the Great Falls later, in their proper place, in his journal.



It would appear that while three of Arnold's boats were "staved," one of these continued to be usable. To be sure, in his letter of November 27th, he speaks of setting out with five bateaux, but apparently he forgot at the moment that one of his five boats was a canoe.

6. Arnold adds: "for 5 days,"—a slip somewhere, for he had expected to reach the settlements on the 30th and actually did so. Arnold, in a letter dated November 27th, speaks of going on from this point with five men. This would imply that the rest walked. His journal says, in a blind way, "3 men." As he did not count himself nor Oswald usually, this might perhaps be interpreted as equivalent to the statement in his letter. In a letter to Washington, November 8th, he speaks of going on with only six men after his first shipwreck, but this may have been a slip of the memory. When these letters were written, Arnold's mind was full of other concerns, and errors are not surprising.

7. There is a break in the journal just here, but this appears to be the meaning. According to our estimates, the Chaudière is 60 feet wide below the dam, 125 feet wide below the Devil's Rapids, 200 feet wide thirty miles below the dam, and then as much as 400 feet wide in many places long before the Du Loup comes in. The water is swift almost all the way, and the rapids could not be numbered. Once we estimated there were about four miles of nearly continuous white water.

I have tried in every way I could think of to obtain reliable information about distances on the upper Chaudière. There is a government map (1898), but it cannot be called wholly correct. This is due very largely, perhaps, to the fact that it follows the older maps of the geological survey. Roads do not appear where they now run, and of course the windings of the river have not

been accurately drawn. The French people along the banks are not intelligent and precise. Figures from the most reliable persons to be found do not always agree. Fortunately, nothing hinges upon an exact knowledge of the distances here, though it would be satisfactory to have it.

8. Arnold's account makes it plain that, as stated in the text, he refers here to the Great and Lesser Falls. The portage of a half-mile was necessary in order to leave the river before entering some rapids which are above the falls, and far enough above them to avoid having to climb the bluff, which here becomes very high and steep. According to a local story, Arnold was capsized between the rapids and the Great Falls, and lost his money-box as well as other things; but the story is valueless and every way improbable. Henry, recalling events over thirty years after they occurred and vaguely remembering these falls, erroneously associated them with Arnold's mishap on the 28th.



"SARTIGAN, Oct. 31, 1775.

"GENTLEMEN—

"I have now sent forward for the use of the detachment 5 bbls. and 2 tierces and 500 lbs. of flour by Lt. Church, Mr. Barrin and 8 Frenchmen, and shall immediately forward on more as far as the falls. Those who have provisions to reach the falls will let this pass on for the rear; and those who want, will take sparingly as possible, that the whole may meet with relief. The inhabitants received us kindly, and appear friendly in offering us provisions, &c. Pray make all possible despatch.

"I am Gent. your's &c.

"B. ARNOLD."

"Officers of the Detachment."

Mr. Codman (p. 111) speaks of Arnold as "purchasing supplies" "two days after leaving Lake Chaudière"; but he was more than two and a half days on the river.

11. At this point, for obvious reasons, the journals become peculiarly unsatisfactory. For example, Tolman writes, November 1st, "we having been four days without any provisions"; but as the division took place late on October 28th, this appears incredible. Stocking says that "many" of his company had been without food for five days on the morning of November 2d; but that is impossible, for he records that all shared in the division of October 28th. Senter states (November 1st) that "several had been entirely destitute of either meat or bread for *many days*." Dearborn mentions two dogs eaten on November 1st. One of them belonged to him. But Melvin, of his company, puts these incidents on October 31st, and adds another dog, while Humphrey, far behind Dearborn, saw men kill and eat a dog on November 1st.

any sort of meat for the starving so
with herbs and roots, she became ir
sick." This is, however, supported
than tradition, so far as I know.
therefore, Dearborn's dog and those
were sacrificed, hers escaped." The
dogs made above appear to clash
theory. Stocking speaks of a calf as t
of a cow on November 2d, and Thaye
on November 3d; but it is highly in
such incidents occurred. Mr. Codn
quotes Morison's account at length
but Morison writes on November 2d o
days without eating anything, while h
clearly that he had supper on Octobe
that he roasted and ate his shot-pou
would have made it drier and harder t
boiling could have got anything out o
"huge mountain" and "lofty hills" t
Chaudière ran, whereas these terms c
with propriety to the region. With s
possible to make out exactly the march

In the hope of clarifying the reader'
a diagram, connecting events of the m
of the river, has been presented (p. 22

12. Apparently Morgan must have l

company at the scene of their mishap at evening on the 31st. Would Morgan have waited there a day and a half? We may be sure he would not; and "Provincial" says that after their shipwreck the company "then all took to the land, and made the best of their way towards the inhabitants." In view of what we have learned of Senter's and Stocking's journals, these slips do not surprise us. According to Senter, Morgan's men lost everything except their lives, while Stocking intimates that a very small part of their provisions was saved.

13. Apparently Arnold, Morgan, McClellan, and Smith met with disaster at the same place. That is what we should expect. As to the last three the journals leave no room for doubt. Dearborn speaks of encamping near a fall where ten boats were wrecked,—all except Arnold's and his, he says. This was eight miles by land from the lake, which may answer fairly well to Arnold's "ab^{t} 15" by water. (Arnold's bateaux suffered, but his canoe, like Dearborn's, escaped injury here.) As there was a camp where Morgan met shipwreck, Dearborn was likely to spend the night there. The connection appears complete when we note further that just below the place of wreckage mentioned by him, Dearborn passed a carry of "a Bout Half a mile," and that Arnold carried one hundred and forty-six rods just below the scene of his mishap; therefore Arnold's and Morgan's wrecks occurred at the same place, for the "ten" boats cannot be made up without Morgan's. Haskell puts the place of disaster just where Arnold does, fifteen miles, by the river, from Lake Megantic. Where misfortune overtook Ward's and Goodrich's bateaux we do not know. Morgan's, Smith's, Goodrich's, and Ward's may have made the ten mentioned by Dearborn.

Mr. Codman (p. 112) places McClellan's mishap where he does Arnold's, viz., at the Great Falls. Aside from other objections to this, (1) we find "Provincial" and Morison meeting with McClellan on October 31st, while they cannot have passed the Great Falls until November 3d, and (2) Henry states that three days were required for two active Indians to go from the first settlement with a canoe to the place where McClellan was left, and bring him down. Had he been lying at the Great Falls this would have required only three or four hours. Mr. Codman (p. 113) accepts Henry's account. No. 28 (p. 112) speaks of the bateau in which McClellan lay as having been "carried further than the others"; but evidently it was carried no farther than the others which were transported across the Boundary Portage.

Mr. Codman states (p. 113) that Dr. Senter "with the few instruments which he carried in his knapsack tried the Sagradoine method to relieve the sufferer." Senter's word, however, is Sangradoine. He evidently

went up the river travelled in canoes, others must have been sensible enough to walk. Arnold's letter of October 27th states that he was told there was "a good road . . . all the way down"; but this is equally hard to believe.

16. The only large tributuary of the Chaudière is the Du Loup, but there are several other streams which would be very uncomfortable to wade in November.

17. Dearborn was ill, and for this reason, perhaps, he hurried on in advance of his men, though apparently not more than an hour's march. One may infer that the two companies were together here from the fact that they were together later.

18. Morgan's men disappear after they are wrecked, but we have glimpses of Goodrich's. Melvin (October 31st) speaks of Captain Smith's overtaking Goodrich's company; but we can infer little from this, for (1) Melvin states that Goodrich's company broke up the day before, (2) we do not know whether Smith was in advance of his men or behind them, and (3) Melvin says Goodrich's men stopped, but does not indicate where or how long.

19. For they were told that the first inhabitants were fourteen miles away.

20. Mr. Codman (p. 119) pictures the Canadians as coming back to the camp "with the bodies of half-frozen and insensible provincials, slung in place of their flour-sacks across their horses." But this is certainly fanciful. Mr. Codman's authority just here is plainly Morison, and Morison's words are: "They [the Canadians] gave them bread and saved them from death, placed them upon horses," etc. Here is nothing about carrying the soldiers like meal-bags. On the other hand, if the men were able to eat bread, they were then

able (if not before) to sit on the horses, aided, perhaps, by Canadians walking beside them.

21. We may perhaps infer that Thayer and Topham were alone, whereas Meigs speaks of the men with him.

22. Haskell was of this party; Tolman came later.

23. Both Thayer and Topham had been in the rear of the division, but Topham seems to have gone ahead.


24. Of course Arnold or Hanchet may have had something to do with these people.

25. See note 10. In Arnold's letter of November 8th to Washington he speaks of sending "fresh provisions, flour, &c." The first item refers, perhaps, to the cattle.

26. See Chapter XIII., note 12.

27. But possibly his illness may have been the reason.

28. Melvin spoke of Morgan's men as stealing his provisions at the bark house on Lake Megantic, but records eating the last of his supply on November 1st. Evidently a part of his food was not taken, for he mentions (November 2d) that his comrades would not give



of relief, Captain Smith gave him a thick piece of bacon-fat as large as a man's hand, done up in a paper. For certain exaggerated reports, see note 11.

31. Mr. Codman (p. 133) accepts this as "probably not far from the truth," only he represents Morison as saying that "the effectives at Point Levi" numbered 510. Arnold wrote Washington, November 8th, that all were "happily arrived (except one man drowned and one or two sick—and Colonel Enos's division)"; but manifestly this was not correct. It should be noted that Morison ignored desertions. Henry thought seven starved.

32. No. 106, i., p. 386. With reference to the Indians (next sentence of the text) it may be added that Arnold's bargain with them seems to have made no mention of clothing (see p. 244).

33. At the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Enos (No. 54, 4, iii., 1710) Lieutenant Buckmaster testified that when the fourth division returned there were 150 men with it but not of it. If we deduct 30 for Colburn's men and others who were not soldiers and allow 250 for the three companies, we get a total of 370, which, added to Arnold's 675, make 1045. But this figuring is really of very little value, since we are ignorant how many had deserted or been sent down the river sick, or how many of the sick had died, etc.

XV: Pages 235–246.

1. Spelled also Sattagan, Sattigan, etc. Sattigan has been said to have been the Indian form. Between Sertigan and Sartigan one is inclined to look upon the former as the correct French spelling, because we find—even in the Quebec *Gazette*—the form St. Igan, and this would come more naturally from Sertigan than from Sartigan.

2. For example, a map of the British Dominions in America, by Thomas Kitchin, places Sertigan pretty near Quebec; Sayer and Bennett's map of August 14, 1776, puts it about one-third of the way from the St. Lawrence to Lake Megantic; and a map of "Canada, Louisiane et Terres Angloises par le Sr. d'Anville" (1775), places it just below the mouth of the Du Loup.

3. For this and other valuable points relating to this region I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mons. J. Edmond Roy, author of No. 159 and other valuable works on the local history.

4. Senter, however, as well as Dearborn, appears to have acquired some idea of the truth, for after he had gone five miles from the village that he called "Sartigan," he began his next entry: "Sartigan, Saturday, [Nov.] 4."

By "Sertigan" or "Sartigan" (in quotation marks) is meant the first settlement entered by the Americans.

5. No. 106, i., p. 401. It needs to be added that

considerable affluent flows from that quarter, he must have meant the S. E.

9. There is a Rivière St. André between these two, but (1) it does not seem large enough to fit the case, and (2) had the settlement stood there, it would have been less than three miles from the Du Loup, while the R. la Famine is four miles distant.

10. The mere fact that, according to Allen, Hanna's house was that of a "lord," would make one doubt very much whether it had been standing in 1775, for we are told by Haskell that the dwellings in the first settlement were "small." Besides, Allen says there was but one other house near Hanna's, while Haskell mentions "three or four" in the first settlement.

11. Mr. Codman (No. 28) makes several mistakes here: (1) he accepts "Sartigan" as the actual name of a village ("there were but 3 or 4 small houses . . . in Sartigan"—p. 120). (2) He represents that there was a "house on the Du Loup" (p. 120). The only evidence in favour of this is that of Allen, which has been analysed, and that of Henry, which is inconclusive as well as untrustworthy. Henry states only that the first house was within "a few hundred yards" of a river that had to be waded. (Since Mr. Codman uses these quoted words, we may infer that he relied upon Henry.) According to our hypothesis, this stream was not the Du Loup but the La Famine. Against the theory that a house stood on the Du Loup we have a plenty of evidence: (*a*) No village exists there now. (*b*) In 1824 fewer houses were there than existed in 1775 in the first settlement, whereas settlements had been growing. (*c*) Arnold says that four miles beyond the Du Loup brought him "to the first house." (*d*) Dearborn places the first house about four miles below the Du Loup. (*e*) It took

Senter until half past ten o'clock to go from the Great Falls to the first inhabitants that he mentions. (*f*) Thayer places the first house five miles beyond a river, which cannot well have been any stream above the Du Loup. (*g*) Humphrey and Topham represent the first house as five and six miles below the Falls, which does not permit us to fix it on the Du Loup. In short, there is very strong evidence against such a theory and practically none for it.

(3) Mr. Codman (p. 120) represents Dearborn as stopping at a "house on the Du Loup," which his journal proves he did not do, even if a house stood there.

(4) He represents Dearborn as going six miles to "Sartigan" the next day. But (*a*), as shown above, no journalist represents the distance from the Du Loup to "Sartigan" as six miles; (*b*) since Dearborn's journal shows that he went over four miles below the Du Loup on November 2d, to say that he had to travel six miles farther to arrive at "Sartigan" is to place the settlement

later date. Besides, Dearborn's account makes it clear that he found Arnold on that day at least ten miles below the Du Loup, while Mr. Codman places "Sartigan" about six miles below that river.

Further evidence that Arnold was not in "Sertigan" on November 3d is suggested by Senter. At 10:30 on November 3d Senter arrived at "the first town, principally inhabited by aborigines," which corresponds with Mr. Codman's description of the first settlement: "Sartigan, a settlement largely Indian." Then, Senter says, he went on five miles farther to find Arnold.

12. No. 54, 4, iii., 1328. Force again gives the name of the Quebec gentleman as Manir, but it was really (J. D.) Mercier, as already mentioned. Mr. Codman writes "Manier."

13. I infer that this money was some of the specie referred to by Washington, because paper would have been useless here.

14. It is very discouraging to try to identify places in this region, for the French *habitants* are not only ignorant, but sublimely indifferent about history. All along the way I did what I could to gain local information, but obtained the smallest possible results. At St. Francis (St. François) Mons. Taschereau Fortier, Registrar of Deeds, and a member of the most distinguished family of the district, drove about with me most courteously to interview the oldest people, and continued his researches after I left, but without securing much valuable information. Even a priest and local historian, Father Demers, whose kindness I desire to acknowledge, was unable to tell me anything about the state of things in 1775. No light could be obtained from parish records, for the oldest do not quite reach that year. I had hoped to be able to identify the sites of certain taverns referred to by

journalists and possibly find the buildings, but I failed to satisfy myself. One thing told me was that about half-way between St. George and St. Francis there always had existed an inn; but this does not fit any of the journals well. Another was that about a mile below St. Francis there stood formerly a small wooden fort on the west side of the river, and the "Bostonnais" (as the Americans were called) left a garrison there; but (1) the journals give no hint of such a thing; (2) Arnold could spare no men for garrison duty; and (3) why should he have cared to hold a fort there?

15. Evidently vigorous work was done to prepare for the hungry army. Henry mentions Steele and John M. Taylor of Smith's company as co-operating actively with Arnold.

16. Mr. Codman says (p. 125): "they were not averse to receiving fair pay for their provisions"; but the journalists agree that the prices were exorbitant. Dearborn writes: "ask a very great price"; Topham:



born, that Arnold was to pay. Probably, then, the word means the Portuguese gold coin called commonly the Johannes or Joe.

20. Mr. Codman (p. 120) places at about this time the return of "Burdeen," a private in Topham's company, who, with a number of other invalided men, was saved by finding and killing a horse that strayed from the relief party. But the fact is really much more interesting and significant, for, according to Topham's and Thayer's journals, the man did not rejoin the army until November 22d. This shows that the Canadians continued friendly. Topham spelled the name Brudeen.

21. Mr. Codman says (p. 126): "The river ceased to curl madly over rock and shingle, and, though still white with foam, became quieter and broader," etc. But this is not true of the river above the St. Francis Rapids, since these are the worst of all, nor below them, since there is no foam, but only dead stillness for many miles.

22. The French name of St. Mary (sometimes written St. Mary's) is Sainte Marie, of course.

XVI: Pages 247–257

1. Mr. Codman states (No. 28, p. 126) that Arnold was "entertained handsomely" by Taschereau. This would be an important statement, if true. But (1) had Taschereau been at his home, he would have left it on Arnold's approach, for he could not have forgiven himself or been forgiven by his friends for striking hands with the enemy. He was, in fact, conspicuous for loyalist zeal, served as officer and paymaster, and fought the Americans at the assault on Quebec. See No. 225, September 23, 1809, and No. 148, December 21, 1809. He particularly proved his enmity toward the invaders by

undertaking to punish one of his tenants who refused to take up arms against them (No. 159, iii., 49). So marked was his hostility, that the Americans sold his effects at public auction in February, 1776. (2) According to Sir James LeMoine (No. 91, p. 62) the tradition is that Taschereau was in Quebec. (3) This tradition has been confirmed to me by a descendant of Taschereau. (4) Senter's allusions to roast turkey and Spanish wine (which probably suggested that Taschereau entertained the American officers) may be sufficiently explained by the fact that the manor house and its contents were doubtless freely used by the Americans, since the political sentiments of the proprietor were of course reported to them. And (5) Roy states that Taschereau left his manor house before the Americans arrived there (No. 159, iii., 49).

Taschereau's place belongs now (1902) to Mr. Charles P. Lindsay; but the old mansion was destroyed by fire, and the present house stands on the other side of the

more & staid at S. Arey's parish at a house near the chappel of the same name. there we dined and set out again for Point Levi where we arrived about 8 o'clock."

The only way I can get a meaning from this is to paraphrase it thus: "Nov. 7, I, though no more bound to do this extra work than any other of the ten captains, had been ordered by Lieut. Col. Greene to remain with Capt. Topham up the river three days to urge on the rear, and then to go to St. Mary. When I reached St. Mary, Col. Arnold sent me back to "Sertigan" to hire boats for the invalids and bring them to the rest of the army. Nov. 8, when I reached St. Mary with 96 invalids, Major Meigs met me, and proposed that we buy canoes in order to take the invalids around to Point Levi by water. So we bought 20. But then Major Meigs left me; and I, not knowing how to go by water and understanding that the canoes were to be used for crossing the St. Lawrence, decided to carry them overland. This we did, four of the invalids carrying by turns under each canoe. ["16 remaining men were not able to do duty."—*Marginal Note.*] From St. Mary I went 12 miles without seeing a house, dined at St. Henry at a house near a church of that name, then went 15 miles more, and reached Point Levi at 8 o'clock P.M." But according to Humphrey and Topham twenty canoes were carried by Meigs; and it does not seem possible that this was another lot.

3. In French, the *Route Justinienne.* Justinien was a Récollet priest. He spent seven years in this field and died in 1760.

4. In French, St. Henri.


5. In French, the *Route du Pavé;* called also *Le Vieux Chemin,* and *Le Chemin du Petit St. Henri* (a

place near the northern end of it). This road was begun in the summer of 1746, and completed a year later.

6. No. 91, p. 162.

7. At this point we are very much in the dark. Arnold's journal is missing. Dearborn and Henry were sick and behind. Meigs, Thayer, and Topham marched in the rear. Senter hired a horse and went with the chaplain. Stocking and Tolman seem again to be reflections of "Provincial." "Provincial" and Morison, though members of the same company, here disagree. Melvin is clearly inaccurate. Haskell, though good, does not give us all we wish to know. "Provincial" mentions one march of three miles on November 7th, while Haskell mentions very distinctly two such marches.

8. This letter is headed "St. Mary's 4 leagues from Point Levi." Both the distance from Point Levi and the fact that the letter was written on the 7th show that it probably should have been headed "St. Henry." The


FROM
A MAP DRAWN BY
A BRITISH CAPTAIN
1759
POINT LEVY
POINT DES PÈRES
FERRY TO LÉVIS
LÉVIS
QUEBEC
ST. CHARLES
RIVER
ST. LAURENCE RIVER
LANDING PLACE
ETCHEMIN R.





where they took post, as also at my mill," which implies that the mill was not at the Point.

Sometimes the name appears to have belonged where Lévis is now. Ainslie's journal (No. 3) speaks of Caldwell's mill as "three or four miles above Point Levy," which would place the Point about opposite Quebec. Melvin has it: "Nov. 8. Came to Point Levi, . . . opposite Quebec." And the battery opened by the Americans on April 3, 1776, which was opposite Quebec, is spoken of as being at Point Levi in Nos. 3, 70, 98 (Finlay's journal), 224, etc.

Finally, we have good evidence that the name was applied still higher. The *Journal of Remarkable Occurrences* (No. 131, 1880) speaks of "Col. Caldwell's mill at Point Levy." November 8th or 9th, a midshipman named McKenzie was captured by the Americans while trying to obtain something from the mill; No. 3 says of this event, "A boat from the *Hunter* sloop was fired at from Major Caldwell's mill"; Henry (No. 72, p. 79) states that the mill was "on our left" and about a mile from his quarters, which fixes his quarters as about three miles above a point opposite Quebec; Henry says that at the time the *Hunter's* boat approached the mill, all the soldiers ran that way, and that "Morgan and the Indians, who lay nearest to the commander's quarters, were foremost," *i. e.*, Arnold's quarters were farther upstream than Henry's; yet Arnold headed his letters, "Point Levi." (Henry is confirmed at one point by No. 3, which says that McKenzie was captured by Indians.)

Meigs wrote: "Our men, that were gone forward to *Point Levi*, made prisoner of Mr. M'Kenzie"; but he was captured at Caldwell's mill, and must have been taken (aside from Henry's testimony) by men quartered somewhere near. Haskell wrote, November 13th: "At Point

Levi the carpenters were all drawn out to making ladders and paddles; this evening [*printed* morning] all were ordered down to the river to a place of rendezvous, in order to cross over." Now the rendezvous was Caldwell's mill, so that Haskell appears here to apply the name Point Levi to some spot on the bluff above the mill. No. 3 says: "A party of the rebels was lodged in it [the mill]," yet all of the Americans are reported as being at "Point Levi." Humphrey speaks of arriving at "Point levy," and then says that "we spied them [McKenzie's party] and fir'd Upon them." This places the mill at Point Levi, and also places Arnold there, for Humphrey speaks of coming up with Arnold. Thayer's account is the same. Senter states that the Chaudière emptied "but four miles above Point Levi," and the mouth of that river is seven miles above the part of Lévis opposite Quebec.

The effect of all this, after every necessary allowance has been made, is to prove, it seems to me, that the name

David de Lauberivière. At that time the present road along the river had not been constructed.

12. *Chemin du Moulin.* There can be no doubt, I think, that these were the roads travelled by the Americans, for it is known exactly what roads were in existence at that time, and these are the lines that fit what information we have as to the movements of the army. The pivotal point of the route was St. Henry. Dearborn states expressly that the troops went by that village, while Humphrey, Thayer, and Topham speak of dining at "St. Arey's," evidently an attempt at the French pronunciation of St. Henri. Meigs lodged there, he says.

13. Senter arrived on the 8th, and says that few of the troops came that day. Dearborn states that the "main Body" arrived on the 9th. It seems clear that the Americans lodged at the top, not at the foot, of the high bank of the St. Lawrence; for (1) Henry indicates as much very plainly, (2) Haskell speaks of being "ordered down to the river" so as to cross it, and (3) there was no road at the foot of the bluff.

14. *Rivière de la Scie.*

15. A mill that is believed to be a close imitation, or perhaps a reproduction, of this is now standing on the spot. It was built in 1781. My information on these points comes from Mons. J. Edmond Roy, who not only is the accomplished historian of the region, but was formerly a part-owner of the mill. I have also made two personal visits to the place.

16. Haskell so states, and Melvin implies the same.

17. No. 3: On the third of November ". . . we learnt that a great body of men were not far from Quebec. . . . The Lieut.-Governor ordered that all the canoes, boats, shallops & craft shou'd be brought off from the opposite shore & from the Island of Orleans."

18. Cramahé to Howe (MS.), November 8th, No. 220, Eng. and Amer., August, 1775—December, 1776, p. 109.

19. According to No. 3 and the *Journal of Remarkable Occurrences* (No. 131, 1880), this took place on the 8th; but they state that, in consequence of the capture of McKenzie, the sloop battered the mill the next day. It hardly seems probable that the captain of the *Hunter* would have waited so long before opening fire on the rebels who had taken his brother prisoner. Indeed, Senter intimates that the capture was immediately followed by the cannonade. With the exception of Morison, all of the American journalists who date the affair place it on the 9th.

20. "Provincial" and Tolman (followed by Mr. Codman, No. 28, p. 137) state that the boat came for flour, while Morison says "flour & other provisions"; but the first two accounts are undated, the third is dated wrongly (November 10th), and all of them are inaccurate. Hum-

15, 1776. Halstead was a partner in the business to the extent of having a share of the profits. Caldwell says he detained "some flour and 200 bushels of wheat." He was appointed commissary of the American forces. The information that he could give did not throw much light on the exact condition of things in Quebec, for he had been suspected of holding communications with the enemy, and, several days before, had been sent down to the Island of Orleans. He was originally from Jersey. At Quebec he had been a merchant. The text follows Senter as to the date of Halstead's appearance; but Arnold's letter (postscript) of November 8th mentions the arrival of a friend from Quebec, and perhaps this was Halstead.

24. As fast as beeves were killed the skins were made up into these moccasins (Senter).

25. It is very needful to determine as well as we can where these vessels were stationed. Our only official information is a letter from Captain Hamilton, of the *Lizard* frigate, to Admiral Graves, November 9th (No. 20, Admirals' Dispatches, No. Amer., vol. vi.), which says: "Yesterday the [Lieutenant] Governor sent me advice of the advanced Guard of the Rebels being within two leagues and a half of the Main River, and desiring the [*Hunter*] Sloop might move higher up the River to keep a good look-out on the Enemy. I therefore ordered Captain MacKenzie on that service; he is within our signals." This implies that the frigate remained at the usual anchorage near the city, but that the *Hunter* proceeded a considerable distance up the river. Fobes states that the British "stationed a sloop-of-war up the river." Senter mentions that young McKenzie was captured "in sight of two of their ships of war." One of these was apparently the *Hunter*, for she opened

"fire," and we naturally assume that the other was the *Lizard*. This seems to imply that the frigate was hardly four miles distant. Arnold wrote Washington, November 13th: "To prevent which [*i. e.*, our crossing] the *Hunter*, sloop, and *Lizard*, frigate, lie opposite—however expect to be able to evade them." This he wrote just before the crossing was made, and when, therefore, the point of departure had probably been fixed; and for this reason, as well as the fact that we have placed Arnold's headquarters—not with absolute certainty, however—more than three miles above the Lévis ferry, we are inclined to infer that Arnold's point of view when he said "opposite" was not far from Caldwell's mill, whence he set out to cross.

Another point needs to be considered. It was known that the Americans came to attack Quebec, and of course their most obvious plan would be to cross at the city, where the river was narrowest; therefore Captain Hamilton would naturally be on his guard there. But probably he knew that easy access to the Plains of Abraham

Perhaps, then, we may conclude that Captain Hamilton placed the frigate as far above Quebec as he could without losing command of the narrow passage there, and sent the *Hunter* a little above Caldwell's mill, where the river narrowed again at Point Pizeau. McKenzie would still be within his signals.

26. See Arnold's letter to Washington, November 13th. This is the only reason given by him for the delay in crossing, though he also mentions that he has waited three days for the rear to come up. His words are: "The wind has been so high these three nights I have not been able to cross the river." To Montgomery he wrote: "As the wind has moderated, I design crossing this evening"; *i. e.*, but for the wind he would have crossed sooner. Mr. Codman does not allude to this vital difficulty.

27. Topham, in particular, was ordered on this business (Humphrey), and he notes: "Borrowed of some Frenchmen some wooden canoes" (November 10th).

28. November 13th, Arnold wrote Montgomery, "near 40," and Washington, "about 40"; November 27th, he wrote "about 30." Dearborn and Meigs say thirty-five.

29. The mouth of the Chaudière is about three miles above the mill. Senter, as printed, reads "were to be drawn from the cave of the Chaudiere," and Mr. Codman (p. 143) follows this; but the MS. is quite rational: "were br[t] down from the cove of the Chaudiere."

30. Arnold wrote Montgomery, November 14th, that the crossing was "effected between 9 and 4." Meigs recorded: "at nine o'clock we began to embark our men." Morison wrote, "At about 9 began to cross." Senter, to be sure, noted that the men assembled at two o'clock A.M.; but why should they wait so long, and how

could three trips have been made over and back in two hours? Henry's time for embarking is "between 10 and 11." The mill is mentioned by Senter and Henry, and that was in fact a good place to go from.

31. Senter so states, and one of the boats is mentioned by several of the journalists.

32. From about a mile to about a mile and a half according to the route followed.

33. Marshall (No. 109), who used Lieutenant Heath's journal, states that the first landing was about a mile and a half above Wolfe's Cove, but that it was found impossible to scale the bluff. Senter also mentions that a landing was made above the Cove, though he says the intention was to go directly there.

34. Arnold speaks of the weather as not "suitable" for another trip. Wind was of course the thing to make trouble.

35. Here is a difficult point. Senter calls the night "exceeding dark," whereas Humphrey states that "it was a calm moonlight night," and Haskell that it was



36. Henry states that it was built by those who landed first; Senter, that it was made to warm the men who were wrecked, and these do not appear to have belonged to the first party that crossed.

37. Senter affirms that the firing was contrary to orders; but Thayer says that he, Arnold, and four more hailed the boat, and that "we" fired on her. Topham and Melvin affirm that the Colonel fired. Arnold himself (letter of November 14th) wrote: "we fired."

38. Marshall (No. 109) states that the leaders held a council on the north side.

39. Henry says, "the following night." Thayer writes: "Topham and I . . . could not then bring the whole party over. whoever [*i. e.*, however] We brought the remainder over the second attempt." Dearborn says that "all our men that were fit for duty which was about 500" crossed in the night of November 13–14. Arnold's letter of November 20th to Washington indicates that he had with him about 550 effectives: but does not indicate precisely at what time. On the 14th, Arnold wrote Montgomery of his "party of 500" as having "nearly all" got over, though he sent word to Hanchet: "many of the men I expected are left behind." Meigs says that "about 500" crossed in the night of November 13–14.

Stocking and Tolman mention some harmless fire from the frigate early on the 14th, and the former represents some of the men as crossing after daybreak.

40. Arnold to Hanchet, undated (No. 106, i., p. 375).

41. The principal points requiring notice in this portion of Mr. Codman's narrative (not to mention omissions) are the following: (1) The name "St. Marie" is used (*e.g.*, p. 130); but of course the correct form is Ste. Marie in French or St. Mary in English. (2) He

states (p. 126) that Arnold received Montgomery's letter of October 29th at St. Mary and "at once" despatched a reply. The reply, then, went from St. Mary. But Montgomery's letter was not received until November 8th; Arnold left St. Mary November 6th, in all probability; and, as we have seen, he headed his reply, "2½ leagues from Point Levi," so that it was written more than twenty miles from St. Mary. (3) He writes Eleazar instead of Elzéar (Taschereau); Cramahè instead of Cramahé. (4) He speaks (p. 130) of "some of the officers" riding on horses from St. Mary on; but we hear of none who rode except the surgeon and chaplain. (5) He speaks (p. 130) of the soldiers leaving St. Mary as refreshed by "four days of rest"; but the facts are that few reached the first settlement before afternoon or evening on Nov. 3d; then they had over thirty miles to march before reaching St. Mary — a sufficient task for two days, considering their condition; on the sixth, as is clear from the accounts of six journalists, they left St. Mary and marched from two o'clock P.M. (6) Mr. Codman (p. 121) says that the troops



three miles. It is in fact over eight miles in an air-line. (9) He says (p. 131) that at this time "the severe Canadian winter had begun." This expression would imply at least a freezing temperature; but, as he recognises on page 130, the mud was deep in the road. (10) He represents (p. 131) both the army as halting and the lieutenant with his squad as going forward to Point Levi, on November 8th; but "Provincial" says (November 7th), "halted till evening, when a Lieut., with 20 men was ordered forward to see if the way was clear." Morison's journal places this in the *morning* (evidently a slip) of November 7th. Tolman has it: "7th . . . halted till night, when [*i. e.*, at nightfall] a lieutenant was sent," etc. Stocking's record is: "7 . . . halted until night. A lieutenant," etc. (11) He states (p. 131) that Arnold went to Point Levi with the lieutenant; but the only evidence bearing on this is Arnold's letter of November 8th to Montgomery. This proves that at 1 o'clock A.M., November 8th, he was at least "2½ leagues from Point Levi." It is hardly possible that, besides reading a letter from Montgomery and writing a long reply, he could have reached Point Levi, as the lieutenant did, by 2 o'clock, with danger, darkness, and a rough road to hinder him. (12) He states (p. 132) that on the 9th "the whole army now advanced to Pt. Levi"; but Arnold wrote Washington on the 8th that his army "are here and [*i. e.*, or] within two or three days march"; some, then, reached Point Levi before the 9th. "Provincial" speaks of being quartered there on the 8th. Senter indicates that a portion of the army arrived that day. On the other hand, we have many intimations that some did not appear until after the 9th. (13) He says (p. 132) that the falls of the Chaudière tumble "into the great river," *i. e.*, the St. Lawrence; but these falls are two and

deen and others did not turn up until
were not in such shelters. (15) He
Morison's estimate that seventy or eigl
wilderness as "probably not far fron
Morison himself adds that he was "i
that some of these got to the inhabit
on Chap. XIV. and text). (16) Mr.
134) that Caldwell's mill stood "about
of Point Levi," but if the name "Po
in its broad sense (see note 10) the
Levi; if in its narrow sense, it was sev
(17) He gives (p. 134) the distanc
mill to "King's wharf, Quebec," a
yards"; but the site of King's wharf
staff of the Quebec citadel, so that
an air line was close to three miles.
134) that "The mill was the property
Caldwell"; but the mill, an appendag
of Lauzon, was *leased* by Caldwell in
chased by him until February 28, 1801
(19) He says (p. 134) that "The p
found in charge [at the mill] joined th
commissary." This has reference, o
stead. But we have no evidence tha
at the mill, and Senter mentions his
9th, adding that he had been banishe
the Island of Orleans "several days"

could only be applied to the citadel, and the citadel did not exist in 1775. (21) He says (p. 135) that "a detail of carpenters under Lieut. Savage was told off to make scaling ladders, spears, and hooks"; but (*a*) could carpenters make the hooks of scaling ladders? (*b*) Thayer and Humphrey represent the spears and hooks as made by the blacksmiths under Captain Hanchet, and Haskell confirms this. (22) He places (p. 136) the capture of the midshipman on November 11th as Henry does; but very many of Henry's dates are wrong Topham, Thayer, Haskell, and Melvin agree that the incident occurred on the 9th (see note 19). Senter, to be sure, mentions it under date of the 11th; but so does he mention Halstead's arrival, which, he adds, took place on the 9th.

Addendum to note 2 on Chapter II.: "Provincial's" journal, as printed in Glasgow, begins, "The Journal of Capt. William Hendricks, and Capt. John Chambers, of the Rifle-Men, from Carlisle," etc. Hence Egle, and also Codman (p. 318), speak of it as Hendricks's journal. This, however, it cannot have been, for it continues after Hendricks died. Chambers was a private. Hence the above remarks, due probably to somebody in Glasgow, have no authority, and the journal is anonymous. Possibly Chambers was the author, but the theory of the text seems more reasonable.

APPENDIX

ARNOLD'S JOURNAL OF HIS EXPEDITION TO CANADA

From the Sparks Manuscripts in the Library of Harvard University, No. 52, vol. ii., p. 1. The MS. is endorsed as follows: "The original in possession of Judge Edwards of New York. This copy given me by Mr. R. R. Ward, Feb., 1831."

N. B.—In quotations from the journal it has not always seemed desirable to reproduce exactly all the rather annoying peculiarities of punctuation, capitalisation, spelling, and abbreviation, though enough have been given to show how the journal was written; but they are here printed as they appear in the MS. In several cases the MS. is not perfectly clear, however. A very conspicuous instance of obscurity is the spelling of "Chaudière." In a few cases abbreviation is indicated in the MS. by a mark not exactly imitated in type fonts.

A number of our Men employed in bringing Provisions, &c, with his Excellency Gen[l] Washington and Dispatch bark. Five of the Transports [1]—

WENSDAY 27[TH] SEP[R] 1775.*

Major Meigs with Cap[ts] Hanchets, Wards, Dearborns & Goodrichs Companies Marched at Noon—Send down a number of Boats to bring up all the flour from below—Wrote to my Sister Hannah—Sent to the Commissary to forward on all the Battoes &c.

*Of course the MS. does not use capitals in these headings except at the beginning of the day and the month.

Colburns, with all the men & boats—ord
criminal on Board the Broad Bay Cap
stores &c—

FRIDAY. 29 [?] SEPT^{R} 177
Capt^{n} M^{c}Cobbs & Scotts Comp^{is} marcl
noon—left Fort Weston in a Bark Cano
fax—left Col Enos with Capt Williams
up the rear with the Provisions behin
proving very leaky stopped at Vassalt
above Fort Western & changed her fo
Lodged ab^{t} 4 miles short of Fort Ha
River from F Weston to Halifax is No.

SATURDAY SEPT 30^{H} 177
At 6 A.M. crossed the 3 mile Falls &
Fort Halifax where I found Cap^{t} Dea
rich's Comp^{ns} just over the falls which
over—Good carrying Place—

SATURDAY SEPT 30. 177
At 10 A.M. dined at Crosiers & hired hi
to carry over baggage over land about
the riples or quick water above the fall
dangerous & difficult to pass. At 5 P.M
& proceeded up the river one mile &
lodged in the Woods with Major Meigs

SUNDAY OCT 1. 1775.
Mounted the River at ab^{t} 12 miles, ove

at one Widow Warrens—great part of the way small falls & quick water.[7]

MONDAY OCT. 2[D] 1775.

At 10 A.M. arrived at Norridgewalk Falls 6½ miles from where we lodged—great part of the way swift water & Rapids. The Land from Fort Western to this place appears in general very good & fertile & is thickly inhabited. Here we leave the English settlements, no Inhabitants being above the falls, which by the best estimation are 50 miles from Fort Western—Here I overtook Capt Morgan with his division, who had just got his baggage over the Carrying Places, which is about 1500 yards over, so high there.[8]

N.B.[9] Course from Fort Halifax over the Ripple N° Dist. 5[m]

From Ripple to sou heavyon falls—very crooked, ab[t] N° 16

From sou heavyon falls to Norrigewalk S. W. 5 & N. W. 7— 12

33

SUNDAY OCT[R] 3[D] 1775—

The Rifflars proceed for the G Carrying Place some[10] Thayers & Hubbards Comp[s] employed in getting over their baggage, examining Bread great part of which is damaged by the Boats leaking, & the difficulty of passing the Rapids, where it is impossible for People unacquainted to get up the Boats without ship.[g] water. here is some small vestiges left of an Indian Town, (destroyed by the English ab[t] 10 years[11] since) the foundation of an Old Church and alter the monument over the fort[12] S[t] Francis. the founder of the Church & the whole tribe we are told are extinct except two or three—

WENSDAY OCT 4[H] Carpenters employed in repairing

preceeding day—

FRIDAY OCT 6^{H} Major Meigs with his forward—Col Enos with the last Divisio

SATURDAY OCT 7^{H} The last division e amining their Bread (part of which is for use) carrying their Baggage & Pro Portage

SUNDAY 8^{H} OCT^{R} We have not been our baggage over the Portage until this r have constantly had two sleds going with the height of the Hill & the bad road— prevents our proceeding this day—

MONDAY OCT 9^{H}—Struck our Tents—c gage across the Portage—embarked & p River about 3 miles 6° N. N E here the l markable turn to the E N E. ab^{t} ¾ of a m W B N ab^{t} ¾ of a mile more. we crosse land being ab^{t} 30 rods, which saves mor rapid water—here the River takes its pr N. at 12 o Clock passed the 7 mile Stre at one of the Islands, & at 5 encam M^{c}Cobb on another Island, within 2 mil falls, the whole dist^{ce} this day 16 miles Easterly the water very rapid, the land the River, to Corratunk falls appears ^{14} & tile & tolerably well wooded with some Beech Maple, Pine, Hemlock, &c

TUESDAY OCT^{R} 10—AT 9 A

Arrived at Corratunk falls the fall of

feet—the Portage near 50 Rods over—We proceeded up the River ab^{t} 5 miles ag^{t} a very rapid stream C° ab^{t} N° — here the mountains begin to appear on each side the river, high, & snow on the tops and appear well wooded —the River from Norridgewalk to the G Carrying Place is very uneven in wedth, but in general about 400 yards & full of a great number of small Islands which appear very fertile land—We ascended the River this day ab^{t} 12 miles in general very rapid & shallow water—we encamped late at night much fatuiged—

Wensday Oct 11th 1775—We embarked early this morning & proceeded up the river, the Stream very rapid indeed—At 10, arrived at the Great Carrying Place which is very remarkable, a large Brook emptying itself into the River just above which comes out of the first Lake—When abreast of the Carrying Place in the River, you will observe at ab^{t} 400 yards above you a large mountain in shape of a shugar Loaf—at the foot of which the River turns off to the Eastward—This Mountain when you are at the carrying Place seems to rise out of the middle of the river—Here I overtook Capt Morgan & his Division, Col° Grain [16] & Division—part of each had proceeded as far as the Second Lake Major Meigs arrived just before me—Met Lieut^{t} Church who had been at the dead River on a survey & reports as follows—From Keneler[16] over the Portage to the first Pond or Lake course w^{t} 27° N° Distance 3¼ miles rising ground, bad road but capable of being made good.

Over the first Pond half a mile, which Pond is 1¼ mile long [17]—here our People caught a prodigious number of fine Salmon Trout, nothing being more common than a man's taking 8 or 10 Doz in one hours time, which generally weigh half a pound a piece—The Second Portage is W. 6° N° — half a mile & 20 rods—very hard, but ruff

Width 2 miles—Co over W. B N.

The fourth or last portage is West 20° N miles & 60 rods—the first part of the road —the last mile a Savanna, wet and mirey a inches Deep—

THURSDAY OCT. 12TH—Lieut[t] Steel return diar [?] Pond & says he discovered no the dead river from the last Carrying plac be 80 Miles—most part of the way a fine c current hardly perceptible—some five falls ing places, and rapid water—The carryi the dead river to Shordair [?] Pond ab[t] good & ground most part of the w Moose and other game on the River— ployed Capt Goodrichs company in bu House on the 2[d] Carrying Place to acc sick, 8 or 10 in number who we are oblig hind—Also a Party at the E[t] side of the build a small Logg House for men & pro

Ordered Lieu[ts] Steel & Church with a surveyor to Chaudair [?] Ponds to Clear take a survey of the Country—Lieut[t] St the Chaudair [?] near the Inhabitants falls, portages, &c—& return to the P Possible. Our men are much fatigued in their Battoes, Provisions, &c, the roads had however their spirit and industry

bridge, and only one death has happened, & very few accidents by water, which is the more remarkable as there seldom passes a season without some People being drowned in the Kenebec, which is very difficult & dangerous to ascend—

Oct^r 13^th This morning dispatched one Eneas & another Indian with Letters to some Gentlemen in Quebec & to Gen^l Schuyler—sent a white man with[90]
who is to proceed as far as Sartigan & after discovering the sentiments of the inhabitants, & procuring all the intelligence he can, is to return to us at Chaudair Pond where we expect to meet him in ab^t 7 or 8 days. Two divisions have this day reached the Dead River.[91]

N. B. The foregoing transmitted to Gen^l Washington—

SATURDAY OCT^R 14^TH 1775—

Left our encampment at 4 P.M. carried over the Portage, which accord^g to Lieut. Church's survey, is W 6° N ¼ mile & 20 Rods—ground hard—we soon arrived at the second Pond which makes as desolate an appearance as the first does bountifull, the Lake being very irregular, long & narrow—the trees all dead & full of moss—the water very thick & muddy. Our course over it for ab^t ½ mile was West, then stand N. B W. ab^t ¾ a mile up a narrow creek, or arm of the Lake. Our course over the Third Portage was W^t 10° N°. 1⅝ of a mile — Road extremely Bad, being choaked up with Roots, which we could not clear away, it being a work of time—reached the third Pond or Lake—there the prospect is very beautiful & noble, a high chain of mountains encircling the Pond, which is deep, clear & fine water, over which a forked mountain[92] which exceeds the rest in height bear^g N. West, & covered with Snow, in contrast with the others adds

uniform—a small elbow running into it a
on the west side of which it empties itself.
on the Portage at 1 o clock P. M. We asc
about 1 mile the Portage conducting us th
breach in the mountain—After descendi
mile we came to a low Savanna, where we
the night.

MONDAY OCT.R 16.H Early in the morn
our Route over the Savanna which is divic
wood not exceedg a 100 rods. The Road
and miry, being near up to our knees. (
our Boots) we got over without being m
course was nearly W. 20° N. 2¾ miles & (
the men had a most fatiguing time in gett
Battoes, baggage &c. at half after one 1
at a small brook, where we lanched our 1
rowing abt 1 mile arrived at the Dead 1
abt 60 yards wide uniformly deep & gentl
Prior to which ordered 10 men of eacl
Major Meigs Division to work on the 1
rear might pass with less difficulty—Cont
age up the River—we were now near the
mentioned the preceding day—Here the
traordinary windings seemed unwilling t
hours had passed away & we had gained
course, but at last by slow degrees it bec
lar & returned to its proper course "—w

we passed Capt. Morgans Compy & continued our course 2 leagues where we found an Indian House.[35] One league further up we overtook Capt Green & Division, with whom we encamped much fatigued—our course was abt W. N Wt—

Tuesday. Oct. 17th Finding Col Greens division short of flour (great part of their Bread being damaged) ordered a Subt 2 Sergts & 29 privates, out of each company under the command of Major Bigelow, to return & assist the rear in bringing up their Provisions, the remainder of the division to be employed in making up their Cartridges—Caught a number of fine Trout on the River. At 12 o Clock Capt Morgans Division passed us & went on for Chaudire Pond


Wensday Octr 18th 1775—At 10 A.M. Capt. Goodrich's & Dearborns Companies arrived—gave orders for their making Cartridges as well as those who are up—at 5 P.M. Major Meigs arrived with the last of his division.

Oct 19th Thursday—Small rains the whole of this day—at 3 P.M. the storm abating, Major Meigs went forward with his division, & soon after followed & proceeded on our way abt 2½ leagues to the second carrying Place.[36] our course was various—part of the way was S. W. & gradually shifted to S. Et with many turnings and windings. We passed 6 small rips, very swift water & shallow, which brought us as near the mountain as we had been at any time before. The course over this carrying Place is So 35° Et distance 15 Perches. Night coming on & the rain increasing we encamped on the Portage & caught a plenty of fine Trout near the Falls—

N. B. rained very hard all night. The whole Country since we came into the Dead River appears a flatt for a great dist[e] to the No ward & Ewd tolerable land & some

storm continuing, they proceeded on, inter
camp early, Continues rainy the whole o
wind to the So. w^{d}—

SATURDAY OCT^{R} 21—Storm continues th
abated, a Prodigious fall of rain for 2 da
raised the River upwards of three feet, whic
loss of time we instance in our Travels as
low before. At 7 A.M embarked & proce
River 3 leagues when we came to a small f
the Portage over W N W ab^{t} 10 rods ^{27}.
higher up came to another fall more c
Portage over ab^{t} 26 rods C^{o} W. N. W. C
Route up the River for ab^{t} half a mile
another fall.^{28} the portage 75 rods Co ov
about 90 Rods higher up met with a fo
considerable & long ^{30}—Portage over W.
73 rods — here we overtook Capt Morgan
vision, but as his encampment was bad pro
one mile higher up, very wet & much fat
Paddled up near four leagues, thro' the rai
tinued incessantly. It was now quite da
had little time to encamp, & it was near
fore we could dry our Clothes & take a
ment, when we wrapped ourselves in ou
slept very comfortably untill 4 o clock in
when we were awaked by the freshet whic



very luckily for us we had a small hill to retreat to, where we conveyed our baggage & passed the remainder of the night in no very agreeable situation—

SUNDAY OCT. 22D—This morning presented us a very disagreeable prospect, the Country round entirely overflowed, so that the course of the river being crooked, could not be discovered, which with the rapidity of the current renders it almost impossible for the Battoes to ascend the River, or the men to find their way by land or pass the small brooks, arms of the river, &c—Add to this our Provisions almost exhausted, & the incessant rains for three days has prevented our gaining anything considerable, so that we have but a melancholy prospect before us, but in general in high spirits. At 9 A.M. Capt Morgan with his Compy passed us up the River, & at 5 P.M. Major Meigs with part of his Division came up with us, were employed the whole of this day in Drying our Baggage, &c, the whole of which was sometime under water (last night) and very wet—

MONDAY OCTR 23D, 1775—

At 7 A.M. Capts Smith, Hendrickson,[31] & Major Meigs with his Division came up & passed on — At 10 A.M. embarked & proceeded up the River — the stream by reason of the freshet very quick: in abt 3 miles we came to the crotch[32] of the River. Our C° was abt wt — Here we found that the Land [party] had by mistake taken the S. W. or wrong course which we rowed up two miles, & sent men ahead to inform them of their mistake, & direct their march. This mistake occasioned a detention of the Battoes & whole division near 2 hours, when the whole were formed we proceeded up the River against a very Rapid Stream abt 3 miles to the 7h Carrying Place,[33] C° over N°. 35-E distant 7 Perches: here we had the misfortune of oversetting 7 Battoes & loosing

TUESDAY OCT^{R} 24. Sent back the si
& ordered Col Green & Col Enos to ser
of the Poorest men of their Detachment
15 days provision for the remainder, wh
on as fast as possible. Capt Hanchet
out early for Chaudier Pond, in order to
visions from the French inhabitants of S
use of the army.— Dispatched the Divis
noon set forw^{d}. Went about 7 miles — v
— when we came to two falls — the P
first was N° 20° W. 12 Perches the sec
ab^{t} 100 yards above the first was N° 12°
N. B. this is the 10 carrying Place since
Dead River. We are now about 20 miles
Pond — We proceeded ab^{t} 1 ^{m} higher
coming on, & the rain increasing, which
an hour before, we encamped — It conti
snowing all night At 4 in the morning the
N° & it cleared up—Ab^{t} two inches now

WENSDAY. 25^{H} OCT^{R}. We embarked
ing & proceeded up ag^{t} a rapid stream, ab
to a Portage of ab^{t} 40 rods, C^{o} ab^{t} W. N^{l}
inconsiderable—ab^{t} 1 mile higher up fou
the Portage over 100 Rods, N. W^{t} V
rapid $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile, when we entered the first
ab^{t} $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile wide, but contracts itself in

passed on in a small Rivulet for half a mile which brought us to a Lake [39] ab^{t} 5 miles long & $\frac{3}{4}$ wide—Several Points make out into it — All these Lakes are surrounded with a chain of prodigious high mountains—At the cut of this Lake which lies N. & S, we found it contracted to ab^{t} 3 rods wide for a short distance which brought us to a small round Pond [40] or rather the N^{o} end of the Lake — Here we were a long time at a Loss for the Portage — at length we found a small brook [41] which we entered & rowed up ab^{t} 1$\frac{1}{2}$ miles with much difficulty being obliged to Clear away the drift Loggs in many places — Snowed and blowed very hard.—the wind at N^{o} All this day in the last Lake the Sea ran so high we were obliged to go on shore several times to Bail our Battoes, which was with much difficulty kept above the water — Night coming on & we being much fatigued and chilled with the cold, we were obliged to encamp without being satisfied whether we were right or not as our guides gone forward had made no marks or we had missed them—We made it 11 o clock before we could get comfortable to lie down. The whole distance this day appeared to us near 14 miles, but as we rowed ag^{t} sea & wind we might possibly be deceived 3 or 4 miles in the distance —

THURSDAY 26^{H} OCT^{R}

Early in the morning despatched one of my men up the small stream to see if he could discover any signs of a Portage while we got Breakfast, & packed up our baggage He returned without making any discovery; we continued our Route up a narrow & very crooked & rapid brook ab^{t} 3$\frac{1}{2}$ miles which brought us to a Portage of 12 Perches. C^{o} W. 20° S. to a small Lake [42] ab^{t} 80 rods long & 30 broad. In a few minutes we arrived at another portage C^{o} W. 35° N. Dist^{t} $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile & 53 rods—carried over & entered another Lake [43] $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile in

Chaudiere Pond: the length of the portag
rods—the first 2 miles abt N. 1½ miles W.
to the brook—abt 2 miles of the First Pa
age you ascend, which brought us to t
Land at an elevation of abt 35° from th
scended the Hill to the Brook. We ad
Portage about 3 miles this evening (at
fatigued. The whole of our baggage
until very late, & we made it near midr
could pitch our tents; the whole distance
miles. All these small Lakes[46] have a
with each other by a small Brook or ri
most of them are considerable Falls, whi
many Portages. N. B. Sent back Nehe
to Pilot up the rear—here we met 20 mer
Churche's Party—

FRIDAY, 27. OCT. We continued our
Portage. 1 Mile Brot us to a beautiful
mile more to the stream[48] which we ente
Bidding adieu to the Southern Waters, w
River which is abt 2 rods wide abt 10 mil
crooked & runs all points of the Compas
obstructions of Loggs, &c. which we
cut away. On this stream we met L
Church with one Jakins, whom I had
sent down to the French inhabitants. F
[illegible] the French Inhabit

Montreal, & one small Frigate at Quebec—at 4 P.M. we entered the Chaudeire Pond or rather Lake Magantuck which is in length from N° to S°. ab^{t} 13 miles, & 3 or 4 wide—We rowed on ab^{t} 3 miles to the E^{y} side & encamped: here we found a very considerable wigwam: we waited here for the arrival of Capt Hanchet & 60 men who left the carrying Place with us to come on by land. At ab^{t} Sun set we discovered them on a Point of low Land on the E^{y} side ab^{t} 2 miles from us. I immediately sent all the Battoes for them who discovered them on a low marshy ground, to gain which they had waded two miles thro' water to their waists: This error was occasioned by their endeavoring to keep the Stream, whereas they should from the carrying Place kept on the high land & steered in about N B E or N. N. E. which would have brought them to the Lake clear of the sunken ground—It was near Midnight before all the men were brought over, as the Battoes were obliged to go three & four times each—

SATURDAY 28^{H} OCT^{R}—Dispatched one Hull to Col Enos & the rear Division to Pilot them up, wrote his [illegible] Genl Washington & enclosed the letter to Col Enos with orders to send it forward by Express. Capt Hanchet with 55 men marched on at 6 o clock—at 7 embarked with Capt Oswald—Lieut^{t} Steel and Church & 13 men in 4 Battoes, & a Birch Canoe, being Resolved to proceed on to the french Inhabitants, & at all events send back provisions to meet the rear, who are at a very short allowance of Provisions, and the men much fatigued & some sick—We paddled on briskly, & at 10 A.M. reached the N° End of the Lake, where the Chaudiere takes its rise—C° N° B E. Dist. 13 miles—Went a shore, made a fire. I waited for the rear Battoes who were near 4 miles astern of us. At 11 entered the Chaudiere which

we had the misfortune to overset & sta
all the Baggage, Arms, & Provision of
two of the Boats to pieces ag^{t} the rocks—
lives were lost altho' 6 men were a long
in the water & were with difficulty saved
tune, tho' unfortunate at first view, we m
happy circumstance to the whole, & kn
of Providence for no sooner were the me
barked to proceed, but one of the men w
cried out a fall ahead which we had neve
of, & had we been carried over must
been dashed to pieces & all lost—We
portage, which is 146 rods. C^{o} E. 30° N
ing our Baggage over it, entered again or
with more precaution than before, & aft
mile discovered more dangerous Rapids—
& examined them, & finding they wer
coming on, made no attempt to pass them
& divided our provision which amt^{d} to
Flour to each man for 5 days.

SUNDAY 29TH OCT^{R}. At 7 A.M. embark
toes & a Birch Canoe 3 men—We had no
when the Canoe by running ag^{t} the rock
& could not proceed—the men took thei
on board—We proceeded this day ab^{t} 40
less dangerous than before, as the rive



MONDAY 30th OCT—

Early this morning embarked & proceeded down the River ab[t] 10 miles when we came to rapid water—filled one of our Battoes, but luckily lost nothing: here we were obliged to lower down the stream by our Painters: about 2 [m] lower we came to Falls [51] and a Portage half a mile over C[o] N[o] here we met with two Penobscot Indians who appeared friendly & assisted us over the Portage—½ a mile lower down brought us to another Portage [52] of ab[t] 15 rods—3 miles further bro't us to the crotch of the River where the Des Loups [53] enters, which is ab[t] 7 rods over—4 miles further brought us to the first house on

NOTES

1. Oswald's journal for September 26th concludes thus: "a number of our men employed in bringing up provisions, etc; wrote his Excellency General Washington, and despatched back five of the transports."

2. Oswald's journal for the 28th begins: "Part of the fourth & last division, McCobb's & Scott's Companies, embarked; Captain Williams's Company being left for batteaus, oars, paddles, etc." Certainly this is not "a copy" of Arnold's journal, neither do the differences seem attributable to Force. Perhaps Oswald kept a journal of his own, and incorporated some of his own record with Arnold's, when the latter was written off for Washington.

3 Perhaps a copyist's error for "ab[t]."

4. It will be noted that there are two headings for this date. In Oswald's journal there is but one, and Arnold is represented as dining at 2 P.M. There are other differences.

ferences between
Oswald, since the latter is easily accessi
record for this day may be quoted: "I
ment early in the morning; at ten, A.M.
& fifteen mile streams; dined at one W
P.M., reached the Scohegan Falls, wh
Hubbard's and Thayer's Companies; a
carrying place, which is about one
launched our batteau again, and proce
about five miles, and at eight, P.M., c
Widow Warren's, distance seventeen
Scohegan Falls, about N.; from the f
lodged S. W., water quiet part of the
small falls." It does not look as if O
written this from Arnold's journal and

8. Oswald's journal says here: "w
course N. W." One is tempted to sup
words of Arnold's entry should be: "o

9. The rest of the entry for Octc
appear in Oswald's journal. "Sou
"Skowhegan." "Sunday," below, wa

10. Oswald's journal has in the p
"Topham's," which makes the meanir

11. In Oswald's journal, "fifty."

12. Oswald omitted "the fort."

13. In pencil, "Greens" and also
latter is, of course, correct.



16. In pencil, "Kenebec." In the next line, Oswald's journal has, "three-quarters of a mile," a clear error.

17. Oswald: "a quarter of a mile," another error.

18. Oswald: "half a mile."

19. An evident error for "1¼," which Oswald gives. See Arnold for October 14th.

20. The word "them" from Oswald's journal fits well here

21. Here Oswald's journal ends.

22. Evidently Mt. Bigelow, though Arnold's bearing is not right.

23. Compare Montresor's journal.

24. Hurricane Falls.

25. The cabin of Natanis.

26. At Arnold Falls.

27. Probably at Eustis dam.

28. Probably Black Cat Rapids.

29. Probably Lower Ledge Falls.

30. Probably Upper Ledge Falls.

31. Hendricks.

32. Probably at the mouth of Alder Stream.

33. Probably Upper Shadagee Falls.

34. At this point comes in the MS. a blank sheet; but the entry for the next day shows what the resolutions were.

35. "Sartigan."

36. Sarampus Falls, probably.

37. Lower Pond.

38. Bag Pond.

39. Long and Natanis Ponds.

40. Round Pond.

41. Horse Shoe Stream.

42. Lost Pond.

43. Horse Shoe Pond.

44. Mud Pond.

45. Arnold Pond, formerly called Moosehorn Pond.

46. Except Lost Pond.

47. Or Getchell. Undoubtedly Getchell is intended.

48. Arnold River, called in 1775 the Seven Mile Stream.

49. Or Sartigan. Just below, "Lake Magantuck" signifies "Lake Megantic."

50. The lacuna should doubtless be filled with the word "Excellency."

51. Great Falls.

52. At the Lesser Falls.

53. Known now as the Du Loup.

For further explanations, consult the text and notes which precede.



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eastward A
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Arrowsic Islar
Augusta, *see* F
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of expeditic
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ical note, 2
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for (see C
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
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